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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the theoretical and empirical evidence for a 
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and financial characteristics. 
An empirical analysis is performed to examine the Australian evidence for such a 
relationship, from a financial asset perspective. CSP data provided by Corporate. 
Monitor Pty. Ltd. are used in the analysis. Specifically, available measures of 
environmental, social and governance performance of 237 Australian companies are 
compared with selected financial asset characteristics, including firm size, book-to­
market value, financial performance and risk, covering the period between July 1997 
and August 2003. Evidence of relationships is sought using bivariate correlations, 
group comparisons and multivariate regression models. The analysis allows for 
heterogeneity in CSP-financial characteristics relationships, related to firm size, 
trading history and industry. 
Findings indicate that governance performance is most strongly related to 
financial characteristics, followed by social performance, whereas environmental 
performance is in general not strongly or consistently related to financial 
characteristics. Very strong and consistent evidence is found of a negative relationship 
between risk and all categories of CSP, although such relationships are again strongest 
for corporate governance. Strong evidence is found of a positive relationship between 
financial performance and governance performance ( and to a certain extent social 
performance), which is concentrated among recently listed companies, large 
companies and constituents of an industry group containing banks, diversified 
financials, insurance companies and telecommunication companies. Environmental 
and social performance is found to be contingent on size and industry, whereas 
governance performance is found to be contingent predominantly on size. However, 
the causes of the relationships between environmental and social performance and size 
are suggested to be different from the causes of the relationships between governance 
performance and size. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The traditional firm, which evolved with the popularisation of capitalistic economics 
during the industrial revolution, had one responsibility and objective: To maximise the 
economic wealth of its owners within the constraints of the law. Not so the contemporary 
firm. The contemporary firm is not only expected to assume economic and legal 
responsibilities, but also ethical and discretionary responsibilities toward society. 
Consequently, whereas the traditional firm was evaluated solely on its financial performance, 
the contemporary firm is also evaluated by its corporate social performance (CSP). There is 
no unique explanation as to what exactly is embedded in this term, but a general interpretation 
is that CSP measures a firm's ability and performance in meeting public expectations of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), which encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary responsibilities a firm may assume (Carroll, 1979). 
The question of whether managers should be expected, or indeed allowed, to pursue 
CSP as part of their corporate objectives has been passionately debated since the early 1900s, 
when this idea first sparked controversy among scholars and practitioners. The possible 
consequences of pursuing CSP have been examined from the perspectives of political 
ideology (should business managers be allowed to make value judgements on social issues 
management?), social welfare (is the pursuit of CSP actually beneficial to society?), agency 
theory ( do managers and shareholders have conflicting CSP objectives?), and shareholder 
wealth (does the pursuit of CSP affect shareholders' financial wealth?). This thesis examines 
CSP from the latter perspective, investigating the link between CSP and financial asset 
characteristics. 
The theoretical and empirical case for a relationship between CSP and financial 
characteristics, and particularly financial performance, has been explored vigorously since the 
early 1970s, yet no common consensus has been reached on whether or why a particular type 
of relationship may be expected or exists in practice. Empirical evidence is largely 
inconsistent, and gives no unique indication of whether such relationships are positive, 
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negative or neutral. That said, there is comparatively stronger theoretical and empirical 
support for a positive relationship between CSP and financial performance, and for a negative 
relationship between CSP and risk. 
Several scholars have pondered the possible reasons behind the inconsistency in 
empirical findings. A common argument is that it is a result of great inconsistencies in the use 
of data and in methodology and research design (Ullman, 1985; Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
The literature review presented here confirms that the empirical literature is extremely 
inconsistent in use of data and methods, but although an attempt is made to establish whether 
certain types of data or methods result in certain findings no such patterns are detected. Two 
possible explanations remain. Either there are no consistent relationships between CSP and 
financial characteristics, implying that reported results are found simply by chance, or a 
hitherto undiscovered pattern exists, but cannot be found unless the correct methodology is 
employed. 
As might be expected, scholars have supported the latter explanation and begun a 
renewed search, not so much towards the simple answer to whether there is a relationship 
between CSP and financial characteristics, but rather towards the answer as to when and 
where particular relationships are likely to exist. In other words, scholars appear to an 
increasing extent to suggest that there are no unique CSP-financial characteristics 
relationships, but that they depend on certain factors, referred to here as CSP-financial 
characteristics contingency factors. 
1.2 Why Is Research on the Relationship Between CSP and 
Financial Characteristics Important? 
Beside the personal satisfaction some may find in proof that it 'pays to be good', or 
alternatively that it 'pays to be bad', evidence of whether, how and when CSP is related to 
financial characteristics is of great importance to managers, investors and regulators. 
If contemporary managers are expected to pursue CSP, as they appear to be to 
varying extents, managers need to know how this may affect their firms and how CSP affects 
1 1  
financial performance and risk. As it is, managers may appear to treat the pursuit of CSP as a 
philanthropic strategy, which in effect furthers managers' personal political objectives rather 
than those of shareholders (as argued by Jensen (2002), among others). Since no clear 
message is provided to managers in terms of whether or not they should pursue CSP, 
managers need information on whether the pursuit of CSP can be credibly justified as a 
strategy furthering the wealth-maximising objective. 
Recent years have seen an increased interest in socially responsible investment 
(SRI), which may be defined as an investment strategy that takes into account a company's 
CSP as well as its financial performance when selecting and managing investment portfolios 
(FTSE, 2005). Evidence on whether there are trade-offs or synergies between CSP and 
financial performance will be important to investors who seek to maximise personal financial 
wealth before social welfare. From a financial asset perspective, it is also interesting to find 
out whether CSP is linked to certain financial asset characteristics and investment styles. This 
is particularly important to SRI fund managers, who need to understand how high-CSP 
portfolios behave and to market these products to investors. 
Lastly, the truth about CSP and financial characteristics should be important to 
regulators. Regulators must consider how markets self-regulate and internalise negative 
externalities of production. In markets where it "pays to be good", firms are likely to pursue 
CSP as a strategy towards wealth maximisation. In markets where it does not "pay to be 
good", it is likely that regulators or government may wish to intervene to prevent market 
failures. 
1.3 The Approach and Significance of the Present Study 
The present study will make a significant contribution to the existing literature for 
the following reasons. Firstly, the existing empirical evidence is based almost exclusively on 
U.S. data. The present study presents much needed evidence from the Australian market. The 
literature suggests that CSP-financial characteristics relationships depend on factors that 
change over time and differ across markets. This renders the existing evidence only partly 
useful for an Australian audience. 
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Secondly, existing research typically samples only the largest firms in the relevant 
market. The present study uses a large sample representative of a large spectrum of Australian 
companies. The CSP and financial asset characteristics of 237 companies are investigated, 
covering a large bulk of the 300 largest and most frequently traded companies in Australia. 
This is a substantial sample given that half of the existing evidence is gathered based on 
samples of less than 85 companies. 
Thirdly, much of the existing research is based on CSP measures that are often 
questionable in quality. For example, many studies use aggregate measures of CSP covering 
many separate areas that arguably ought to be investigated individually rather than in 
combination, or measures that are so specific that they become impractical as indicators of 
CSP. Some older studies also use CSP measures that are based on managers' self-assessment, 
and which therefore are subject to obvious bias. The present study uses publicly available 
agency-produced CSP measures covering three distinctive areas, namely environmental 
impact, social impact and corporate governance. 
Fourthly, existing research typically uses crude and un-adjusted measures of 
financial performance. The present study uses various measures of financial performance that 
are consistent with contemporary conventions in the evaluation of financial assets, including 
the Sharpe Ratio, Jensen alpha and benchmark-adjusted performance. Other measures 
relevant in the evaluation of financial assets, and therefore included in the analysis, are style 
characteristics, including size and book-to-market value, and risk, including total risk and 
market beta. 
Lastly, existing research typically lacks the allowance of heterogeneity in CSP­
financial characteristics relationships across different types of firms. The present study makes 
an important contribution by incorporating some CSP-financial characteristics contingency 
factors into the research design, and demonstrating that some CSP-financial characteristics 
relationships are contingent on size, trading history and industry group classification. 
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1.4 The Structure of This Thesis 
This thesis consists of five further chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the CSR debate, and 
is important because it provides the background for why the term CSR exists, why it has 
become so important in recent years, and why the virtues and vices of CSR are so 
passionately debated by scholars and practitioners. It presents the political cases for and 
against including CSR in the corporate objective function, and theories of how CSP and 
financial characteristics may be interrelated. 
Chapter 3 provides a critical analysis of the existing empirical research on the 
relationship between CSP and financial characteristics. Fifty-five studies reporting on such 
relationships are identified and critically analysed as a body of literature. Reported findings 
are compared with use of data and research methodology in search of possible sources of the 
aforementioned inconsistencies in reported findings. 
Chapter 4 discusses the data and methodology employed in the empirical analysis. 
CSP data for the empirical analysis was initially collected from two sources, namely 
Corporate Monitor Pty. Ltd. and Reputation Management Pty. Ltd .. The CSP data from these 
two sources are compared and contrasted in Chapter 4, focussing on rating methodology, 
format and the statistical properties of the data. A justification is presented for why the data 
from Corporate Monitor are preferred to that of Reputation Management, and therefore 
exclusively included in the empirical analysis. The Corporate Monitor data are then 
investigated in detail. The sample selection process is described in detail, and the statistical 
properties of the selected sample are provided. The choice of included financial variables is 
then discussed along with how these are measured, and the statistical properties of the 
financial asset characteristics of the sampled companies are provided. 
The last part of Chapter 4 discusses the methodology employed. First, possible 
methods of allowing for industry-related heterogeneity in CSP-financial characteristics 
relationship are discussed and evaluated. The present study employs an approach where 
industry groups are constructed and analysed as individual samples. Seven industry groups 
are constructed for this purpose, using a framework based mainly on Rowley and Berman's 
(2000) list of possible important CSP-financial characteristics contingency factors. Second, 
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the five specific analytical methods employed are discussed in detail. These include 
investigations of bivariate correlations between CSP and financial asset characteristics, 
comparisons of portfolios of firms with different CSP, models where financial asset 
characteristics are regressed on CSP, models where CSP measures are regressed on financial 
asset characteristics, and an extended asset pricing model where CSP measures are added into 
a conventional three-factor asset pricing model. 
Chapter 5 reports the results of the five specific analyses in turn, and then discusses 
the implications of these findings. The latter part of this chapter includes an attempt at 
explaining the evidence provided, and a suggestion of how this evidence is significant for 
managers, investors, SRI fund managers and regulators. The limitations of the study are 
summarised, and relevant topics for future research are suggested. 
Chapter 6 concludes by providing a very brief summary of what has been achieved 
in the present study, what this evidence implies and why this research has been worthwhile. 
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2 THE CSR DEBATE 
This chapter explores the questions of whether, why and how business is expected to 
include CSR as a part of their corporate objective function, referred to here as the CSR 
debate. The CSR debate takes place across several disciplines of the social sciences for two 
reasons. Firstly, it relates to underlying ideologies of society that define the business-society 
relationship in different economies and at different points in time. Secondly, these issues 
affect the validity of fundamental theories of the firm and how firms are expected to maintain 
their legitimacy and succeed within society. 
Contemporary business philosophy and the perception of what responsibilities 
business is expected to assume has evolved with society from the beginning of modem 
civilisation, and especially since the emergence of the industrial economy in the 1800s. 
Carroll (1979) describes four types of responsibilities that business may assume and has 
assumed throughout history, including the economic responsibility of maximising wealth for 
the owners, the legal responsibility of abiding by the rules and legislation of the society in 
which the firm operates, the ethical responsibility of abiding by the norms and values of 
society that are not necessarily codified in law, and the discretionary responsibility on issues 
for which society has no clear-cut message for business. 1 Where on this hierarchy of 
responsibilities a firm is expected to venture depends on the society in which the firm 
operates. As will become evident when discussing CSR in a historical context, the 
responsibilities business are expected to assume have differed quite dramatically through the 
ages. 
The economic responsibility of wealth maximisation has been the primary objective 
of the traditional firm that evolved following the industrial revolution in the late 1800s. 
However, important societal changes during the 1900s introduced the idea that business also 
has social responsibilities. This, combined with the idea that economic and social 
responsibilities may be interrelated, appears to have resulted in ambiguity in the corporate 
objective function (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; Levitt, 1958). The focus of the present 
1 While wealth may refer to more than just financial wealth (such as health, life expectancy and happiness) this 
term refers solely to financial wealth throughout this thesis. 
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study is on how social responsibilities appear to be related to the economic responsibilities of 
the firm. It seems evident that this is the most important issue underpinning all parts of the 
CSR debate. 
The question of how business meets public expectations of CSR relates to the area 
of social issues management, which now holds an important position in the management 
literature (see for example Carroll, 198 1; Luthans, Hodgetts, & Thompson, 1990; Post, et al., 
1996). While it is important to appreciate how and why social issues management theory 
emerged, this is not the focus of the present study. A brief discussion is provided comprising 
the development of stakeholder theory, which has been important in the development of social 
issues management and the contemporary conceptualisation and interpretation of CSR. 
An empirical analysis is undertaken to examine the financial case for including CSR 
in the corporate objective function. Hence, the focus here is on the case for and against 
including CSR in the corporate objective function, on the interrelationship between social and 
purely economic responsibilities, and on the ambiguities that arise from such 
interrelationships. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, the background for the traditional 
firm is discussed in brief, focussing on what responsibilities have been expected of, and 
assumed by, business up until the 1970s. Secondly, more recent developments during the last 
half of the 20th century are discussed with particular emphasis on the significant societal 
changes that took place during the 1970s, 80s and 90s, and describing how the contemporary 
concept of CSR emerged. Thirdly, the significance of CSR from the contemporary firm's 
perspective is discussed. 
2.1 The Traditional Firm 
At first glance the contemporary CSR literature can create an impression that the 
concept of CSR is a relatively new one, and that the CSR debate evolved during the last three 
decades (see for example Freeman, 1984; Krumsiek, 1997). This suggests that the 
contemporary conceptualisation of CSR is formed on the basis of these recent societal 
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changes, but this does not mean that the CSR debate was non-existent prior to this. The 
following sections are provided as a historical background to the traditional firm. 
2.1.1 The Background to the Traditional Firm 
A historical Background/or Contemporary Business Philosophy 
Moore ( 1950) divides the history of business philosophy into five phases: The pre­
business capitalism period (before 1 100 A.D.), the petty capitalism period (1 100- 1300), the 
mercantile capitalism period (1300- 1800), the industrial capitalism period (1800- 1900) and 
the financial capitalism period ( 1890- 1933) (these are both part of the same phase, according 
to Moore (1950)), and the national capitalism period (1933-present). Carroll (198 1) and 
Luthans, Hodgetts and Thompson (1990) both use Moore's (1950) framework to provide a 
comprehensive historical background for the contemporary CSR debate. The limited scope of 
the present study permits only a brief description of how business has developed through 
these stages. 
It has been suggested that although there is evidence of business activity having 
taken place during the pre-business capitalism era, business did not flourish (Carroll, 198 1;  
Luthans, Hodgetts and Thompson, 1990). The conduct of business was often guided by 
religious beliefs and social affiliations in ancient cultures of the pre-business capitalism 
period. One of the most advanced cultures of this period was classical Greece. It was in 
classical Greece that early ideas of democracy were developed based on the ideas of Aristotle 
(384-322 B.C.) (Gaarder, 1991; Roberts, 1995), and it is arguably from these underlying 
ethics that modem western society has evolved. Although the ancient Greeks were at the 
forefront of development of philosophical and political subjects, they failed to recognise the 
potential of commerce. In short, they perceived trade as a 'low-brow' activity reserved for the 
lower-class citizens. They did however have high expectations of the standard of morality in 
trade, and were particularly opposed to the idea of material gains from business being used at 
the discretion of business people, without regard for the community (Carroll, 198 1 ). 
During the petty capitalism period (1 100- 1300), business became more integrated 
into society and was treated as an important part of it, establishing the foundations of our 
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present society. The petty capitalists were small business people, such as merchants and 
shopkeepers, and they were individualists. They stressed the importance of independence, 
self-worth, and achievement through individual effort and they believed in democratic 
economic equality. During this time, however, the Catholic Church was extremely pervasive, 
powerful and influential in defining the code of conduct for business. Hence, it was the 
Church that defined the social responsibilities of the petty capitalists, and the Church viewed 
the profit motive as anti-Christian, thus upholding an anti-business attitude (Carroll, 198 1).2 
During the mercantile period ( 1500- 1800) the petty capitalists ventured into 
international trade, probably prompted by the discovery and colonisation of several 'new 
worlds'. The state recognised the economic benefits of manufacturing and trade and 
developed an important role in financing and subsidising business, and business recognised 
the benefits of government support. Hence, the economic philosophy of mercantilism 
introduced the beginning of a mutually beneficial interrelationship between government and 
business. The Church also lost some of its previous monopoly on control of the state, 
catalysed by the protestant reformation and the Calvinist movement. This close protectionism 
of business provided by the state did however prove unsuccessful in the end, and the first 
arguments for 'lassez-faire' capitalism were suggested by the Frenchman Francois Quesnay, 
and later developed by Adam Smith in "The Wealth of Nations" ( 1776). This new idea proved 
to be an important development in the next phase (Carroll, 198 1 ). 3 
The fourth phase comprises two parts. Industrial capitalism ( 1800-1900) brought a 
changed attitude towards work and profits. In sum, the capitalistic ideas popularised by 
Adam Smith were adopted wholeheartedly and unreservedly, fuelled by a new 'cultural 
2 In particular, the Church condemned the idea of increase in wealth from trade, as well as the practice of usury. 
St. Thomas Aquinas is the originator of the concept of just price, which he defined as the price at which both 
parties were satisfied (much like the later introduced concept of a free market equilibrium price). The underlying 
philosophy was that the merchant should earn just enough to maintain his standard of living. Any practice that 
improved the merchant's  standard of living was regarded as dishonourable and sinful. Usury, or the practice of 
lending money with an interest charge for its use, was also deemed sinful, since no man could demand 
ownership over time because all time belongs to God (Carroll, 198 1  ). 
3 Carroll ( 1 98 1 ,  p 1 3) explains that mercantilism eventually failed "because it tried to keep uneconomic 
enterprise alive, because it curbed individual initiative, because it buried itself in bureaucratic red tape, and 
because it fostered wars and trade rivalries that eventually destroyed the markets it was trying so hard to create". 
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trinity' of the market ethic, protestant ethic, and liberty ethic.4 These ethics applauded self­
regulation and enterprise, and condemned the autocratic power that the state and the Church 
had previously held over business. 
Moore ( 1 950) suggests that these three ethics set the stage for the industrial 
revolution and the growth of business. The industrial capitalist was faced with few regulatory 
or moral constraints, and was free to pursue profits and economic expansion. The 'robber 
barons' represent the extremity of unscrupulous conduct, and this era arguably represents the 
closest humanity has ever been to a pure capitalist society. The ruthlessness in business 
conduct in regards to the poor treatment of workers, customers and suppliers has been blamed 
partly on the acceptance of what was later termed Theory X. Theory X holds that humans are 
simple beings who are basically lazy, will shun responsibility whenever and wherever 
possible, and are motivated only by economic incentives (Luthans, Hodgetts and Thompson, 
1 990). 5 Social Darwinism was being practised in business to its fullest extent, and 
competition was extremely fierce. It has been suggested that at this time business assumed 
absolutely no responsibility for society. 
The extreme conditions which resulted from the ruthless conduct of industrial 
capitalists was somewhat curbed by the emergence of the financial capitalists ( 1 890- 1933). 
The financial capitalists started forming large business trusts, which made it easier for all 
companies to exist and survive. Examples of such trusts were the huge Standard Oil 
Company, put together by J.D. Rockefeller, and the giant U.S. Steel Corporation formed by 
J.P. Morgan. As businesses grew into large corporations and gained monopoly power they 
were capable of pricing below cost in order to drive out any competition. This resulted in a 
great economic instability driven by dramatic fluctuations in prices. The unstable economic 
conditions, monopolistic pricing schemes, and the "public-be-damned" attitude by the large 
corporations led to a falling trust in Adam Smith's ' lassez-faire' theorem. The 'invisible hand' 
4 Behind the market ethic was the ' lassez-faire' view of Adam Smith, based on his argument that society is better 
off without any government intervention in a system where competition serves as a self-regulatory 'invisible 
hand' .  The protestant ethic originated in the new protestant view that work itself was sacred ("to work is to 
pray"), and that it was man's duty to use his God-given talent or calling in life and make the most of his abilities. 
The liberty ethic originates in John Locke's anti-autocratic philosophy, positing that autocracy upheld by royalty, 
aristocrats, or the church is a hindrance to an industrialised society (Carroll, 1981  ). 
5 This assumption was challenged by the emergence of modern human psychology, which is partly attributed to 
Maslow's works (see for example Maslow, 1 998), and which had significant implications for management 
theory. 
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clearly was not working to the best interests of society, and this may have played a part in the 
stock market crash of 1929 and the depression that followed in the 1930s (Luthans, Hodgetts 
and Thompson, 1990). 
The last phase of national capitalism ( 1933- present) arguably came as a result of 
'lessons learnt' from the failure of the 'lassez-faire' system. John Maynard Keynes proposed a 
new economic theory in 1936 arguing that government intervention through fiscal and 
monetary policy could act as an economic stabiliser. The role of the government as a regulator 
of economic activity was hence implemented. Several new laws were passed in the US (and 
elsewhere) to impede undesirable conduct such as anti-trust activity, monopolistic behaviour, 
and false advertising. Later came legislation to regulate specific industries. This does not 
indicate any significant change of motivation on the part of corporations, however. The 
improved business conduct that resulted from these changes is suggested to have resulted 
from legal constraints rather than humanistic motivations, and corporations were not expected 
to take part in community affairs or concern themselves with social issues. Fair treatment of 
labour was generally taken care of by the growing position of labour unions, whose existence 
in time became protected by law and also later accepted by governments and businesses as a 
fruitful institution which took care of many of the social responsibilities that otherwise could 
have been forced onto businesses themselves ( as they have been, to some extent, in recent 
times) ( Luthans, Hodgetts and Thompson, 1990). The increasing role of the government as a 
regulator continued into the 1970s, at which point regulation reached a new level as the public 
became much more aware of social issues, demanding new legislation to restrain acts of 
inequality and discrimination based on race, gender, religion or ethnic background, as well as 
the negative externalities of consumption and production (Carroll, 198 1; Freeman, 1984; 
Krumsiek, 1997; Luthans, Hodgetts and Thompson, 1990). 
Fundamental Theories of the Traditional Firm 
Fundamental theories of the firm appear to be based on the traditional firm 
(Zingales, 2000). Hence, fundamental theories of the firm appear to be deeply rooted in the 
capitalistic definition of business and its role within society. That is, the traditional firm exists 
as a means of combining labour and capital with the objective of creating value (Zingales, 
2000). Firms are owned, and hence controlled, by their shareholders. Managers are therefore 
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agents acting on behalf of, and in the best interests of, shareholders. Hence, managers hold 
obligations only to shareholders, and obligations to society therefore lie in upholding these 
responsibilities within the legal boundaries defined by the legal system (Friedman, 1962, 
1970). Moreover, it is generally assumed that shareholders of the traditional firm gain utility 
only from wealth. Managers are therefore faced with the very definite objective of 
maximising shareholder wealth. Hence, in the traditional view, CSR (insofar as CSR does not 
maximise shareholder wealth) represents theft by management pursuing self-interest 
objectives with money that is not theirs to spend (Friedman, 1962, 1970). This in effect 
assumes that there are no positive synergies between firms' economic and social 
responsibilities. 
This particular view of the firm has been defended with much gusto since the ideas 
of capitalism were adopted by the industrial capitalists in the 1800s (by for example 
Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; Levitt, 1958), although the view of what responsibilities 
government has in regulating business has changed dramatically. The underlying theory of the 
firm, in terms of its core responsibility being to maximise shareholder welfare, appears to 
have prevailed until this day. At least, no alternative objective appears to have taken its place 
entirely. This must be borne in mind when evaluating arguments that have been raised over 
the past century for and against the adoption of CSR as part of the corporate objective 
function. 
2.1.2 CSR Before the 1970s 
Heald ( 1957) provides a discussion of CSR in a contemporary historical context. He 
argues that examples of the integration of social responsibilities in business started to emerge 
over the period when the financial capitalists took over from the industrial capitalists during 
the 1880s and 1890s, with the new large corporations taking on philanthropic roles by means 
of charitable giving and financial support for employee activities such as the YMCA. 
The increased attention to CSR provided by the financial capitalists significantly 
improved the welfare of certain constituents of society, especially in terms of workers' 
welfare. There was an increase in the interest and attention on the part of management to 
safety and sanitary conditions in its plants and to payments for accidents, retirement and 
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death. Heald (1957) suggests this was a direct result of labour unionism, public opinion and 
political pressures, and implied "an obligation on the part of management for the health and 
welfare of those most directly affected by its operation" (p. 377). 
A factor that contributed to this improvement was the increasing size of large 
companies (as described by Carroll, 198 1; Luthans, Hodgetts and Thompson, 1990). The 
larger size of these companies forced their management to realise that their success depended 
on the approval of the general public. One example is Theodore N. Vail, leader of the Bell 
System in the US, who realised that his company assumed many of the characteristics of a 
public utility and therefore that government intervention was inevitable. Vail therefore 
welcomed this regulation and attempted to "humanize the corporation in the eyes of the 
public". So successful were his attempts that he was later ranked as one of the first U.S. 
leaders to "appreciate the problems of public relations in a farsighted way and to find a basis 
for their long term adjustment" (Long, 1937, quoted by Heald, 1957, p. 378). In hindsight, 
this is perhaps the first instance of proactive behaviour in a CSR context. 
Heald (1957) suggests that the first World War added to the general tendency of 
businesses taking on social responsibilities : 
"Not only did the war call forth in extraordinary measure a spirit of self­
sacrifice and service to the nation, it also imposed demands for massive social 
assistance programs. [ ... ] Even after the enthusiasm and need of the war years 
relaxed, [business' financial] support remained a policy of many, though far 
from all business firms. Post-war conditions brought a decline but not an end 
to the acceptance of these new responsibilities" (p. 379). 
Heald (1957) adds that 'service' emerged as the new buzzword in the 1920s, 
although the meaning of the word was largely defined in accordance with managers' own 
views on the nature and limits of their social obligations. Some managers were more 
committed than others. Some, such as Owen D. Young of the General Electric Company, 
argued that large companies have an obligation beyond profit making, and that corporations 
should strive to become "good citizens", and that service had precedence over profit. Henry 
Ford agreed with the notion of firms holding certain responsibilities, but differed with Young 
23 
in that he stressed that .firms must meet their economic obligation first, and then their other 
obligations. His reasons were largely grounded in capitalistic ideology, and his interpretation 
of 'service' was to increase welfare by increasing production and providing work and goods 
to the public (Heald, 1957). 
Heald ( 1957) thus tells the story of a contemporary conception of CSR which 
originated with the financial capitalists of the late 1800s, and gained support through the 
social issues that arose during the Great Depression of the 1930s. He creates an impression of 
CSR still largely gaining support through the 1940s and 1950s. Nevertheless, the adoption of 
CSR has consistently met with criticism. 
Early Criticism of CSR 
The integration of social responsibilities in business that emerged with the financial 
capitalists spurred a fierce debate on whether or not CSR should be included in the corporate 
objective function. The earliest reference to such criticism appears to be Ghent, who already 
in 1902 criticised this new trend for its similarity to the economic feudalism of the Middle 
Ages, and who argued that CSR was being used as a tool for forestalling public criticism and 
regulation rather than from an actual concern for social issues (as reported by Heald, 1957). 
Similar but more specific arguments have since been provided by Levitt (1958), Friedman 
(1962; 1970) and recently Jensen (2002). Ghent did admit, however, that the idea of 
businesses taking some responsibility for society could be fruitful, but that the 
implementation of the idea thus far was imperfect (Heald, 1957). 
Marshall ( 1970, p. 20) suggests Theodore Levitt represents "one of the first and 
most severe voices of criticism of the corporate responsibility to be heard in business circles". 
His 1958 paper titled "The dangers of social responsibility" presents passionate criticism of 
CSR, with arguments well rooted in the political ideologies of individualism, democracy and 
capitalism. Levitt (1958) does not mince words in his critical examination of how CSR is, and 
should be, incorporated into management's responsibilities. 
Levitt (1958) suggests CSR to be a "fashion accessory" of self-interested 
businessmen, whose priorities are not as much the health of the businesses they are paid to 
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manage, or the welfare of society, as the pursuit of their own objectives as individuals, be it in 
terms of personal political agendas or self-realisation. In spite of suggesting self-interest to be 
the main objective behind CSR, Levitt (1958) also provides an argument for CSR as a 
profitable strategy. The problem is the practice of 'dressing up' conventional profit-making 
objectives as philanthropic, when they clearly would not be pursued if they were not 
profitable. In other words, the only ethical approach to CSR, according to Levitt ( 1958), is to 
pursue CSR when profitable, but to also admit the real objective behind any socially 
responsible activities, which is profit. 
Levitt (1958) also warns against the dangers of pursuing ambiguous corporate 
objectives, such as those implied by CSR, rather than the well-defined traditional objective of 
profit maximisation. He argues that as soon as the corporate objective function includes CSR, 
this leaves managers with the luxury of making value judgements on which social issues to 
pursue and which not to pursue. In effect the multiple objective function reduces to the single 
objective of maximising the manager's utility. This argument is exactly what Jensen (2002) 
provides 46 years later. In other words, this issue appears unresolved to this day. (Jensen's 
criticism is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2.2.) 
The strongest part of Levitt's (1958) argument is perhaps his adamant reminder of 
the importance of separation of the responsibilities of the public and private sectors. Levitt 
(1958) emphasises that, in order to produce a society built on ideas of democracy and freedom 
it is imperative to create and maintain a pluralistic, rather than monolithic, system. Put simply, 
the functions and responsibilities of business and governments are separate and they need to 
be kept separate. Levitt (1958) argues that it is undemocratic and therefore unethical for 
managers to assume any authority on how social issues should be dealt with. Managers hold 
no right to assume such a role and have no expertise in dealing with these issues, and they are 
therefore not likely to succeed in such a role. Hence, any attempt by managers to take on 
other roles besides that of the profit-maker is bound to fail. On the larger scale, if a separation 
of private and public sector responsibilities and functions is not maintained, the consequences 
will, according to Levitt (1958), be dire. He warns of companies assuming a role in society 
similar to the medieval Church, describing this scenario as the beginning of a fascist regime 
where business moulds society rather than the other way around. 
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Friedman ( 1962) is widely regarded as the originator of, or at least the main 
spokesperson for, the arguments that Levitt (1958) provided four years earlier. Friedman 
(1962) gives little specific acknowledgement to others throughout this book (so it is difficult 
to determine exactly from where the ideas expressed in it originate). He does however make 
an acknowledgement in the preface of his book outlining some scholars who have contributed 
to forming the arguments he presents. The titles he mentions reveal that these are views 
deeply based in individualism. 
The notion of changing societal values across time and across cultures is relevant to 
the CSR debate because it seems plausible that the decision on how firms should treat the 
CSR problem (which here refers to the approach to including CSR as a part of the corporate 
objective function) depends on the governing political climate, which differs across 
economies and over time. Davis (1973) presents a case for business holding a social contract 
with society, and therefore existing only on the legitimacy of society. Hence, firms that do not 
operate in accordance with societal values will eventually lose their legitimacy to exist and 
will fail to survive. If business exists on the legitimacy of society, it follows that business 
must look to the governing political climate, which should reflect the public opinion, in search 
of an answer to the CSR problem. It may not be as simply dealt with as Friedman (1962) and 
Levitt (1958) propose. 
This said, the argument for separation of responsibilities of the private and public 
sector is strong. One of the fundamental rules of democracy is that the decision, on behalf of 
others, of what is right or wrong should not be made at the discretion of managers or anybody 
else but by a democratically elected government. It is the government's responsibility to 
translate the opinions of the majority into policies and laws that reflect these, and no other 
entity has any moral authority over anybody else. Strictly speaking, any manager or 
individual who assumes authority on ethics is therefore acting in conflict with democratic 
ideals. Although much of the developed world operates under democratic ideals, the levels of 
government intervention in the business sector differ across countries. 
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2.2 Towards a New Theory of the Firm 
2.2.1 Recent Developments in the Business-Society Relationship 
The previous sections provide a backdrop for the evolution of the contemporary 
CSR debate as it developed along with important societal changes during the last decades of 
the 20th century. In the 1950s there was great confusion in terms of what should be considered 
the responsibilities of business. It seemed the trend was for managers to increasingly focus on 
''the common good", although there was no available theory on why this was the preferred 
conduct, let alone how, and at what costs, such objectives should be pursued. This prompted 
many to question the ethics of CSR. 
From the 1970s onwards there has been a significant rise in stakeholder activism. 
Krumsiek (1 997) and Shepard, Betz and O'Connell ( 1 997) both attribute this rise in 
stakeholder activism to heightened awareness of social issues in general. It is suggested that 
the catalyst for this change was the emergence of a new demographic in the U.S. population, a 
segment of the Baby Boomer generation dubbed the "cultural creatives", suggested to be at 
the forefront of this heightened social awareness and social activism.6 Alongside these forces, 
the informational revolution spurred an increased thirst for, availability of, and acquisition of 
information on health, environment, and labour issues. Krumsiek (1 997) suggests that 
contemporary individuals are much more aware of the consequences and externalities of 
consumption and production, both in the way these affect them directly or indirectly, and their 
concern for how these may affect others. It appears likely that these forces of change 
prompted the development of stakeholder theory, which presented a theoretical framework for 
how business and the communities it operates within and around are affecting each other. 
Krumsiek (1 997) describes a transfer of welfare responsibilities from government 
bodies to corporations: 
6 This idea is attributed to sociologist Paul H. Ray (1997). According to Ray, the 'cultural creatives' represent 
nearly one-fourth of all American adults and are found in all social groups. They tend to be "affluent, well­
educated, and on the cutting edge of social change" (p. 29). This segment is described as the people involved in 
the Vietnam protests and the sexual revolution, and in general those who grew up questioning many of the rules 
and norms of the establishment. Consequently, these people, aided by technological advances such as the 
Internet and prompted by their thirst for knowledge of all aspects of consumption and production, have become 
"information junkies"; always searching for more information on all aspects of business, society and the 
environment to better understand how their consumption affects their lives (Ray, 1997). 
27 
"With the end of the Cold War and the era of big government in decline, the 
private sector is poised to influence all aspects of society; political, financial, 
and moral. By choice or necessity, business is taking responsibility for a 
broader set of roles, from job training to child care" (p. 26). 
This indicates a change away from the traditional business-society relationship, 
which had a strong grounding in individualism and capitalism, and towards a view where 
some of the roles of government as a regulator have become much stronger. Further, some of 
the responsibilities of dealing with externalities and 'social ills' have been transferred from 
government to business (which is exactly what Friedman (1962; 1970) and Levitt (1958) 
argued so adamantly against). 
Shepard, Betz and O'Connell (1997) argue that the rise in stakeholder activism 
manifests itself in the growing number of activist stakeholder organisations, in the form of 
lobbying groups and special interest groups and organisations, which are often helped by 
outside groups and the media in promoting change in the management of corporations. Such 
activist groups are described as having resulted in "the routinization of distrust in the form of 
controls and sanctions (accountability mechanisms) that range from negative publicity to legal 
proceedings" (p. 1003). They further suggest that such control mechanisms work in three 
ways, "by increasing access to information concerning corporate activities and products; by 
specifying desired outcomes; and by increasing [stakeholders'] pressures for participation in 
decision-making and the regulatory-control process" (p. 1003). 
As a consequence of all this change in the cultural and political climate, the last 
three decades have seen many instances of companies being forced to pay some of the social 
costs associated with their operations as a direct result of stakeholder activism. For example, 
in 1 996 Exxon was sentenced by a U.S. District Court to pay USO 5 billion to cover clean-up 
costs related to the 1989 Valdez oil spill. This was on top of the USO 900 million that Exxon 
was already paying in damages and fines. Texaco paid USO 176 million to settle a racial 
discrimination class action lawsuit in 1996. The British tobacco company B.A. T. revealed that 
its legal costs from tobacco liability cases totalled USO 160 million in 1996 alone (Krumsiek, 
1 997). All of these cases are examples of externalities to some extent becoming 'internalised' 
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as social costs of business operations have become private costs borne by the corporations. 7 
These are only the explicit costs of irresponsible behaviour. Implicit costs by loss of 
reputation and public goodwill are also likely to be considerable (sometimes even greater than 
the explicit costs, as is suggested by Zingales (2000)), and add to the total cost of such 
behaviour. 
The societal changes that appear to have increased the significance of CSR in recent 
times arguably also explain the increased significance of SRI (Krumsiek, 1997). While CSR 
reflects the expectations of all stakeholders in terms of the obligations of business, SRI 
reflects such expectations of shareholders in particular. Hence, SRI is more specific than 
CSR, but has particular importance in this context because it implies that shareholders may 
value CSR as well as wealth. This is important because the traditional firm holds obligations 
first and foremost to shareholders, and SRI therefore carries implications of how managers 
should uphold their fiduciary duty as agents. The increased significance of SRI is manifested 
in the strong growth in SRI, especially in terms of SRI funds, which is observed in many 
developed economies in recent years. (For a discussion of the development of SRI in 
Australia, see The Allen Consulting Group (2000)). 
This discussion of significant recent societal changes is relevant to the question of 
how CSP and financial characteristics are related. Such changes have implications for 
fundamental theories of the firm, which do not fully incorporate the importance of stakeholder 
relations and valuable implicit contracts firms may hold with various stakeholders, including 
society as a whole (Zingales, 2000). Recent developments appear to imply that the debate on 
what responsibilities business should assume is not as important as the question of how 
economic and social responsibilities are interrelated. This appears to be the issue that has 
spurred the development of newer perspectives of the contemporary firm, in terms of how it 
operates, remains competitive and survives. 
7 Beauchamp's ( 1 989) "Case studies in business, society, and ethics" provides in-depth analyses of many cases 
on stakeholder activism concerning issues including gender discrimination, product safety standard, unfair 
dismissal for whistle blowing, advertising to children, false or misleading advertising, chemical waste, animal 
testing, and advertising health threatening substances. 
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2.2.2 The Emergence of New Theories 
The emergence of stakeholder activism in the 1970s appears to have given further 
support to the idea that business holds obligations to various groups in society, and must 
uphold these obligations in order to survive. Put another way, the idea of business holding a 
social contract with society, where the legitimacy of its existence rests on public assent 
(Davis, 1973), becomes relevant because it explains why such societal change must be 
reflected in the fundamental theories of the firm. Note that the adoption of this idea is not 
equivalent to the condemnation of the idea of wealth maximisation as a primary objective of 
the firm. Such misinterpretation appears to have been blamed most frequently on Friedman's 
(1962; 1970) arguments against the adoption of CSR, since he in effect defines CSR as non­
wealth maximising behaviour (Walters, 1977). In recent years many have argued that CSR 
may well harmonise with the wealth-maximisation objective, and even that CSR may in 
certain cases be a necessary (but not necessarily a sufficient) condition for wealth 
maximisation (Davis, 1973; Frooman, 1997; Jones, 1980; Moskowitz, 1972, 1997). Hence, 
positive synergies between economic and social responsibilities are implied. 
The emergence of new theories, such as stakeholder theory, can be viewed as a 
manifestation of the changing theory of the firm in terms of how firms may succeed. More 
recent theories suggest that the firm is defined as more than just a facility where labour and 
capital are organised to produce output, instead defining the firm as a complex system of 
relationships between constituents where the success of the firm depends on the quality of 
these relationships and how well they are managed by the firm (Zingales, 2000). 
As has been discussed, the emergence of CSR as part of the corporate objective 
function has been heavily criticised. Beside the political arguments that CSR is anti­
democratic, this criticism also pointed at the concept of CSR being too vague and subjective 
to serve as an objective for management (Friedman, 1962, 1970; Levitt, 1958). Jones (1980) 
argues that this is not a valid argument against the concept of CSR but rather a statement 
recognising the need for a social issues management theory. Jones (1980) argues that, granted 
that corporate managers do have a responsibility to constituent groups other than 
shareholders, managers are faced with five important questions: Who are these groups, how 
many of these groups must be served, which of their interests are most important, how can 
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their interests be balanced, and how much corporate money should be allotted to serve these 
interests? Four years after Jones' ( 1980) plea for a theory of how stakeholder relationships 
may be managed, Freeman (1984) introduces and popularises stakeholder theory, which 
effectively addresses the first four of Jones' (1980) questions. 
The Principles of Stakeholder Theory 
Although the popularisation of stakeholder theory is typically attributed to Freeman 
( 1984), Freeman himself attributes the foundation of stakeholder theory to ideas proposed by 
Adam Smith in 1759, Berle and Means in 1932, and Barnard in 1938. Freeman claims that the 
actual word "stakeholder" first appeared in the management literature in an internal 
memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963. The stakeholder concept was 
originally defined as: "those groups without whose support the organization would cease to 
exist" (p. 3 1  ), and included shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and 
society. It was argued that "unless executives understood the needs and concerns of these 
stakeholder groups, they could not formulate corporate objectives which would receive the 
necessary support for the continued survival of the firm" (p. 32). 
Freeman (1984) suggests that this idea further spurred development in four areas, 
namely corporate planning, systems theory, corporate social responsibility, and organisation 
theory, all of which have contributed to the development of strategic management. Relating 
this to the CSR debate, these theories seem to have a basis in the idea that firms are complex 
social institutions rather than simply facilities where labour and capital are turned into goods 
and services by means of logical, rational and efficient processes. 
Freeman (1984) redefines stakeholders as "any group or individual who can affect, 
or 1s affected by, the achievement of a corporation's purpose. Stakeholders include 
employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, environmentalists, government and 
other groups who can help or hurt the cofl'oration" (p. vi). Freeman (1984) works from this 
basis, having defined and identified the possible stakeholders to the firms, and presents a 
method and reasoning for how and why relationships between the firm and these stakeholders 
may be managed. He thereby provides a new perspective on how firms may operate, where 
the focus is always on the interdependency between the firm and its environment. Freeman's 
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( 1984) stakeholder theory may be regarded as an inevitable theoretical development that 
naturally evolved as the business environment became increasingly complex. 
Freeman's ( 1984) stakeholder theory presented an answer to the questions posed by 
Jones (1980) (with the notable exception of the fifth question). The need to address these 
issues appear to be a result of the significant changes in the business operating environment 
which evolved over the preceding period, challenging the validity and usability of many other 
theories which are based on the underlying theory of the traditional firm (Zingales, 2000). 
Freeman (1984) does not seem to place much importance on the link between CSR 
and stakeholder theory. When explaining how CSR relates to stakeholder theory he states that 
the concept of CSR was spurred by the concept of SRI, which deals specifically with the 
relationship between the firm's management and owners (it may however seem more likely 
that SRI was a result of public expectations of CSR). However, it is on the basis of 
stakeholder theory that CSR has been given new and more explicit interpretations. Hence, 
although stakeholder theory and the CSR debate developed independently of each other, 
stakeholder theory was quickly adopted as a theoretical foundation for a contemporary 
conceptualisation of CSR. The two concepts are almost inseparable in the more recent 
literature (see for example McWilliams & Siegel, 200 1; G. Moore, 200 1; Rowley & Berman, 
2000; Ruf et al., 200 1; Ullman, 1985;  Waddock & Graves, 1997b ). 
Some Implications and Extensions of Stakeholder Theory 
CSR has been interpreted and discussed in the literature in various ways, spanning a 
wide range of different conceptualisations of CSR that often are based on unarticulated 
underlying ideological views (see for example Friedman, 1970; McWilliams & Siegel, 200 1; 
Post et al., 1996). This makes the CSR literature extremely difficult to systemise and 
summarise and contributes to the difficulty in defining CSR. In particular, Freeman's (1984) 
ideas on stakeholder management have been developed further and provide important links 
between CSR and various theories of the firm. The most significant of these appear to be the 
link between CSR and valuable implicit contracts, further linking to transaction cost 
economics, and the resource-based view of the firm. Hence, stakeholder theory appears to 
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have developed in its own direction. Some suggested implications of stakeholder theory are 
now discussed. 
Ruf et al. (2001) draw a direct link between CSR and stakeholder theory when 
suggesting that CSR is equivalent to "meeting the demands of multiple stakeholders" (p. 143). 
Similarly, Waddock and Graves ( 1997b) suggest that CSP actually measures the quality of a 
corporation's stakeholder relations. Ruf et al. (2001) also suggest a link between stakeholder 
theory and valuable implicit contracts, arguing that "Stakeholder theory posits that firms 
possess both explicit and implicit contracts with various constituents, and are responsible for 
honouring all contracts" (p. 145). While explicit contracts are legally enforceable, implicit 
contracts are not. Implicit contracts are described as self-enforcing relational contracts, which 
"become self-enforcing when the present value of a firm's gains from maintaining its 
reputation ( and, therefore, future terms of trade) is greater than the loss if the firm reneges on 
its implied contracts" (p. 145). 
Ruf et al. (200 1) thereby suggest that Freeman's (1984) stakeholder theory can be 
complemented by both transaction cost economics and the resource based view of the firm. 
Transaction cost economics implies that "firms that satisfy stakeholder demands or accurately 
signal their willingness to cooperate can often avoid higher costs that result from more 
formalized contractual compliance mechanisms ( e.g. government regulation, union 
contracts)" (p. 143- 144). Ruf et al. (200 1) argue that the concept of CSR may also be better 
understood from a resource-based perspective, focussing on the resources that firms use in the 
production of goods and services and how the uniqueness of these resources provides 
monopoly power and hence economic profit. A resource-based perspective of the firm implies 
that "firms view meeting stakeholder demands as a strategic investment, requiring 
commitments beyond the minimum necessary to satisfy stakeholders. By strategically 
investing in stakeholders' demands, firms gain a competitive advantage by developing 
additional, complementary skills that competitors find it hard to imitate" (Ruf et al., 2001, p. 
144). Hence, skill in stakeholder management may represent a valuable and unique resource 
to the firm. 
The transaction cost and resource-based perspectives are not dissimilar. One talks 
about contracting costs and one about the value of resources. A resource-based view is 
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possibly a bit more general, because contracts are assets, but assets are not necessarily 
contracts. The important point is that resources include both tangible and intangible resources, 
and intangible resources include skills and reputation. CSR relates to intangible resources that 
may be valuable to the firm and hence its shareholders. 
CSR is thus linked to the firm's ability (1) to lower transaction costs by lowering 
contracting costs and (2) to capitalise on unique resources. These abilities are linked with the 
quality of the firm's stakeholder relations, and the quality of a firm's stakeholder relations is 
the very definition of CSP, according to Waddock and Graves (1997b). 
2.3 The Significance of CSR from the Contemporary Firm 
Perspective 
2.3.1 The Contemporary Firm 
The contemporary firm has been forced to adapt to a new environment of ever­
increasing complexity, having to keep track of rapid changes in public expectations, and faced 
with an apparently unresolved problem of ambiguous corporate objectives. Consequently, the 
contemporary firm is different from the traditional firm in how it operates and how it may be 
expected to succeed in remaining competitive and generating wealth for shareholders whilst 
maintaining its legitimacy to operate within society. 
Zingales (2000) explains how the contemporary firm differs from the traditional 
firm, and how such differences appear to have emerged. He explains that it is important to 
understand and appreciate this evolution because it needs to be reflected in all disciplines 
within the broad field of business studies. This includes issues such as defining a firm and 
what its objectives, rights and responsibilities are; in other words, defining business' place 
within society. Zingales (2000) argues that, if the underlying theory of the firm changes, then 
this forces the subsequent disciplinary theories to change in order to accommodate the new 
theory of the firm, otherwise we are left with theories that are no longer valid and that cannot 
be trusted for application in the contemporary real world. 
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Zingales (2000) describes a business environment that has undergone enormous 
change over the last 40 years, and a set of business theories that is trying hard to catch up. He 
argues that the traditional view of the firm was modelled on the traditional business 
corporation that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, describing the traditional 
firm as being predominantly asset-intensive and highly vertically integrated with a tight 
control over its employees secured by a hierarchical system of authority. In contrast, the 
contemporary firm is held together with 'a looser form of collaboration' and with human 
capital as the most crucial asset (Zingales, 2000, p. 1624). Zingales (2000) argues that, in 
contrast to the traditional firm, the boundaries of the contemporary firm are in constant flux, 
and that these can easily be changed by financing and governance choices. Hence, he argues 
that there is a need for a new theory of the firm. 
However significant these changes in the business environment appear to be, the 
notion that managers are agents who must first and foremost uphold their obligations to 
shareholders appears to prevail. It may be, therefore, that it is not necessary to create a new 
theory of the purpose of the firm, and that what is needed is a new theory of how firms may 
meet these traditional objectives in this new setting of an extremely complex operating 
environment. This is in effect what Jensen (2002) argues. 
Zingales' (2000) description of the emergence of the contemporary firm provides a 
justification for why, in the mid- 1980s, the development of a stakeholder theory was indicated 
and hence provided. The main contribution of stakeholder theory is perhaps that this theory 
was built on real observations of how contemporary firms operate, rather than on more 
restrictive assumptions on how the traditional firm is expected to operate. What stands out in 
Zingales' (2000) argument to highlight the significance of stakeholder theory is his 
description of a change from 'direct control' to a 'looser form of collaboration' and the shift 
from an asset-intensive to a human capital-intensive corporate structure. Stakeholder theory 
provides the model for how a 'looser form of collaboration' between constituents works and 
how these relationships, or what Zingales (2000) later refers to as implicit contracts, may be 
managed. 
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2.3.2 The Importance of Implicit Contracts 
Zingales (2000) argues that the boundaries of the firm, in terms of control and 
valuation, have become blurred. The control of the firm has been gradually shifted from 
management and shareholders to employees, something that was unthinkable for the 
traditional firm. This has rendered explicit contracts between firms and employees very 
incomplete and increased the importance and value of unique implicit contracts. It seems 
probable that it was exactly this trend that prompted the development of stakeholder theory. 
Indeed, stakeholder theory may be viewed as a theory of how and why to manage the 
contractual relationships that the firm holds with its stakeholders, especially implicit contracts 
that may exist (Ruf et al., 2001). 
CSR, stakeholder management and valuable implicit contracts appear to form a 
trinity of contemporary value creation. A link between CSR and the valuation of implicit 
contracts is indicated in Section 2.2.2, via stakeholder theory. What makes Zingales' (2000) 
contribution important is his careful examination of how implicit contracts now hold a more 
significant position in business life than they used to and how this affects the underlying 
theory of the firm and thus every other discipline which rests on the assumptions of this 
theory. 
The notion of the firm as a nexus of contracts has long been an accepted alternative 
view of the firm, which has implications for how firms are valued (Jensen, 2002; Zingales, 
2000). 8 This view posits that the value of the firm is the sum of the values of all existing 
claims on the firm. Whether or not implicit claims or contracts are included in this definition 
has significant consequences for how firms are valued, and, obviously, the greater the 
importance of implicit contracts the greater will be the difference between the firm's value 
when calculated as the sum of the value of explicit claims only versus the value of both 
explicit and implicit claims. Because implicit claims have become so important in later years 
this has made the difference more apparent and provided a great challenge for valuation. This 
is because implicit claims are inherently difficult to value, as they are not tradeable. 
8 The notion of the firm as a nexus of contracts is, according to Zingales (2000), attributed to Alchian and 
Demsetz (1 972) and Jensen and Meckling (1 976). 
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Since implicit .contracts are not legally binding there is no explicit cost involved in 
not honouring an implicit contract. However, breaches of implicit contracts sometimes carry 
significant implicit costs. Since they are not legally binding, the value of an implicit contract 
is directly dependent on the likelihood of the contract being honoured, in the eyes of the 
holder of the contract. The perceived likelihood of an implicit contract being honoured 
depends on the credibility of the promise that the contract will be honoured, and this 
credibility depends on the reputation in honouring such contracts of whoever offers the 
contract. Organisational reputation is therefore often the most precious asset the organisation 
has. Reputation can rarely be purchased for money, and may take years of persistent good 
performance to gain yet it can be lost very quickly at considerable cost to the firm. 9 Zingales 
(2000) links such reputational capital with the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy costs 
when he uses the term 'organisational capital' . 
If the firm is only worth the sum of its explicit claims there is theoretically no loss 
associated with financial distress or bankruptcy. It is only when other claims (implicit claims) 
which have value exist as well that there is a loss associated with financial distress and 
bankruptcy. This cost or potential cost measures the value of the firm's implicit claims. 
Zingales (2000) calls this cost, or the value of implicit claims, a firm's organisational 
capital. 10 As described above, organisational capital is therefore a function of how trustworthy 
the firm is in terms of honouring implicit claims, in the eyes of stakeholders, which again 
depends on the firm's reputation in honouring such claims. 
The growing importance of implicit contracts links both the transaction cost 
economics and the resource-based views of the firm, implying that a reputation for honouring 
9 An example is given by Moskowitz ( 1 997) who describes how Swiss banks, for which reputation has long been 
a crucial asset, lost credibility and social acceptance when it was uncovered that funds held by Jewish families 
who perished in the second World War had been embezzled by bank managers without any attempt to seek out 
surviving relatives to whom these moneys rightfully belonged. The cost to these banks of losing their valuable 
reputation for trustworthiness would have been quite significant, and the price they would have had to pay for 
resurrecting their lost reputation would have been even greater. Zingales (2000) presents an example of Saatchi 
& Saatchi (a large and very successful advertising company) who lost one of their key employees in a dispute. 
The board of directors failed to recognise the true value of the implicit contract the firm held with the employee, 
and suffered a severe financial loss and gained a substantial competitor when this employee started up on his 
own. 
10  Note that this term has been attributed other meanings in the literature. Cornell and Shapiro ( 1 987, p. 8) define 
organisational capital as "the current market value of all future implicit claims the firm expects to sell", whilst 
also acknowledging that other slightly different definitions of this term are used in the literature. This is slightly 
different from the meaning Zingales (2000) attributes to this term, although they certainly seem to be related. 
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implicit contracts may reduce costs and add wealth through development of unique resources. 
Such reputation and unique resources appear to be clearly linked to CSR, and this again 
explains the importance that has been attributed to CSR in recent years. 
2.3.3 Sources of Ambiguity in the CSR Debate 
Jensen 's Critique of the Use of Stakeholder Theory 
So far it has been suggested that although the business environment has changed 
dramatically in recent years, thereby changing the ways in which firms operate and create 
value, the predominant perception of the main purpose of the firm being maximisation of 
shareholder wealth still appears to prevail. Jensen (2002) argues that while wealth 
maximisation should be the only objective of the firm, observation of actual firm behaviour 
suggests the fundamental purpose of the corporation has become ambiguous as a result of the 
adoption of stakeholder theory. Consequently, he argues, there is confusion in our time as to 
what role business has in society and what functions it is expected to serve. 
Jensen (2002) suggests the contemporary firm unreservedly embraced stakeholder 
theory and interpreted its concepts as an alternative to the traditional objective of wealth 
maximisation. He suggests that, "fuelling the controversy are political, social, evolutionary, 
and emotional forces that we don't usually think of as operating in the domain of business and 
economics. These forces serve to reinforce a model of corporate behaviour that draws on 
concepts of 'family' and 'tribe"' (p. 8). This sounds similar to Levitt's (1958) argumentation. 
Jensen's (2002) argument differs in that Jensen more clearly separates objective from process 
when arguing that the quality of stakeholder relations should not be an objective to replace 
wealth maximisation, but that the quality of stakeholder relations may be an important part in 
the process of wealth maximisation. 
The validity of Jensen's (2002) argument that firms' corporate objectives have 
changed is perhaps debatable. The symptoms Jensen (2002) describes may be a consequence 
of managers realising exactly what he himself argues, that wealth maximisation is a complex 
process in today's operating environment, and that wealth maximisation may well depend on 
the quality of stakeholder relations. Managers may therefore find it useful to signal to 
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shareholders and other .stakeholders that they appreciate this and are acting accordingly. It 
may be that normative statements with non-capitalistic ideological undertones have been 
provided in the management literature to suggest that managers should adopt the objective of 
stakeholder management in place of wealth maximisation. Of course, it is also possible that 
some managers have interpreted stakeholder theory as an alternative corporate objective that 
leaves them freer to pursue the interests of other stakeholders, themselves included, and that 
they have interpreted stakeholder theory as a justification for pursuing the interests of these 
stakeholders at a cost to shareholders. Nonetheless, there is no strong evidence to suggest that 
this is an accurate description of how contemporary firms are managed. 
Jensen (2002) argues that stakeholder management fails as a managerial objective 
because it fails to provide a complete specification of the corporate purpose or objective 
function. Although it is suggested here that stakeholder theory was not intended to be a 
contender to value maximisation, it appears that some may have interpreted stakeholder 
theory as at least complementing value maximisation and that a problem of multiple and 
ambiguous corporate objectives may have resulted from this. In that case, Jensen (2002) does 
contribute by providing a reminder of why a single objective is better than multiple 
objectives. 
As Jensen (2002) argues, the performance of a manager pursuing one single 
objective can easily be measured. This is, of course, true as long as the objective pursued is 
objectively quantifiable, measurable and assessable, which wealth creation is. In contrast, the 
pursuit of multiple objectives opens up the possibility of ambiguity, hence presenting a 
measurement problem. Without a primary objective, whatever this may be, managers are left 
without a single reference point to provide a guide for what is to be accomplished, how to 
keep score, and how to measure better versus worse. A managerial objective must involve an 
overriding objective (regardless of how many restrictions are placed on this function) that is 
measurable and one-dimensional, that is, there is no ambiguity in which of two outcomes are 
preferred. This ambiguity problem only exists where the trade-off between the different 
objectives is unknown. This is similar to working out efficient outcomes without identifiable 
indifference or iso-performance functions. It is impossible to make unambiguous judgements 
on performance or efficiency without having identified the trade-off between the factors 
involved. 
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Jensen's (2002) argument is therefore not really that single objectives are always 
preferable to multiple objectives, but rather that multiple objectives do not work unless the 
trade-offs between objectives are known. Jensen (2002) argues stakeholder theory poses an 
alternative objective to the wealth maximisation objective, stating that "stakeholder theory 
says that managers should make decisions that take account of the interest of all the 
stakeholders in a firm" (p. 8). When arguing this he refers to Freeman (1984), although there 
appears to be no assertion in Freeman's (1984) book to imply that stakeholder theory provides 
an alternative corporate objective to the traditional objective of wealth maximisation. The 
underlying assumption appears rather to be that wealth maximisation may depend on the 
quality of stakeholder management. It would therefore be unreasonable to argue that 
stakeholder theory is faulty when it is rather managers' interpretation of stakeholder theory 
that is to blame. 
Nevertheless, if it is true as Jensen (2002) argues, that managers seek to benefit 
multiple stakeholders of the firm without any more specific objective function, this clearly 
will lead to ambiguity in measuring their performance as managers. Jensen (2002) proposes a 
solution to the alleged conflict between stakeholder theory and the value maximisation 
theorem. He proposes what he calls an "enlightened value maximisation" objective, which he 
equates to "enlightened stakeholder theory". The essence of these two terms is that the 
corporate objective is still value maximisation, but with an added emphasis on the possible 
dependency of long-term value maximisation on good quality stakeholder management. 
While Jensen's (2002) introduction of "enlightened value maximisation" is useful 
the idea this conveys is not new. It simply provides the objective function that would be 
implied if it was already established that ( 1) value maximisation is the ultimate objective of 
the firm, that (2) shareholders extract all their value or utility from financial wealth, that (3) 
the value of the firm is a function of various variables including the quality of the firm's 
stakeholder relations, and lastly that (4) there exist positive synergies between the quality of 
the relations that the firm holds with at least some stakeholders and the value of the firm. 
Jensen's (2002) contribution is therefore the allowance of positions (3) and (4), which are 
hypotheses that were not new in 2002 given the evidence provided here. 
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This said, although this idea is not new the terminology is, and these new terms do 
contribute by translating the ideas provided in the CSR literature into more explicit terms. In 
this case, they provide a merger between stakeholder theory and the fundamental financial 
value maximisation position. The question is whether Jensen's (2002) introduction of 
enlightened value maximisation actually provides a practical solution to ambiguities in 
performance measurement, which it does not appear to do. 
Additional Sources of Ambiguity 
It appears that the whole CSR debate, from a financial asset point of view, hinges on 
three issues: (1) To whom does business have obligations; (2) do shareholders value CSR as 
well as wealth; and (3) how, if at all, does CSR relate to shareholder wealth. 
Firstly, there is the question of to whom firms have obligations. The traditional view 
is that they have obligations first and foremost to shareholders. Regardless of changes that 
have occurred during the last two hundred years since capitalism was first implemented as an 
underlying construct of society, firms are still owned by shareholders and managers must still 
act in their best interest as agents for the owners. Although other views are presented, it is this 
view that best describes how firms have operated in the past and arguably also how they 
operate today. Hence it seems permissible to assume this view holds. This view is not 
necessarily in conflict with recent adaptation of stakeholder theory, of CSR being part of the 
corporate objective function or CSR representing a strategy for wealth creation. 
Assuming that firms hold obligations first and foremost to shareholders, the second 
issue is whether shareholders' value only wealth or whether they value CSR as well. The rise 
in shareholder activism and SRI suggests that the interests of some owners may have 
changed, and that some shareholders may indeed be interested in more than just wealth. This 
places managers in a potentially difficult position. The maximisation of shareholder wealth is 
relatively straightforward. The goal is to maximise the market value of the firm. Moreover, it 
is easy to evaluate whether managers are being successful in reaching this goal since such 
success is relatively easy to quantify and compare on a scale. If shareholders indicate that they 
are also interested in beneficial social outcomes, this leaves managers with the responsibility 
of managing social issues of which, it might be argued, they have no expertise, (Davis, 1973; 
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Friedman, 1962, 1970; .Levitt, 1958). 1 1  Moreover, it is extremely difficult to objectively 
evaluate relative performance of managers on theirs success in terms of social issues 
management. This is the main argument against CSR, or the unreserved adoption of 
stakeholder management, as argued by Jensen (2002). 
An approach to social issues management that seems more realistic both in terms of 
actual manager behaviour and feasibility is one where managers seek to maximise shareholder 
wealth via a process that is socially acceptable, responsible or proactive, depending on the 
public expectations faced by the company and the effectiveness with which the company can 
produce CSP. This leads to the third issue of whether and how CSP is likely to relate to 
shareholder wealth. Several theories are suggested in the literature in this regard, summarised 
in Section 2.4 . 
In sum, there is no clear theoretical proof of why CSR should be positively or 
negatively associated with firms' success. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, there is no 
clear empirical proof for the nature of such an association. This said, there is a much stronger 
theoretical and empirical body of evidence supporting a positive such association than there is 
supporting a negative such association. One interesting question that emerges from both the 
theoretical and the empirical literature is whether such CSP-financial performance 
relationships differ across different type of companies. 
2.4 The Implications of CSR as a Part of the Corporate Objective 
from a Financial Asset Perspective 
Performance is relatively easy to define from a financial asset perspective, since it 
must reflect changes in shareholder wealth, via changes in share prices and wealth 
distributions to shareholders over time. In an efficient market all relevant information 
1 1  There appears to be another problem in this context that is not discussed in the l iterature. If shareholders are 
allowed authority on social issues management based on their shareholding, this would mean that influence on 
social issues management depends on wealth (which is probably how welfare management works in practice). 
Hence, large shareholders would be more powerful than small shareholders in deciding how to deal with social 
issues, and non-shareholding constituents of society would hold no power at all. According to democratic ideals, 
all constituents of society should hold equal power in electing how to deal with social issues. If shareholders are 
allowed extra influence, then this may well be deemed unethical. Hence, shareholder activism may well be 
unethical in itself. This argument is perhaps rather extreme, but following Levitt's ( 1958) criticism of the 
democratic ethics of CSR, this argument seems equally relevant. 
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available in the public domain is included when valuing shares. Such information includes 
accounting information, which reflects historical profitability, and news or rumours that may 
form perceptions about future profitability. Hence, accounting data reflect historical ability to 
generate wealth, whereas market data reflect the market's perceptions of future ability to 
generate wealth (Bosworth & Kells, 1998; McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988). The 
following discussions are provided with this in mind. 
2.4.1 A New Type of Performance Measure 
The traditional firm has generally been evaluated only on its economic or financial 
performance. The apparently increased significance of CSR over the recent years has brought 
a new set of performance measures in the form of various CSP measures, designed to measure 
performance on CSR issues. Hence, the contemporary firm is evaluated also on non-financial 
attributes via CSP measures. These attributes include, for example, environmental impact, 
social impact, legal compliance and governance, workplace relations, quality of management 
and corporate philanthropy. These measures, given their prevalence and availability, appear to 
be of some interest to at least some societal constituents. The question posed in this section is, 
what significance does this have from the perspective of the contemporary firm? 
Recall Jensen's (2002) argument that CSR does not belong in the corporate 
objective function because it is impossible to quantitatively evaluate managers' performance 
in CSR. CSP measures do to a certain extent quantify such performance. The problem is, of 
course, that CSP measurement is very subjective. Moreover, the trade-off between CSP and 
financial performance is largely unknown, except from some vague and inconsistent 
indications provided in the empirical literature. However, it does provide a measure of the 
extent to which the firm is operating in concert with public expectations, and hence their 
legitimacy within society. Therefore, to the extent that CSR has significance for firms' 
success, CSP measures may be useful. The question of whether or not firms actually place 
any such interpretative value on CSP measures is not addressed here. Rather, the question is 
whether or not there appears to be any financial incentive to do so. 
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2.4.2 How CSP May Affect Financial Variables 
The CSR literature presents various theories of how and why CSR and CSP may 
affect financial variables. Krumsiek ( 1997), as well as Moskowitz ( 1997), suggests that a 
strong concern for social issues in society is likely to be reflected in business and its viability. 
The success of business may depend, not only on short-run competitiveness and profit­
maximisation, but also on long-run competitiveness. Hence, success is likely to be obtained 
by strategic planning with emphasis on the factors that may affect competitiveness in the long 
run. A relationship between CSR and financial characteristics is thereby indicated. The most 
interesting question in the context of a CSP-financial characteristics relationship is perhaps 
the question of how CSP may indicate ability to create value. This can be indicated by a CSP­
financial performance relationship as well as a CSP-risk relationship. 
It is practical to divide a discussion of how CSP may affect financial variables into 
four parts, namely possible benefits related to CSP; possible costs related to CSP; CSP, risk 
and the cost of capital; and CSP and the financial impact of SRI on the firm. 
Possible Benefits Related to CSP 
CSP will affect revenue to the extent that customers value CSP, which is reflected in 
customer CSP demand via goods and services demand. The idea that CSP is valued by 
customers and therefore has potential to increase consumer and producer surplus has been 
referred to as the "social impact hypothesis" (Preston & O'Bannon, 1997). Customers may 
value CSP for a variety of reasons. As discussed earlier, a heightened awareness of CSR 
issues may be strongly related to the informational revolution of the 1970s, 80s and 90s. 
Consumers today are much more aware of, and interested in, information regarding the effects 
of consumption and production on their own health and welfare, the welfare of society and of 
the environment. As discussed earlier, Krumsiek (1997) suggests that a segment of the baby­
boomer generation, referred to as the "cultural creatives", represents an important driving 
force behind awareness of and demand for CSP, by "combining a serious concern about their 
inner lives with a strong penchant for social activism" (p. 26). In other words, today's 
consumers may have demand for CSP due to concern for their own and others' welfare. A 
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firm's ability to supply CSP may relate to the resource-based view of the firm, as discussed 
earlier. 
It might be added that the amount of information now available to consumers 
regarding the consequences of consumption and production makes decision-making a much 
more complex process than it has been traditionally. Whereas consumption traditionally has 
involved fairly simple decision-making (for example, when buying food the objective would 
be to get as much as possible of the food you like for as small a cost as possible), consumers 
today are faced with ethical dilemmas daily. For example, when buying paper products 
consumers may now choose between unbleached and bleached, and non-recycled and 
recycled varieties. Consumer choice is greater than ever, and this forces some consumers to 
make ethical decisions at nearly every purchase. 
Possible Costs Related to CSP 
CSP may reduce or increase costs. The discussion on the importance of implicit 
contracts for contemporary firms is linked to transaction cost economics (contracting costs in 
particular), which indicates that CSP can reduce costs, thereby increasing profitability (Ruf et 
al., 2001). It is of course also likely that CSP may be costly and is sometimes seen as 
representing an irrecoverable sunk cost. Even if the cost is not sunk, it may require capital that 
sometimes is costly to raise, and the payoff from such investments may be difficult to 
estimate or simply take too long to realise. Sometimes the cost implied in pursuing CSR 
activities is ongoing. Hence, there are many arguments for how CSR activities may increase 
costs. It may therefore be that CSP is not likely to be produced efficiently by small and risky 
firms, which are likely to have less available resources and high capital costs. 
Friedman (1962; 1970) is known in the literature as the most prominent advocate of 
the cost implied by CSR, arguing that managers use CSR as a means to further their own 
social, political or career agendas, at the expense of shareholders. He therefore appears to 
suggest that the costs of producing CSP are sunk costs rather than investment expenditures 
with associated potential future gains. Preston and O'Bannon (1997) call the assumption that 
CSP production represents a net cost to the firm the "trade-off hypothesis". 
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Stakeholder theory provides much of the basis for arguments that high CSP may 
imply lower costs to the firm. Preston and O'Bannon (1997) use the term 'social impact 
hypothesis' when suggesting that failure to meet the expectations of various non-shareholder 
constituents will ultimately result in higher costs and/or lost profit opportunities. McGuire, 
Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) and Ruf et al. (2001) have provided arguments that CSP 
may reduce both explicit and implicit costs. Zingales' (2000) discussions on valuable implicit 
contracts imply that loss of CSP can imply loss of valuable organisational capital, 
representing significant implicit cost to the firm. 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) argue that any explicit costs of CSP, if 
they exist at all, are likely to be minimal and that firms may actually benefit from socially 
responsible actions in terms of employee morale and productivity, which implies lower 
implicit costs of production. This seems a little simplistic, however. It seems very likely that 
some firms face significant costs in producing CSP, especially if this implies significant 
modifications to production processes or would imply changing the nature of the firm's 
business. This may be the case, for example, for nuclear power, uranium mining and tobacco 
companies. It may be very costly for such firms to improve environmental impact, and these 
firms may only pursue CSP to the extent that this is financially viable. Such firms may not be 
financially able to eliminate their environmental impact, but they may be able to reduce such 
impact at an acceptable cost. Other firms may be able to meet CSP demand at a much lower 
cost, finding that activities such as charitable giving, community involvement, the choice of 
particular suppliers, or fair treatment of women and minorities is highly valued by 
stakeholders and is relatively cheap to implement. 
Consumer activism has in many instances proven that firms must look after their 
'social image' as well as their image overall. Boycotts, for example due to the public not 
wishing to support the use of cheap labour in developing countries, or unsustainable use of 
resources, are likely to affect sales directly and significantly. Some industries may be more 
sensitive to such issues than others, that is, some industries may face a higher CSP demand, or 
may belong in what Herremans, Akathapom and Mclnnes (1993) dub 'high social conflict' 
industries. This assumption is supported in the literature, where for example Rowley and 
Berman (2000) suggest that CSP demand is higher for firms with high levels of 'strategic 
exposure'. They suggest that such exposure to potential stakeholder action may arise from 
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firm characteristics, issue conditions, industry characteristics, stakeholder environment, and 
institutional context. (The implications of this suggestion are investigated in more detail in 
Section 2.4.4.) 
Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001, p. 374) argue that CSP may reduce agency costs 
because "CSP can create an organizational expectation of altruism, in which opportunistic 
politicking has no place and, thus, no costs associated with it". If so, firms who are 
particularly prone to such costs will face higher potential CSP benefits. This is the opposite of 
the argument presented by Levitt ( 1958) and Jensen (2002), who argue in effect that agency 
costs will increase as a consequence of managers pursuing CSP. 
In sum, there are theories for CSP being both positively and negatively related to 
revenues and costs. A 'social impact hypothesis' proposes a positive relationship between 
CSP and revenue and also a negative relationship between CSP and costs, a 'trade-off 
hypothesis' proposes a positive relationship between CSP and costs, agency theory proposes a 
possible negative as well as positive relationship between CSP and costs. 
CSP, Risk and the Cost of Capital 
The idea that pursuing CSP may represent better quality management implies that 
pursuing CSP may in some cases serve as a risk management strategy (Waddock & Graves, 
1997b), or, on the other hand, it may lead to higher exposure to public scrutiny hence 
increasing risk (Rowley & Berman, 2000). To the extent that CSP affects perceived risk, and 
to the extent that this risk is priced in the market, CSP may affect a firm's risk premium, 
which affects the cost of capital via a movement along the capital supply curve. Similarly, to 
the extent that CSP affects investors' willingness to hold shares, CSP affects the supply of 
capital by shifting the capital supply curve in a horizontal direction. 
Stakeholder theory, contracting theory and the transaction-cost perspective have 
been used to justify arguments that a negative relationship between CSP and risk can be 
expected because CSP will strengthen explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and its 
stakeholders and therefore reduce the probability of stakeholder action. Higher risk of 
encountering such stakeholder action (including boycotts, strikes, litigation, 'clean-up', or 
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other government intervention) is likely to imply higher uncertainty and variability of returns 
(M. Anderson, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997a). This leads to the hypothesis that there is a 
negative causal relationship from CSP to risk. Obviously, the higher a firm's exposure is to 
such potential harm, the greater will be the potential gain of employing CSR as a risk 
management tool. 
Waddock and Graves (1997a) present a "good management theory", asserting that 
CSP indicates quality of management. Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001, p. 373) elaborate, and 
state that investors and lenders may regard poor CSP as a symptom of poor management, 
because "the firm has not acquired a 'progressive' reputation", and that they therefore will 
perceive firms with poor CSP as riskier investments because of a higher uncertainty and 
variability of future cash flows. Cornell and Shapiro ( 1987) argue that failure to meet the 
expectations of various non-shareholder constituencies will generate market fears, which in 
turn, will increase a company's risk premium. This might imply that firms to whom 
management reputation appears to be important can gain from pursuing CSP via reduced 
perceived and real risk. Conversely, it seems plausible that high CSP may also be associated 
with higher levels of risk, because firms with high CSP may present an invitation to public 
scrutiny, hence increasing a firm's strategic exposure (Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
Hence, some theories have been advanced explaining how CSP and risk may be 
related, and also that CSP may be related to various types of risk. It is useful to distinguish 
between different types of risk because these are hypothesised to relate to return in different 
ways. Portfolio theory posits that share price volatility alone will not affect the value of the 
share, as this risk can be diversified away by shareholders. Therefore, according to portfolio 
theory, the mere smoothing of cash flows will not increase the perceived value of shares, and 
thus, any CSP effect on firm-specific cash flow volatility will not affect the risk premium. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the finance literature has identified three major costs 
associated with higher variability, namely higher expected bankruptcy costs (and costs of 
financial distress), higher expected payments to corporate stakeholders (that is, higher 
transaction costs and contracting costs, and also higher required rates of return required by 
owners of closely-held firms), and higher expected tax payments (for firms faced with convex 
tax schedules) (Smithson & Smith, 1998; Stulz, 1998). 
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Risk management is often more related to minimising the present value of possible 
future expense than related to variability in returns. Smithson and Smith ( 1998, p. 396) 
suggest that "If risk management policies are going to increase the value of the firm, then 
such policies must either reduce the firm's transaction costs or taxes or improve its investment 
decisions". By defining transaction costs as the expected costs of financial distress, they show 
that risk management can modify the firm's probability distribution of firm value. Hence, to 
the extent that CSP may affect the probability distribution of firm value, CSP may add value 
to the firm (Smithson & Smith, 1998; Stulz, 1998). Risk management may produce a more 
narrow-humped probability distribution of firm value, thereby lessening the probability of 
reaching the critical firm value at which financial distress is encountered. 
Cornell and Shapiro ( 1987, p. 12) link financial distress with implicit contracts, and 
thereby to transaction costs, when specifying that "To the extent that the value of the firm 
depends on its ability to sell implicit claims, financial distress is likely to be particularly 
costly, even in cases where bankruptcy remains a remote possibility. If stakeholders suspect 
that financial problems will lead the firm to reduce its payouts on implicit claims, the prices 
of these claims will fall. In some cases, stakeholders may refuse to buy implicit claims at all 
so that explicit contracts will have to be at substantially higher cost". 
The theoretical evidence provided by Stulz (1998) and Smithson and Smith (1998) 
may have significant implications on the pricing of risk, because it implies that some default 
risk is not diversifiable. However, it may well be that this risk is reflected in priced risk 
factors such as the market beta, size or value factor. Some evidence exists to support this 
assumption, indicating that default risk (or distress) is accounted for in the combination of the 
market beta, size and value factors, which are all priced in the market (Fama & French, 1992, 
1993). 
If CSP can decrease the probability of encountering financial distress through large 
abnormal costs associated with stakeholder action, CSP can also decrease perceived and 
actual risk and hence decrease the firm's cost of capital. Note that implicit costs may also be 
added onto the explicit costs of environmental harm, resulting from the loss of reputation and 
organisational capital (referring to Zingales' (2000) definition of this term). 
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CSP and the Impact of SRI on the Firm 
SRI is, as discussed previously, closely related to CSR and CSP, because demand 
for SRI and CSP is likely to arise from the same motivations, namely the public's desire to 
ensure their consumption, production and investment are not conflicting with their values. 
SRI reflects CSP demand from shareholders in particular, rather than stakeholders in general 
(Freeman, 1984). The growth in the SRI industry in most highly developed countries provides 
evidence that social and environmental issues are a concern to some investors. (For a good 
discussion of SRI trends globally and in Australia, refer to The Allen Consulting Group, 
2000). 
SRI and investor activism may imply that at least some shareholders value other 
factors besides financial wealth. This is not to say that shareholders necessarily are willing to 
forego financial wealth in return for CSP, but that they may extract what may be termed 
extra-financial wealth or utility, or the difference between total utility and utility derived from 
financial wealth, from knowing that their investments do not conflict with their values. 
Alternatively, it could be that some investors perceive high CSP firms to be undervalued in 
the market, and that they interpret CSP as important in determining the perceived risk of a 
share or as an indication of superiority in future value creation. 
Investors' willingness to hold shares affects firms' cost of capital. Even if single 
investor's divestment from a firm may not notably affect the firm's cost of capital, a major 
divestment by a large group of investors or a fund manager may have such an effect, shifting 
the capital supply curve leftward (that is, for a given level of return a lower amount of capital 
is supplied). The relationship between investors' willingness to hold shares and firms' cost of 
capital has been discussed in the literature, generally and specifically in relation to SRI. 
Merton (1987) presents a general model where the cost of capital for a firm depends on the 
number of investors willing to hold shares in the firm. Angel and Rivoli (1997) provide a 
theoretical assessment of Merton's (1987) model and conclude that the effect of investor 
ethical screens is not uniform across firms, and argue that large, fast-growing, riskier firms 
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avoided by a large portion of investors may face significant SRI effects. 12  
In summary, there are various arguments for why CSP may affect financial 
performance and risk, both positively and negatively. As has been indicated throughout, it is 
very likely that a CSP-financial characteristics relationship depends on certain factors which 
differ across firms. Such factors are referred to here as CSP-financial characteristics 
contingency factors. Some have argued for the importance of identifying these factors, 
especially because they ideally should be accounted for in CSP-financial characteristics 
research (Rowley & Berman, 2000). Hence, Section 2.4.4 deals specifically with this issue. 
2.4.3 The Question of How Financial Characteristics May Affect CSP 
The majority of CSP-financial performance hypotheses presented in the literature 
suggest such relationships are causal from CSP to financial characteristics. Hypotheses are 
however also presented suggesting such relationships may be causal in the other direction, 
and that CSP can be sourced to financial characteristics. Hypotheses positing that CSP 
depends on firm size are observed most frequently, but other relationships have also been 
suggested. 
Waddock and Graves (1997a) present an argument that larger firms are more likely 
to achieve high CSP than smaller firms, referred to as the "slack resources theory", which is 
equivalent to Preston and O'Bannon's (1997) "available funds hypothesis". These theories 
hypothesise that larger firms achieve higher CSP because larger firms have more resources 
and will allocate more funds towards activities that have a positive effect on CSP. The idea 
that CSP depends on size would imply that CSP is a characteristics-linked variable with little 
time-variation but large cross-sectional variation. Hence, if this hypothesis holds this should 
become apparent when investigating the cross-sectional relationship between CSP and 
12 Merton's (1 987) model is simplified and presented by Angel and Rivoli (1 997) and is expressed 
(l - qk ) 2 Yk = xk8ak 
qk 
where n is the cost of capital for firm k, qk is the fraction of investors willing to hold shares in firm k, xk is the 
weight of the firm in the market portfolio, o is the risk aversion parameter for each investor in the model, and a/ 
is the variance of the firm's return due to firm-specific rather than market factors. 
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company size. This hypothesis has also been interpreted as implying that CSP depends on 
financial performance, since companies that perform well may be more likely to afford 
investment in CSR activities (Preston & O'Bannon, 1997). Since financial performance is a 
time-varying variable as well as a characteristics-linked variable, this would imply that CSP is 
financial performance-linked variable that has time-variation as well as cross-sectional 
variation. 
While it is possible that a positive relationship between CSP and size may 
sometimes be due to the availability of resources, as suggested by W addock and Graves 
( 1997a) and Preston and O'Bannon ( 1997), this may not always be the case. For example, it is 
likely that environmental performance is a virtue that may depend on available resources, and 
that larger companies therefore may achieve higher environmental performance than smaller 
companies. It is however also likely that certain small companies, operating within niche­
markets such as wind-generated energy or waste management, exhibit a natural advantage 
over larger companies due to their specific scopes of production. It is also possible that certain 
aspects of CSP are related to size due to factors other than available resources. For example, 
corporate governance performance is likely to depend on size because larger companies may 
face stronger demand for such performance from regulators and organised stakeholder groups 
representing investors, consumers and employees. Furthermore, large companies are complex 
organisations, and the need for governance is likely to increase with organisational 
complexity. The importance of available funds may therefore not be equal across separate 
types of CSP. 
Preston and O'Bannon (1997) suggest a "managerial opportunism hypothesis", 
developed on the basis of agency theory, which hypothesises a negative causal relationship 
from financial performance to CSP. This hypothesis posits that management will take 
advantage of periods of good financial performance by "cashing in" on profits and reduce 
CSR expenditure to increase private gain, and that management will attempt to offset or 
justify periods of poor financial performance by increasing CSR expenditure. The 'managerial 
opportunism' hypothesis therefore implies a time-variation in CSP. 
The idea that large firms are in a better position to achieve high CSP than small 
firms is supported by arguments that there may be scale and scope economies of CSP 
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production. Mc Williams and Siegel (2001) argue that the production of CSP may exhibit 
scale economies and that larger firms therefore are more likely to achieve high CSP than 
others because the average costs of producing CSP would be less for these firms. They 
suggest that firms also may exhibit scope economies of CSP production, and that more 
diversified firms face lower average costs of producing CSP, due to synergies between several 
lines of business, than firms focusing on a particular industry. Hence, there is an expected 
positive relationship between firms' diversification and the production of CSP, all else being 
equal. 
It is perhaps likely that some types of CSP are more strongly related to firm size 
than others. For example, between environmental, social and governance performance (which 
is the three specific types of CSP investigated in the present study), environmental 
performance, and to a certain extent social performance, is perhaps more likely to be 
contingent on industry and type of company rather than just firm size (although some industry 
constituents are more homogeneous in size than others). Intuitively, it also makes sense that 
governance performance is contingent not so much on industry and type of company as the 
organisational complexity and managerial sophistication of companies, which are likely to be 
determined largely by firm size. Hence, size may be more important, generally speaking, in 
the production of governance performance compared to the production of environmental and 
social performance, for which other factors related to industry are more important ( or at least 
equally important). 
Ruf et al. (2001) provide a link between CSP and valuable implicit contracts, which 
may be extended to a link between CSP and increasingly valuable intangible assets via 
Zingales (2000). If such intangibles are valued by investors but not fully accounted for on the 
balance sheet, this may result in low book-to-market value. Hence, there is a weak link 
between CSP and book-to-market value, but this relationship hinges partly on a weakness of 
accounting practices in terms of including intangibles into the reported book value. 
Previous discussions also provide some indication that CSP may be more expensive 
for firms with high financing cost, which generally implies smaller and riskier firms. If so, 
this would manifest itself in a negative cross-sectional relationship between CSP and risk. 
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Theories of how financial characteristics may affect CSP imply that caution must be 
taken when interpreting results from cross-sectional CSP-financial characteristics research. 
Evidence of significant CSP-financial characteristics relationships may not only be evidence 
that CSP affects financial characteristics, but also that financial characteristics may affect 
CSP. 
2.4.4 CSP-Financial Characteristics Contingency Factors 
As discussed, it seems plausible that the nature and strength of a CSP-financial 
characteristics relationship should depend on certain factors. This has been argued by Chen 
and Metcalf (1980), Herremans, Akathapom and Mclnnes (1993), Marcus and Goodman 
(1986), Rowley and Berman (2000) and Ullman (1985). Rowley and Berman (2000) provide 
an in-depth discussion identifying a comprehensive set of such CSP-financial performance 
contingency factors. Apart from this, the literature only provides very few suggestions on the 
topic. Rowley and Berman (2000) therefore provide an important contribution to the CSR 
debate. 
Rowley and Berman (2000) sort contingency factors into five mam groups, 
including firm characteristics, issue conditions, industry characteristics, stakeholder 
environment, and institutional context. Important factors identified as determining CSP­
financial characteristics relationships include identifiable strong controversies linked with the 
firm's operations, the position in the value-chain (that is, whether the firm supplies to 
institutional or private consumers), the type of product or service supplied, and the degrees of 
perceived risk of harm. This suggests that CSP-financial characteristics relationships may 
differ across groups of companies that differ in terms of these factors. Companies with higher 
exposures to controversial CSR issues are expected to be more likely to exhibit such 
relationships than companies with few such exposures. Companies that supply mainly to 
industries may face different CSP demand to companies that supply to private consumers. 
Companies supplying goods or services which are controversial in themselves, such as 
uranium mining companies, may find it difficult to feasibly align their operations with 
stakeholder values. Lastly, companies supplying goods or services for which the perceived 
risk of harm is high are perhaps more likely to exhibit CSP-financial characteristics 
relationships than companies with low such risks attached to their products and services. 
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Because the empirical analysis of the present study attempts to allow for and 
identify some important contingency factors, a more detailed discussion of the framework of 
Rowley and Berman (2000) is provided in Section 4.3.2. This concludes the discussion of the 
CSR debate and the theoretical case for possible CSP-financial characteristics relationships. 
Chapter 3 discusses the empirical case for such relationships, and assesses the existing 
empirical evidence provided to date. 
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3 A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF A 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CSP AND FINANCIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
This chapter provides a review of the empirical evidence for various CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships, including a critical analysis of the measurement, use and 
interpretation of CSP and financial characteristics measures, and of research design. This 
chapter thus provides part of the justification for the use of CSP measures, financial 
characteristics measures and research methods included in the empirical analysis of the 
present study. 
The body of literature concerned with the empirical evidence for CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships is relatively new. Originating in the early 1970s, this literature 
has expanded rapidly over the following years. Following Bragdon and Marlin (1972), 62 
CSP-related empirical studies have been identified whereof 55 studies report specifically on 
CSP-financial characteristics relationships. The remaining seven studies report on 
relationships between CSP and other non-financial characteristics, and are not discussed 
here. 13 CSP-financial performance relationships are by far the most reported type of CSP­
relationship, followed by CSP-risk and CSP-size relationships. Because of the relative 
importance of CSP-financial performance research, these studies take up most of the 
discussions in this chapter. 
The size of the CSP-financial characteristics literature dictates that a one-by-one 
critical analysis of individual studies is impractical in this context. Relevant studies will 
therefore be critically analysed as a body of literature, with more details provided for studies 
that are particularly interesting in relation to the present study. 
13 Three studies report on CSP-CSR disclosure relationships (Freedman & Jaggi, 1982; F. L. Fry & Hock, 1976; 
R. W. Ingram & Frazier, 1980, reporting no relationship, a negative relationship, and no relationship, 
respectively), Coffey and Fryxwell ( 1991)  report inconclusive evidence ofa CSP-institutional shareholding 
relationship, Moore (2001 )  reports a positive CSP-firm age relationship, Riahi-Belakoui ( 1991 )  reports a positive 
CSP-organisational effectiveness relationship, and Waddock and Graves ( 1 997b) report a positive CSP-quality 
of management relationship. 
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3.1 The Empirical Evidence of CSP-Financial Characteristics 
Relationships 
Fifty-five studies are identified comparing CSP with various financial 
characteristics. A complete list of all identified CSP-financial characteristics studies is 
provided in Table 8. 1 (placed in the Appendices due to its size), detailing industry specificity, 
sample size, sample period, type of CSP measure, type of financial performance measure, 
type of method, extent of adjustment of financial performance variables, and research 
findings. Among these studies, 5 1  studies report on CSP-financial performance relationships, 
seven studies report on CSP-size relationships, 10 studies report on CSP-risk relationships, 
and three report on CSP-book-to-market value (or similar) relationships. 
CSP-financial performance research findings are inconsistent. There is overall 
stronger evidence for a positive than for a negative CSP-financial performance relationship, 
as 27 studies report a positive CSP-financial performance relationship and only four studies 
report a negative CSP-financial performance relationship. Twelve studies report no evidence 
of a relationship, and eight studies report inconsistent results. The studies reporting on CSP­
size, CSP-risk and CSP-value/growth relationships are summarised in Table 3. 1 along with 
type of CSP and financial characteristics measures. 
Although the majority of studies reporting on CSP-size relationships find a positive 
relationship, there appears to be no strong evidence that size and CSP are consistently 
positively or negatively related. There is however reasonably strong evidence for a negative 
CSP-risk relationship. This could provide support for the good management hypothesis 
suggested by Waddock and Graves (1997a), which posits that CSR may represent a risk 
management strategy, lowering the perceived or real probability of encountering financial 
distress and bankruptcy. This also links well with the notion that CSP measures the quality of 
stakeholder relations, thereby reducing the perceived risk of such contracts not being 
honoured, which may in turn translate to a reduction in the perceived risk of the firm overall 
(Cornell & Shapiro, 1987; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001 ;  Waddock & Graves, 1997b). The 
strongest evidence for a negative CSP-risk relationship is found using accounting-based 
measures of risk. 
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Table 3.1: Empirical Studies Reporting on CSP-Financial Characteristics Relationships 
(Other than Financial Performance) 
This table lists details of empirical studies reporting on CSP-financial characteristics relationships, 
other than financial performance relationships, which include relationships between CSP and size, 
risk, and book-to-market value. The table specifies the type of CSP measure, the type of financial 
performance measure, and the research result. 
Financial Type of Reported 
characteristic Authors CSP measure 
Financial 
characteristics 
measure findings 
Size Social No. of employees Positive relationship 
Environment Total assets 
Sales No relationship 
Net worth 
Composite Turnover Positive relationship 
Composite Total assets Positive relationship 
Lerner & Fryxwell 
(1988) 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1986) 
Moore (2001) 
Pava & Krausz 
(1996) 
Spicer (1978) Environment Positive relationship 
Social Negative relationship Stanwick & Stanwick 
(1998) 
Composite Negative relationship Waddock & Graves 
(2000) 
Total assets 
Sales 
Market capitalisation 
Total assets 
No. of employees 
Risk Composite No relationship 
Composite Negative relationship 
Social Negative relationship 
Environment Negative relationship 
Composite Inconclusive results 
Alexander & 
Buchholz (1978) 
Herremans, 
Akathaport, & 
Mcinnes (1993) 
Lerner & Fryxwell 
(1988) 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1986) 
Pava & Krausz 
(1996) 
Market beta 
Variability of market 
return 
Cash receivables/ 
current liabilities 
Debt/equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
Debt/equity 
Interest coverage 
Market beta 
Solvency risk Negative relationship Rockness, Schlachter Environment 
& Rockness (1986) 
Social Loan losses/total losses Negative relationship Simpson & Kohers 
(2002) 
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In terms of reported CSP-book-to-market value relationships, the use of excess 
market value (the difference between market and book value scaled by sales) is here placed in 
the same category as the use of book-to-market value. There is some evidence in favour of a 
negative CSP-book-to-market value relationship, indicating that CSP may be related to 
valuable implicit contracts not accounted for on the balance sheet. 
Some researchers have also reported more specific findings worth noting. 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) found that a positive CSP-financial performance effect 
disappeared when a research and development (R&D) investment intensity variable was 
included in their regression model. This variable may however have served as a proxy for the 
value factor, indicating that the higher financial performance of high CSP firms was due to 
these firms having lower book-to-market values. This is consistent with the findings of Pava 
and Krausz (1996) and Cochran and Wood (1984). Many of the accounting-based measures of 
risk may be interpreted as indicating bankruptcy risk. The fact that mostly negative 
relationships are reported between CSP and these risk measures supports the idea that CSP is 
related specifically to the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). 
The inconsistency in research findings presented here, especially in terms of CSP­
financial performance relationships, corresponds with existing descriptions of the CSP­
financial characteristics evidence. It is suggested to be a result of inconsistency in use of data 
and methodology (Rowley & Berman, 2000; Ullman, 1985). The following sections provide a 
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Environment Negative relationship 
Composite No relationship 
Composite 
Market beta 
Variability of market 
return 
Debt/equity 
Debt/equity Negative relationship 
Spicer (1978) 
Waddock & Graves 
(2000) 
Waddock & Graves 
(1997a) 
Composite Cochran & Wood 
(1984) 
Book-to-market 
value (or 
similar) 
Rockness, Schlachter Environment 
Composite 
Excess market value 
Excess market value 
Book-to-market value 
Negative relationship 
Inconclusive results 
Negative relationship 
& Rockness (1986) 
Pava & Krausz 
(1996) 
critical review of the existing CSP-financial performance evidence, exploring whether certain 
samples, types of CSP data, types of financial data or analytical tools are more likely to 
produce certain research results. 
3.2 Measures, Uses and Interpretations of CSP 
3.2.1 CSP Measurement Issues 
CSR is a subjective term and is therefore difficult to define and interpret. CSP 
measurement is therefore also subjective, as the practical interpretation of social responsibility 
is complex and equivocal. Consequently, CSR and CSP are provided with a wide range of 
definitions and interpretations in the literature. For example, CSP has been defined as the 
quality of a firm's stakeholder relations (W addock & Graves, 1997b) and in terms of the 
firm's reputation for honouring implicit contracts (Ruf et al., 2001). These ideas can be taken 
further, and using Zingales' (2000) ideas CSP may be indirectly linked to concepts such as 
firms' net worth, the value of implicit contracts, or firms' organisational capital. It is arguably 
highly unlikely that CSP measures are actual measures of valuable implicit contracts or other 
similar intangibles, although it may well be that these concepts are related. 
Carroll's (1979) implied definition of CSP appears to be both unrestrictive and at the 
same time specific enough to be useful as a general definition to be used in this and similar 
studies. Carroll (1979, p. 500) suggests that CSR "encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time", 
implying that CSP measures a firm's ability to meet these expectations. CSP is therefore 
subjective in terms of identifying important expectations stakeholders have in terms of 
various CSR issues at different points in time, as well as how performance on meeting such 
expectations is measured. Hence, any empirical CSP-financial characteristics analysis will in 
effect measure the relationship between the specific CSP measure, and hence the underlying 
construct behind this CSP measure, and the relevant financial characteristics measure. 
Irrespective of how CSP can be interpreted, the methodology behind specific CSP 
measures arguably defines how CSP can be interpreted. Rating agencies may construct CSP 
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measures based on different criteria, which means different ratings may convey different 
information. The issues implied in measuring CSP enjoy broad coverage in the CSR literature 
(see for example Abbott & Monsen, 1979; Baucus, 1995; Rowley & Berman, 2000). The 
discussion here is limited to the general features of various types of CSP measures and how 
these features affect the type of research that can be performed using these measures. 
CSP should arguably be measured on separate criteria, as stakeholders are likely to 
have different expectations on separate issues (Rowley & Berman, 2000). For example, 
stakeholders may have different expectations in terms of the welfare of local communities, 
human rights and ethical issues, environmental issues, governance concerns, and health and 
safety concerns. The creation of a complete set of separate CSP measures for every such issue 
would present obvious difficulties, and broader CSP measures covering similar issues are 
therefore often constructed. However, creating and using such aggregate measures is also 
problematic. Firstly, any aggregate CSP measure implies that individual aspects of CSR need 
to be given appropriate weightings according to their importance. Such value judgements are 
implicitly subjective. Secondly, the interpretational value of results is limited because the 
results of the research will not reveal how performance in particular areas are related to 
corporate financial information. It has been shown that CSP measures are not necessarily 
strongly correlated and that they may therefore be related to financial characteristics measures 
in different ways when examined on an individual basis (Kedia & Kuntz, 1981; Rowley & 
Berman, 2000). 
CSP rating agencies provide measures with various levels of specificity. For 
example, the U.S. Kinder Lydenberg Domini rating system provides ratings across eight 
categories (Waddock & Graves, 1997a), as does the U.S. Fortune Reputation Index (Stanwick 
& Stanwick, 1998). The French AReSE rating agency provides CSP ratings across five 
categories (D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 2001). The Australian rating agencies Corporate Monitor 
and Reputation Management provide CSP ratings across three and four categories, 
respectively. In spite of differences in the number of categories covered, rating agencies tend 
to cover similar types of categories, typically distinguishing between environmental, social, 
corporate governance and employee welfare issues. 
6 1  
The way in which CSP measures are described and used in the literature suggests 
that CSP measures are predominantly assumed to be a characteristics-type measures that are 
relatively static rather than dynamic over time. CSP measures may be interpreted as being 
long-term stable because companies' ability to operate in concert with stakeholders' 
expectations hinges on longer-term strategies implemented by these firms (Newgren et al., 
1985), or it may be that such measures are mainly based on the core operations of these 
companies, as implied by Rowley and Berman (2000). While this may be a sound assumption, 
even firm characteristics may be subject to changes over longer periods of time, and CSP may 
change over time both due to changes in firm characteristics as well as changes in stakeholder 
expectations. Hence, the validity of CSP measures is likely to be time-specific at least to some 
extent. 
CSP measures may on the other hand be dynamic also in the shorter-term. For 
example, if reputation is an important determinant of CSP, then all CSP-related news or 
rumours appearing in the public domain may result in short-term adjustments in perceived 
and measured CSP. If this is the case, timing is much more important than if CSP measures 
are treated as static variables that are dynamic only in the longer-term. It will then be 
important to establish the time-period to which the CSP measure refers, especially if variation 
in CSP over time is to be compared with variation in financial characteristics over time. This 
is generally the approach of event-type studies in CSP-financial characteristics research. 14
More recent CSP measures are provided with periodic intervals of differing 
frequency, and may provide a tracking-device of company CSP over time. This may appear to 
be a natural evolutionary tendency. Older CSP measures seem to have been published rather 
infrequently, such as once per year (for the frequently used Fortune Reputation Index in the 
US and the Reputation Management CSP measures in Australia). The more recently 
introduced CSP measures from Corporate Monitor are updated on a monthly basis. 1 5
14 Such event studies include Bromiley and Marcus (1989), Davidson, Chandy and Cross (1 987), Davidson and 
Worrell (1988), Eckbo (1983), Jarrel and Pelzman (1985), McMillan (1996), Pruitt and Peterson (1986), Shane 
and Spicer ( 1983), Strachan, Smith and Beedles (1 983) and Wier (1983). 
15 The introduction of monthly CSP measures could indicate that CSP actually is a short-term dynamic variable. 
However, what appears when investigating the Corporate Monitor CSP measures more closely is that they are, in 
fact, reasonably static over time, and to the extent that they do vary such changes are typically limited to once­
only adjustments in CSP measures over a full two-year period. This does seem to support the notion that CSP is 
a characteristics-type variable that is relatively static, at least in the short to medium-term. 
62 
The distinction between static and dynamic properties of CSP measures is important 
because it determines the type of analysis that may be employed to investigate CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships. If CSP measures generally are static, this means timing is less 
important. On the other hand, this also means that it is virtually impossible to investigate 
causality in CSP-financial characteristics relationships. If CSP measures are dynamic, this 
means timing issues are important and must be dealt with appropriately. However, if CSP 
measures really are dynamic this may facilitate causality testing, which could yield more 
specific information about the nature and causes of CSP-financial characteristics 
relationships. 
3.2.2 Use of CSP Measures 
As the early literature concerning CSR and CSP suffers from the lack of a 
commonly accepted definition of CSR and measure of CSP, researchers often provided their 
own definitions of CSR and constructed the relevant CSP measures themselves. 16
Alternatively, researchers frequently used particular aspects of CSR and CSP in their 
analyses, such as available pollution indices. 17 In the last decade, however, several agencies 
have started providing measures of CSP across various relevant categories. 
The first CSP measures identified in the literature are very simple. For example, the 
first attempt at measuring CSP in the literature appears to have been Moskowitz (1972), who 
identifies a list of companies with positive CSP, thereby creating a dichotomous type of CSP 
measure later used by other researchers for CSP-financial characteristics investigations 
(Cochran & Wood, 1984; Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977). Other examples of dichotomous CSP 
measures are found in the empirical literature that concerns CSR events, such as corporate 
crime and lawsuits (Davidson & Worrell, 1988; Eckbo, 1983; Frooman, 1997; Strachan, 
Smith & Beedles, 1983; Wier, 1983) and product recalls (Hoffer, Pruitt & Reilly, 1988; Jarrel 
& Peltzman, 1985 ; Pruitt & Peterson, 1986). In these cases, corporate crime, lawsuits and 
product recalls are interpreted as negative CSP events. 
16  See, for example, Moskowitz ( 1972); Abbott and Monsen ( 1979); Aupperle, Carrol and Hatfield ( 1985); and 
Parket and Eilbirt ( 1975). 
17  See, for example, Bragdon and Marlin (1 972); Bowman and Haire ( 1975); Fogler and Nutt ( 1975); Coffey and 
Fryxwell ( 1991  ); Frooman ( 1997); Gottsman and Kessler ( 1998); and Simpson and Kohers (2002). 
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Other more recent composite CSP measures used in the literature include the 
Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) CSP ratings (Lerner & Fryxwell, 1988; Pava & Krausz, 
1996), the Fortune corporate reputation ratings (Herremans, Akathaporn & Mcinnes, 1993; 
McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Preston & O'Bannon, 1997; Spencer & Taylor, 
1987), Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) CSP ratings (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Ruf et 
al., 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997a, 1997b, 2000), Business & Society CSP ratings (Heinze, 
1976), the Community Reinvestment Act CSP ratings (Simpson & Kohers, 2002), and the 
French equivalent to KLD (AReSE) CSP ratings (D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 2001). The most 
frequently used environmental performance measure is the CEP pollution index, which was 
one of the first agency-produced CSP measures to be used in CSP-financial characteristics 
research (Bragdon & Marlin, 1972; Chen & Metcalf, 1980; Fogler & Nutt, 1975; Shane & 
Spicer, 1983; Spicer, 1978). 
Apart from the CEP pollution index, other similar available indicators of 
environmental performance are also used (Gottsman & Kessler, 1998; Stanwick & Stanwick, 
1998). Other measures reflecting social performance (rather than environmental performance) 
include charitable giving (Coffey & Fryxwell, 1991; L. W. Fry, Keim, & Meiners, 1982; 
Lerner & Fryxwell, 1988), involvement in South African business (Coffey & Fryxwell, 
1991), fair treatment of women (Coffey & Fryxwell, 1991; Kedia & Kuntz, 1981), employee 
relations (D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 2001; Preston & O'Bannon, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 
2000) and a Community Reinvestment Act rating (Simpson & Kohers, 2002). These studies 
thus explore direct links between performance in specific CSP categories and measures of 
financial performance. 
Some researchers, especially among the earlier studies, have created composite CSP 
measures based on professional and student ratings of the CSP of selected large corporations 
(Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield, 1985; Riahi-Belakoui, 1991; 
Vance, 1975). Two studies also used managers' own assessment of their companies' CSP 
(Newgren et al., 1985; Parket & Eilbirt, 1975). Measuring CSP by survey results may be more 
efficient in reflecting actual public expectations compared to a rating agency, so long as firms 
are assessed externally and not by their own managers. A comparison of results among these 
studies reveals that the four studies using external assessment yielded two no-relationship 
results (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield, 1985), one negative-
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relationship result (Vance, 1975) and one positive-relationship result (Riahi-Belakoui, 1991). 
Both studies using internal assessment yielded positive-relationship results (Newgren, et al., 
1985; Parket & Eilbirt, 1 975). This latter method is subject to obvious bias. 
Although a wide variety of CSP measures is used in the literature some are used 
repeatedly in several studies. If inconsistency of results is linked to differences among 
particular CSP measures this could become apparent in Table 3.2, which lists CSP-financial 
performance studies using common CSP measures. 
Table 3.2 shows that the two studies using Moskowitz' list of CSP-positive firms 
both report evidence of a positive CSP-financial performance relationship. Both studies are 
comparable in terms of significant methodological attributes, except that Cochran and Wood 
(1984) and Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) compare CSP and financial performance using 
regression and group comparison, respectively. 
The two studies usmg CEP CSP measures report conflicting results, despite 
similarities in terms of sample selection. Both studies include accounting-based measures of 
financial performance (Pava and Krausz (1996) also include market measures) and test results 
for statistical significance, but they use different methods and include different control 
variables. Lerner and Fryxwell (1988) use a regression model and control for both size and 
risk, whereas Pava and Krausz (1996) use group comparison without control variables. This 
could imply that the positive relationship found in Pava and Krausz (1996) may have been a 
result of systematic risk factors that are not adequately controlled for. 
The six studies using the Fortune reputation ratings also report conflicting results. 
All studies include accounting-based financial performance measures, and Herremans, 
Akathaporn and Mclnnes (1993) and McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) also include 
market-based measures. The only clear distinction that can be made between these studies is 
that the two studies reporting no relationship do not test their findings for statistical 
significance, whereas the four studies reporting a positive relationship all do, and three of 
these also include some control variables. In this case, inclusion of statistical tests and control 
variables may reveal an otherwise hidden CSP-financial performance relationship, which is 
the opposite of what is observed among the studies using CEP CSP measures. 
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Table 3.2: CSP-Financial Performance Studies Using Common CSP measures 
This table lists CSP-financial performance studies using common CSP measures, detailing the CSP 
measure, type of financial performance measure, and research findings. 
CSP Reported 
measure Authors 
Financial performance 
measure Findings 
Cochran & Wood (1984) Operating earnings/sales Positive 
Moskowitz' 
relationship 
list 
Operating earnings/assets 
Excess market valuation 
Sturdivant & Ginter ( 1977) EPS growth Positive 
relationship 
Lerner & Fryxwell (1988) Inconclusive 
CEPCSP 
PIE, ROI, 
Average growth rate results 
measures Pava & Krausz ( 1996) ROA, ROE, E/P,PIE, Positive 
Total market return relationship 
No relationship 
No relationship 
ROA, ROI, ROS 
ROA, ROE, ROI 
ROA,ROE, Positive 
relationship 
Fortune 
Abnormal market return 
ROA, Sales growth, Positive 
reputation relationship 
ratings 
Operating income 
growth, 
Abnormal market return 
ROA,ROS Positive 
relationship 
Griffin & Mahon (1997) 
Preston & O'Bannon (1997) 
Herremans, Akathaporn and 
Mcinnes (1993) 
McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis (1988) 
Spencer & Taylor (1987) 
Stanwick & Stanwick ( 1998) Profit/sales Positive 
relationship 
Ruf et al. (2001) ROA, ROS, Sales growth Inconclusive 
results 
KLDCSP 
No relationship 
No relationship 
ratings 
Positive 
relationship 
Mc Williams & Siegel (2000) 
Waddock&Graves(2000) 
Waddock & Graves (1997a) 
Waddock&Graves(1997b) Positive 
Accounting profit 
ROA,ROE, 
Total market return 
ROA 
ROA,ROE, 
Total market return relationship 
No relationship 
No relationship 
ROE, E/P 
PIE 
ROE, ROC, Earnings Positive 
CEP relationship 
pollution 
index 
growth, 
EPS growth, 
Total market return Positive 
relationship 
Chen & Metcalf ( 1980) 
Fogler & Nutt (1975) 
Bragdon & Marlin (1972) 
Shane & Spicer (1983) 
Spicer (1978) ROE, E/P Positive 
relationship 
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The five studies using the KLD CSP ratings also provide conflicting results. No 
patterns emerge to suggest a particular source of this inconsistency. The five studies using the 
CEP pollution index as a CSP measure all use industry-specific samples, all including the 
paper industry. Nonetheless, conflicting results are again reported. Again, no patterns emerge 
to suggest this inconsistency can be sourced to sample selection, data or methodology. 
The most consistent findings are found among studies using illegal corporate 
behaviour as a CSP measure. Of the six studies using this measure, five report a positive 
relationship and only one (Eckbo, 1983) reports inconclusive findings. The only factor which 
sets Eckbo ( 1983) apart from the other studies is that this study includes only mining and 
manufacturing firms whereas all the other studies are non-specific in terms of industry. Since 
illegal corporate behaviour is an important aspect of corporate governance this may provide 
evidence of a relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. 
Three studies use product recalls as a CSP measure, reporting conflicting results 
(Bromiley & Marcus, 1989; Hoffer et al., 1988 ; Jarrel & Peltzman, 1985). All three studies 
are industry specific and include the automotive industry. They are all event studies and they 
all use market-based financial performance measures and regression models. 
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Inconclusive 
results 
Positive 
relationship 
Positive 
Illegal relationship 
behaviour Positive 
relationship 
Positive 
relationship 
Eckbo (1983) 
Davidson & Worrell (1988) 
Davidson, Chandy & Cross (1987) 
Strachan, Smith & Beedles (1983) 
Wier (1983) 
Wokutch & Spencer (1987) 
Abnormal market return 
Abnormal market return 
Abnormal market return 
Abnormal market return 
Abnormal market return 
ROA,ROS Positive 
relationship 
Product 
No relationship 
No relationship 
recalls 
Bromiley & Marcus (1989) 
Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1988) 
Jarrell & Peltzman (1985) 
Abnormal market return 
Abnormal market return 
Abnormal market return Positive 
relationship 
There is therefore no consistency of results even among studies using the same CSP 
measures, except for corporate crime. Hence, the reason behind the variety in results does not 
appear to stem from differences in CSP measures alone. The only consistency is found in the 
two studies using Moskowitz' (1972) measure, but this is perhaps hardly surprising since this 
dichotomous measure is merely a list of firms which Moskowitz (1972) considers to be 
socially responsible. The list contains only 14 large U.S. companies. These companies were 
found in both studies to perform better than other companies, but this could be interpreted as 
evidence that the combination of being large, well established and socially responsible is what 
made these companies financially successful. This could well be evidence supportive of the 
"slack resources hypothesis" (Waddock & Graves, 1997a) or "available funds hypothesis" 
(Preston & O'Bannon, 1997), asserting that large firms are more likely to have the resources 
needed to achieve high CSP, just as much as of the "social impact hypothesis" (Preston & 
O'Bannon, 1997) or "good management theory" (Waddock & Graves, 1997a), asserting that 
CSP represents a strategy for improving financial performance. Hence, this evidence should 
not be interpreted as proof that high financial performance is caused by CSP. 
The above discussion concerns specific sources of CSP measures. It is useful also to 
discuss specificity of CSP measures. The use of CSP measures in empirical research can be 
classified into three main categories, namely composite CSP measures, where one CSP 
measure combines performance of several aspects of CSR; multiple CSP measures, where 
measures of firm performance on several specific areas of concern are examined separately; 
and single CSP measures, where measures of CSP on one particular CSR aspect are 
examined. Among the forty-six CSP-financial performance studies where type of CSP 
measure is specified twenty-two studies use a composite CSP measure, seven studies use 
multiple CSP measures, and seventeen studies use a single CSP measure ( of which nine are 
event studies). Specific CSP measures may be sorted into environmental performance, social 
performance and governance performance. 
No patterns exist among these studies to suggest that certain types of CSP measured 
exhibit certain relationships with financial performance, thus not supporting the idea that the 
use of specific CSP measures will produce clearer results (Rowley & Berman, 2000). A 
possible exception is that five out of the seven studies investigating the relationship between 
governance and financial performance found a positive relationship. A closer look reveals that 
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most of these studies measure governance by incidents of corporate illicit behaviour, and that 
the relationships discovered are all negative governance-negative financial performance 
relationships. This provides some evidence that corporate legal responsibility is a necessary, 
although not necessarily a sufficient, condition for good financial performance, as suggested 
by Frooman (1997). 
This position corresponds with Carroll's (1979) model of CSR, where the economic 
and legal responsibilities of the firms represent the more basic of a firm's responsibilities, 
whereas ethical and discretionary responsibilities are more secondary in terms of evolutionary 
importance, and possibly also in terms of importance overall. Modifying this model, it could 
be suggested that, in order to perform well economically, it is a necessary condition that a 
firm upholds its legal responsibilities, and that financial performance in some cases may also 
depend on CSP as a secondary condition. 
3.3 Measurements, Uses and Interpretations of Financial 
Characteristics Measures 
3.3.J Accounting and Market-based Financial Data 
Financial data can be distinguished by the main data source, and are either 
predominantly accounting-based or market-based. A major difference between market and 
accounting data, apart from having different sources, is that market data in essence are 
forward-looking, whereas accounting data are based on historical information (Bosworth & 
Kells, 1998; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988). The most commonly stated sources of 
ambiguity in accounting data relate to the differences between accounting and economic 
measures of profitability and financial performance (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 1999; Bosworth 
& Kells, 1998), and the issue of subjectivity in reporting standards and calculation of 
accounting measures (Bosworth & Kells, 1998; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988). 
The accuracy of market data is limited by investors' ability to value assets correctly 
(McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Ullman, 1985). Consequently, market-based and 
accounting-based financial variables are not perfect substitutes, and reflect different 
information. However, they are closely linked because investors use historical information 
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(reflected in accounting data and accounting-based performance measures) when forming 
expectations about future company earnings and hence determining share prices. Evidence of 
strong links between accounting-based financial variables and market return has also been 
found empirically, beginning with the seminal paper of Ball and Brown ( 1968). 
Bosworth and Kells ( 1998) distinguish between partial and total, and static and 
dynamic, measures of performance. Partial performance measures reflect particular aspects of 
the firm, such as assets, liabilities, or share price return, whereas total measures are designed 
to measure overall performance, such as abnormal or adjusted market return or Tobin's q, 
defined as the ratio of market price to replacement cost (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 1999). Static 
measures present information about the firm at a particular point in time, such as book value 
and market value, whereas dynamic measures have a time-dimension and measure 
performance over specific time-periods, such as market return on shares or return on assets. 
Although the usefulness of partial measures of performance is limited when 
considered in isolation, they are sometimes very useful when investigated together with total 
measures of performance. Important partial measures may include measures of risk, size and 
other firm characteristics by which firms are commonly categorised as financial assets. 
According to Bosworth and Kells ( 1998), only measures which take into account both 
historical information (through accounting data) and expectations about future profits 
(through market data) provide good measures of performance. 
Several studies in the CSR literature have presented theories on the properties of 
various financial variables in the context of CSP-financial characteristics relationships, and 
also theories of what types of financial variables are likely to reveal CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships. Herremans, Akathapom & Mclnnes ( 1993) and Ullman (1985) 
suggest that a CSP-financial characteristics relationship may be more clearly revealed in 
accounting-based financial variables. They argue that if CSP really does affect the 
profitability of the company this will be reflected in reported accounting variables, and that 
this information may not be included in investors' share valuation. This is conflicting with the 
hypothesis of efficient markets, which posits that all relevant and available information is 
considered by investors and incorporated in the share price. 
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One argument for using market-based performance measures is that investors value 
companies ( and shares) according to perceived ability to generate future earnings, hence 
market data may be appropriate when searching for evidence of valuable intangibles such as 
implicit contracts, or organisational capital, which may be linked to CSP. If shareholders do 
not value such contracts (positively or negatively), then market data will not reflect CSP­
financial performance effects. From a financial asset perspective, such a result will indicate 
that CSP has no significance or importance because it does not appear to be related to 
shareholder wealth. 
Measures of risk reflect important financial characteristics. As with performance 
measures, market and accounting-based measures of risk differ, although Orlitzky and 
Benjamin (2001, p. 379) emphasise that they are "not so much two different conceptual 
components of risk as different operationalizations of the same underlying construct". Total 
market risk, which is measured by variation in asset return over time, comprises systematic 
and non-systematic risks. According to portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), only systematic risks are assumed to be priced in the market (that is, these risks 
matter to investors), whereas non-systematic risk is assumed not to be priced in the market 
due to elimination by diversification in asset holdings (that is, these risks are assumed not to 
matter to investors because they can easily be diversified away). This implies that possible 
CSP effects on non-systematic risk will not be observable in share prices, since the type of 
risk affected is not priced in the market. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, some firm­
specific risks have been argued to be important to shareholders and therefore priced in the 
market, such as the risk of encountering financial distress and bankruptcy. These risks are 
suggested to be absorbed by size and book-to-market value in asset pricing models (Fama & 
French, 1992, 1993; Smithson & Smith, 1998; Stulz, 1998). 
3.3.2 Issues in Financial Performance Measurement 
Performance measurement is fundamentally linked to the approach to firm 
valuation. When firms are evaluated as financial assets, as is the case in the present study, 
firm valuation appears quite straightforward. Firm value is the market value of all claims on a 
company's assets, or the total market capitalisation value. Hence, financial performance must 
7 1  
be measured by changes in total market capitalisation, which together with shareholder 
distributions represents changes in shareholder wealth. 
Alternative measures of firm value apart from market value include book value, 
liquidation value, and replacement cost of assets less liabilities (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 
1999). These may be categorised as partial rather than total measures of firm value. Of total 
performance measures based on accounting data, Tobin's q appears to be the most important 
and also the most commonly used (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 1999; Bosworth & Kells, 1998; 
Welch, 2003) (but is not represented in the empirical CSP literature). The information 
conveyed by Tobin's q is similar to that conveyed by book-to-market value (unless leverage is 
important and not otherwise accounted for). 
Appropriate adjustment of financial performance measures is important in order to 
reflect total performance, particularly when constructing market-based performance measures. 
Market return is a partial performance measure in itself, and total market-based performance 
measures should arguably adjust for factors that are commonly found to explain market 
returns. The asset pricing literature is concerned with the identification of these factors, and 
presents evidence that the most important of these factors appears to be the market beta 
(measuring risk related to exposure to fluctuations in the market), size and value/growth 
characteristics (typically based on book-to-market value). 1 8  If these factors are not 
appropriately adjusted for, reported CSP-financial performance relationships may simply 
reflect a relationship between CSP and asset pricing factors rather than a true relationship 
between CSP and total performance. Whereas there is significant theoretical and empirical 
basis for adjusting market-based financial performance measures for systematic market risk, 
size and value, there appears to be no equivalently strong basis for why, and especially how, 
accounting-based financial performance measures should be adjusted. 19
18  The identification of these three factors is typically attributed to Fama and French (1992; 1 993), who provide 
strong evidence that these three factors capture most factors found to explain cross-sectional variation in asset 
returns. For a good and recent review of the asset pricing literature, see for example Campbell (2000). 
19  Two papers include a control variable that is not usually included in financial asset performance measures. 
Mc Williams and Siegel (2000) and D' Artimoles and Trebucq (2001 ,  this study somewhat replicating the method 
of the former study) both include an R&D adjustment factor, claiming that there is a positive relationship 
between R&D investment intensity and economic performance. This may well be true in an accounting-based 
financial performance measurement context, but there is good reason to believe that any R&D effect on return is 
absorbed in the value factor. When calculating total market-based performance measures, the inclusion of a 
value factor is more consistent with asset pricing theory than the inclusion of an R&D factor. 
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3.3.3 Use of Financial Data in the Empirical Literature 
Use of Financial Performance Measures 
Of the 46 identified CSP-financial characteristics studies where type of financial 
characteristics measure is identified, 26 studies use accounting-based measures, 15 use 
market-based measures, and five use both. Accounting-based financial performance measures 
used in the literature are generally partial rather than total, but are often dynamic rather than 
static. The most frequently used measures are return on assets (16 studies) and return on 
equity (11 studies). Other accounting-based variables include return on investment, return on 
sales, earnings-price ratios, price-earnings ratios, earnings per share and various growth 
measures. Market-based financial performance measures used in the empirical literature are 
based on market return, and are therefore dynamic rather than static although use of total 
performance measures adjusting for common asset pricing factors are rare. Hence, 
performance measures are generally dynamic, but not often total, following the terminology 
of Bosworth and Kells (1998). 
The empirical literature provides no indication that CSP-financial performance 
research results are dependent on the type of financial performance measure used. As 
discussed, the use of adjustment factors when measuring financial performance from basic 
share price returns is important. However, the literature presents no indication that research 
findings are dependent on the use of control variables. 
The period of time over which dynamic performance is calculated in the literature 
varies from daily returns tracked around a specific event (see for example Bromiley & 
Marcus, 1989; McMillan, 1996), to very long-term periods covering up to 10 years (see for 
example Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977; Waddock & Graves, 2000). Newgren et al. (1985) 
suggest that CSP-financial characteristics studies are measuring the financial effects of 
strategic planning and management, and that a financial performance measure should include 
at least five years of data since the strategic time horizon is typically five years. Event-type 
studies in particular seek to find shorter-term patterns in the variation of CSP and financial 
performance and use higher frequency data to track variation in returns around an event. 
73 
These studies therefore may not effectively pick up longer-term effects from strategic 
management. 
Measuring Risk 
Various measures of risk are used in the literature, including total returns variability 
(Herremans, Akathapom & Mclnnes, 1993; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Spicer, 
1978) and market beta (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 2001; 
Davidson & Worrell, 1988; Gottsman & Kessler, 1998; Herremans, Akathapom & Mclnnes, 
1993; Hoffer, Pruitt & Reilly, 1988; Jarrel & Peltzman, 1985; McGuire, Sundgren & 
Schneeweis, 1988; McMillan, 1996; Shane & Spicer, 1983; Spicer, 1978; Wier, 1983). 
Accounting measures of risk used in the literature comprise a range of different measures, 
including debt-to-assets ratios (D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 2001; Mc Williams & Siegel, 2000; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997a, 1997b, 2000), various measures of solvency risk (Rockness, 
Schlachter & Rockness, 1986), acid test ( cash and receivables-to-current liabilities, Lerner & 
Fryxwell, 1988) and Altman's Z-score (Pava & Krausz, 1996), which measures bankruptcy 
risk. Note that some of these studies include risk measures only as adjustment factors, and do 
not report CSP-risk relationships. As reported in Table 3.1 (presented in Section 3.1), 
accounting-based measures of risk are more frequently reported being negatively related to 
CSP compared with market-based measures of risk. 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
Sample Size and the Types of Firms Included in Investigated Samples 
The 5 1  studies investigating CSP-financial performance relationships include 
sample sizes ranging from only one company (McMillan, 1996) to 650 companies (Ruf et al., 
2001 ). The average sample size is 145 companies, with a median of 82, indicating that 
although some studies include very large sample sizes most studies use smaller samples. 
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Sample size does affect the usefulness of research findings. However, it is arguably 
also important that the chosen sample is representative of the population which the researcher 
wishes to understand. Hence, even a relatively large sample size will not guarantee useful 
results if the sample is not representative of the population in question. For example, many 
studies use samples of the largest companies in the population. Many of the U.S. studies use 
the Fortune 500 firms (Abbott & Monsen, 1979; J. C. Anderson & Frankie, 1980; Coffey & 
Fryxwell, 1991; R. Ingram, 1978; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Parket & Eilbirt, 
1975; Waddock & Graves, 1997b), presumably because it is easy to obtain a variety of CSP 
and financial characteristics data for these firms. The fact that more data are provided for 
larger firms implies there is some bias in empirical research towards larger companies. 
Smaller companies are typically excluded from selection and, although much evidence is 
provided on CSP-financial characteristics relationships for large companies, very little exists 
on CSP-financial characteristics relationships for smaller companies. The present study 
includes analysis of large and relatively small companies. 
The number of studies providing evidence of a positive CSP-financial performance 
relationship is proportionately higher for studies with a larger sample size, in fact more than 
twice as many positive relationships are found in larger samples than in smaller samples. An 
overwhelming portion of the identified studies is performed using U.S. data. Only two studies 
using non-U.S. data were identified, where one uses French data (D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 
2001) and one uses U.K. data (G. Moore, 2001). This is problematic for non-U.S. audiences, 
as CSP-financial characteristics relationships may differ between countries. Some countries 
may be more in the forefront of CSR awareness than others, and CSP demand is therefore 
likely to differ across countries. 
Industry Specificity 
The identified studies vary in terms of industry specificity, with 30 of the 5 1  studies 
identified using samples that are not industry-specific. Five studies include a selection of 
specific industries, and 1 1  studies investigate single industries (industry specificity could not 
be identified in five studies). Of the studies that investigate CSP-financial performance 
relationships for specific industries, a wide range of industries are represented. These studies 
are listed in Table 3.3. 
75 
Table 3.3: CSP-Financia.l Performance Research Findings Among Industry-Specific Studies 
This table lists CSP-financial performance studies performed within specific industries, detailing the 
industries investigated, the CSP measure, the type of financial performance measure, and research 
findings. 
Financial 
Industries performance Reported 
Study investigated CSP measure measure Findings 
Environmental Positive 
performance relationship 
Product recalls No 
relationship 
Environmental 
ROE,ROC, 
Earnings growth, 
EPS growth 
Abnormal market 
return 
ROE, E/P No 
performance relationship 
Illegal behaviour Inconclusive Abnormal market 
return results 
Environmental PIE No 
performance relationship 
Pulp and paper 
industry 
Car manufacturers 
Pulp and paper 
industry 
Mining and 
manufacturing ind. 
Paper industry 
Chemical industry Environmental No 
Bragdon & Marlin 
(1972) 
Bromiley & Marcus 
(1989) 
Chen & Metcalf 
(1980) 
Eckbo (1983) 
Fogler & Nutt (1975) 
Griffin & Mahon 
(1997) performance relationship 
Automotive industry Product recalls No Hoffer, Pruitt & Reilly 
(1988) relationship 
Product recalls Positive Jarrel & Peltzman 
(1985) 
Automotive industry, 
pharm. industry relationship 
Kedia & Kuntz (1981) Texan banks Social 
ROA, ROE, ROS 
Abnormal market 
return 
Abnormal market 
return 
Income before Inconclusive 
involvement security gains/losses, results 
Air pollution Negative Air-polluting firms 
and nuclear plants relationship 
Composite CSP Negative Supermarket industry 
(UK) relationship 
Chemical industry Environmental Inconclusive 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1986) 
Moore (2001) 
Rockness, Schlachter 
& Rockness (1986) performance results 
Shane & Spicer (1983) Environmental Positive Paper, power, oil, and 
steel industries performance relationship 
Banking industry Social Positive 
performance relationship 
Computer industry Social and Positive 
environmental relationship 
performance 
Simpson & Kohers 
(2002) 
Spencer & Taylor 
(1987) 
Spicer (1978) Environmental 
Taxes/total assets 
ROA,ROE 
EPS growth 
ROA, ROE, ROS, 
turnover, excess 
market value 
Total market return 
ROA 
ROA,ROS 
ROE, E/P Positive Pulp and paper 
industry performance relationship 
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There are advantages of studying CSP-financial characteristics relationships within 
specific industries, since such studies may reveal differences in within-industry relationships. 
Such an approach is consistent with theories that the nature of CSP-financial characteristics 
relationships may differ across industries (Chen & Metcalf, 1980; Herremans, Akathaporn & 
Mclnnes, 1993; Marcus & Goodman, 1986; Rowley & Berman, 2000; Ullman, 1985). If 
industry specificity matters in terms of detecting CSP-financial performance relationships, 
this could become apparent when comparing research results and industry specificity. 
However, no patterns suggest industry specificity matters in terms ofresearch results. 
Sample Period and Timing 
The earliest identified empirical CSP-financial characteristics study is Bragdon and 
Marlin (1972). It is difficult to make historical comparison of empirical results. The theories 
discussed in Chapter 2 imply that the nature of CSP-financial characteristics relationships 
depends on public expectations of CSR. Public expectations do not only vary between 
countries, but also, and arguably more importantly, over time. Topical issues come and go in 
cycles, both because issues become resolved, such as the South Africa apartheid issue, and 
because issues lose public interest from time to time, such as the great surge in concern for the 
greenhouse effect in the early to mid 1990s, which seems to have waned somewhat in more 
recent times without the problem having been resolved. Hence, specific CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships may differ over time, especially for individual firms. Such effects 
would be difficult to identify, but it is possible to investigate research results according to 
sample periods as specified in each study. 
As well as public expectations of specific CSR issues, the level of public 
expectations of CSR overall is also likely to change over time. That is, it could be argued that 
the 'CSP threshold', or the decision criteria for when a firm is deemed socially unacceptable, 
acceptable, responsible or proactive, have increased in complexity over time. It seems 
plausible that firms are expected to assume a higher level of CSR today in order to achieve 
the same CSP compared to what might have been the case 20-30 years ago. Chapter 2 of the 
present study describes how CSR expectations have evolved in recent history, indicating that 
firms in the 1970s achieved high CSP merely by pursuing non-discrimination policies in 
terms of gender, race and ethnicity in their employment processes. In terms of Carroll's 
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(1979) hierarchy of corporate responsibilities, non-discriminatory workplace practices would 
have represented an ethical responsibility in the 1970s, thereby producing above-average 
CSP. However, these responsibilities have since been codified in law in many societies, 
implying that non-discriminatory behaviour is now largely a legal responsibility rather than an 
ethical responsibility, hence such behaviour may not produce the same level of CSP today as 
it would have done three decades ago. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the availability and sophistication of CSP measures 
has also improved over time, as early measures cover single either very specific or very broad 
CSR issues whereas more recent measures cover a larger range of CSR issues with varying 
levels of specificity. 
Methodological improvements also place some restrictions on the validity of 
historical findings in the empirical CSP-financial characteristics literature. The steadily 
improving understanding of what drives asset prices has improved financial models for 
performance measurement. Adjusting for risk in financial performance measures was rare in 
the 1970s; only one of the eight studies published during the 1970s adjusts for risk (Alexander 
& Buchholz, 1978, using beta), whereas this became more common in the 1980s where 11  out 
of 20 studies adjust financial performance measures for risk. Nine of the 17 studies published 
during the 1990s and beyond include some risk adjustment in financial performance 
measures. 
The identification and acceptance of other priced asset characteristics are also 
somewhat reflected in recent CSP-financial performance research. Whereas few studies 
published in the 1970s and 1980s include such control variables, about half of the studies 
published during the 1990s and beyond include control variables other than risk. This is not to 
say that more recent studies are predominantly of good methodological quality and older 
studies are not. Some of the older studies include very good methods consistent with more 
sophisticated CSR theory (for example Spencer & Taylor, 1987), and one of the oldest studies 
(Alexander & Buchholz, 1978) presents one of the few regression models consistent with 
asset pricing models, which at that time meant the original single-factor asset pricing model 
(based on CAPM). 
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Besides being important due to methodological evolution, timing may also be 
important in terms of sample period. More specifically, general economic trends may have an 
impact on reported CSP-financial performance effects, especially if systematic risks are not 
adjusted for in market-based financial performance measures. If, for example, firms with high 
CSP happen to have more or less market risk than firms with low CSP, this could result in 
CSP appearing to be positively or negatively related to stock price returns during certain 
periods of the economic cycle, when in fact this result could be due to market risk not being 
properly adjusted for. More recently published research does appear to produce slightly fewer 
reports of positive CSP-financial performance relationships, and proportionately more reports 
of no such relationship, compared to earlier studies. This could be due to progressively more 
appropriate adjustments of financial performance measures. 
3.4.2 Use of Research Methods 
This section discusses the methods used to investigate CSP-financial characteristics 
relationships in the empirical literature. The method used to compare CSP and financial 
characteristics is important because it reflects the underlying assumptions of the study in 
question. As with the type of data used, the method used places limitations on what may be 
inferred from research findings. 
The Methods Used in Empirical CSP-Financial Performance Research 
Methods used in the CSP-financial characteristics literature can be divided into four 
main types, namely group comparisons, rank comparisons, bivariate correlations, and 
multivariate regressions. Of the 46 studies reported in Table 8.1 where research method is 
identified, 10 studies use group comparisons, three use rank comparisons, seven use bivariate 
correlations, and 26 use some form of regression model. The empirical literature presents no 
indication that certain methods are more likely to yield certain results than others. 
The main weakness of group comparisons in the CSP-financial performance 
literature lies in the frequent lack of adjustment in the financial performance measure. Only 
two of the 10 studies using group comparisons use financial performance measures adjusted 
for risk, and no other conventional adjustments are made in these two studies or any of the 
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other eight. Furthermore, differences between groups should be tested for statistical 
significance. Two of the 10 studies do not test group differences for statistical significance 
(Parket & Eilbirt, 1975; Wokutch & Spencer, 1987). Another attribute of group comparison 
studies is the number of CSP groups used. It is customary to split the sample into low-versus­
high CSP groups, but this ignores the possibility of the so-called inverted U-shaped CSP­
financial performance relationship suggested by Bowman and Haire (1975) and Sturdivant 
and Ginter ( 1977), indicating that firms with moderate CSP outperform firms with high and 
low CSP. 
Four of the seven studies using bivariate correlations do not adjust financial 
performance measures for size or risk. One study (Marcus & Goodman, 1986) uses a size­
adjusted financial performance measure and two (Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield, 1985; 
McGuire, Sungren & Schneeweis, 1988) use a risk-adjusted financial performance measure. 
None of these studies includes adjustments for both size and risk. 
Regression analysis enables investigation of multivariate relationships, which is 
useful in cases where relationships are complex and include several possible variables. 
Regression models are therefore particularly useful where certain factors need to be adjusted 
for in order to isolate a particular relationship between two variables. Regression models are 
also used to examine combinations of variables in terms of their ability to explain variation in 
a certain variable. 
Of the 13 studies using market-based data in regression models, 10 are event studies, 
of which two do not make any size or risk adjustment, and eight adjust for risk only, using 
beta. Of the three studies that are not event studies, one does not make any adjustments and 
two adjust for risk only. Of the 12 studies using accounting measures in regression models, 
six include both size and risk as independent variables, two adjust for size only, and only four 
do not adjust for risk or size. It is perhaps surprising that it is the studies using accounting­
based measures that provide more frequent inclusion of size and risk as control variables, and 
not the studies using market-based measures. 
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Investigation of Causality in CSP-Financial Performance Relationships 
Thirteen studies report on causal relationships. Of these, seven studies find a 
positive causal relationship from CSP to financial performance, although six of these 
investigate short-term CSP-financial performance effects. Waddock and Graves (1997a) find 
causality both ways, and four studies find causality from financial performance to CSP 
(Marcus & Goodman, 1986; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; G. Moore, 2001; 
Preston & O'Bannon, 1997). Hence, evidence exists to support both the hypotheses that CSP 
leads financial performance and that financial performance leads CSP. 
3.4.3 Allowing for CSP-Financial Characteristics Contingency Factors 
Recent theoretical development has suggested that possible CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships are likely to be contingent on certain factors (Chen & Metcalf, 
1980; Herremans, Akathapom & Mcinnes, 1993; Marcus & Goodman, 1986; Rowley & 
Berman, 2000). Little has been done in empirical research design to allow for such 
contingencies, with three notable exceptions (Herremans, Akathapom & Mcinnes, 1993; 
Marcus & Goodman, 1986; Spencer & Taylor, 1987). Marcus and Goodman ( 1986) 
specifically design a method consistent with contingency theory. Although the main objective 
with their study is to find evidence of how firms behave, the study finds evidence of size as a 
contingency factor, in addition to a variable they label "the extent of the problem". 
Two very interesting studies which use methods consistent with the theory that CSP­
financial characteristics relationships are industry-contingent are those of Spencer and Taylor 
(1987) and Herremans, Akathapom and Mcinnes (1993). Spencer and Taylor use a within­
and-between analysis, which examines both within-industry CSP-financial characteristics 
effects, as well as between-industry CSP-financial characteristics effects. There is good 
justification for the use of this methodology. As discussed in Section 2.4.4, if CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships depend on firm characteristics, it is quite possible that firms in the 
same industry will have similar CSP-financial characteristics relationships whereas such 
relationships differ across industries. Findings of these two studies indicate consistent within­
industry CSP-financial characteristics relationships, but substantial variation across industries, 
supporting the existence of contingencies in the CSP-financial performance effect. Although 
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the method Spencer and Taylor (1987) present is useful, their study has some weaknesses. 
Firstly, the validity of the CSP measures they use is questionable, as these originate from 
survey-results where managers rate members of the same industry in terms of CSP. Secondly, 
they use an unadjusted financial performance measure. 
Herremans, Akathapom and Mcinnes (1993) present a less specific approach by 
splitting the sample into two industry groups of low and high degree of social conflict. Their 
method is built on the assumption that a possible CSP-financial characteristics effect is 
stronger in some industries and weaker, or non-existent, in others. The implication is that 
some industries are more exposed to stakeholder conflicts than others, and that these 
industries therefore have higher potential gains from pursuing CSP. The sample is further 
divided according to CSP by splitting each industry group into low and high CSP sub-groups, 
producing four sub-groups in total. Each sub-group is then treated as a portfolio for which 
various average attributes are computed, including single-factor Jensen alphas, various 
accounting-based financial performance measures, and total risk (measured by total 
variability of stock price returns). Differences between the average financial performance 
attributes for the high and low CSP portfolios are then tested for statistical significance. Thus, 
an indication of a CSP-financial performance effect is provided for the two main industry 
groups. Overall, the differences between low and high CSP firms were mostly significant for 
the high social conflict industry group, and mostly not significant for the other group, 
supporting the notion that CSP is only related to financial characteristics to the extent that 
firms are exposed to stakeholder CSR expectations (Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
The methods presented by Herremans, Akathapom and Mcinnes (1993) and Spencer 
and Taylor (1987) are both considered for replication in the present study. The method of 
Spencer and Taylor (1987) is included, whereas the method of Herremans, Akathapom and 
Mcinnes (1 993) is not included in the present study due to problems with measuring the 
extent of social conflict. A discussion is provided in Section 4.3.2. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The CSP-financial characteristics literature is plagued by inconsistent findings. 
While it has been suggested that this inconsistency is a likely result of the wide variety of 
CSP measures, financial performance measures and methods (Rowley & Berman, 2000; 
Ullman, 1985) there is no evidence that certain periods in time, CSP measures, financial 
performance measures, use of control variables or types of methods produce certain results. 
High consistency is however found in reported CSP-risk relationships, which are mostly 
negative. This, together with investigations of the relationships between CSP and R&D 
investment intensity and book-to-market equity, suggests that previously used methods need 
improvement, especially in terms of adjusting total market performance measures for book-to­
market value as well as size and risk. Also, the need for development of methods that allow 
for CSP-financial characteristics contingency factors is strongly indicated in the literature. 
There is a strong theoretical basis, supported by a small amount of available 
empirical evidence, for an industry-contingent CSP-financial characteristics relationship, 
implying that such relationships vary across industries, but form more consistent patterns 
within industries. Studies allowing for across industry heterogeneity in the CSP-financial 
characteristics relationship, such as Spencer and Taylor ( 1987) and to a certain extent 
Herremans, Akathaporn and Mcinnes (1993), present an important improvement in research 
methods. Such research may improve the consistency of findings and provide much needed 
information on how CSP and financial characteristics are interrelated, and in what 
circumstances a CSP-financial characteristics relationship may be expected to be positive, 
negative or neutral. 
The next chapter discusses the CSP and financial data used in the empirical analysis 
of the present study, as well as the methods applied. The methodological approach employed 
here attempts to deal with some of the issues that have been identified as being problematic in 
the existing literature. The choice and use of CSP measures, the selected financial asset 
characteristics variables and the methods applied in the empirical analysis are selected on the 
basis of these issues. 
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4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the CSP and financial asset characteristics (referred to 
hereafter as F AC) data included in the analysis and the methodology for the analysis. Two 
sources of CSP data and two sources of financial data were considered for inclusion in the 
analysis. Section 4. 1 provides a thorough examination of both types of CSP data available and 
the methodologies and attributes of each, justification for why Corporate Monitor's CSP data 
are used in the analysis, and description of the data and sample inclusion criteria. Section 4.2 
discusses the financial data included in the analysis, including descriptions of included F AC 
measures, justification for including these F AC measures, how these measures are calculated, 
and description of the F AC dataset. Lastly, Section 4.3 discusses the methodology of the 
analysis and describes how the five research questions are addressed. 
4.1 Description and Assessment of the CSP Data 
CSP data from Corporate Monitor and Reputation Management Pty. Ltd. were 
considered for inclusion in the analysis. CSP data were collected from both sources and the 
attributes of each investigated. The two organisations exhibit significant differences in rating 
methodology as well as rating format and distribution. 
The CSP data from Corporate Monitor are used in the empirical analysis for the 
following reasons: 
1. The Corporate Monitor dataset covers 279 publicly traded Australian companies. The
usable portion of the Reputation Management dataset is very small, and at most 57 large
publicly traded Australian companies are covered.
2. The Corporate Monitor CSP ratings are constructed based on data collected from the
public domain. The Reputation Management CSP ratings may be subject to bias because
they are based on self-reported information.
3. The Corporate Monitor CSP ratings are more normally distributed than the Reputation
Management CSP ratings, which makes it is easier to compare relative CSP with relative
F AC in the analysis.
84 
This section begins by describing the CSP ratings and rating methodologies of 
Corporate Monitor and Reputation Management, followed by a comparison of the two data 
sets. 
4.1.1 CSP Ratings from Corporate Monitor 
Corporate Monitor's ratings on environmental, social and governance performance 
of Australian companies have been published monthly in the Ethical Investor magazine since 
June 2001. Ratings are provided for the largest 200 companies listed on the ASX, by market 
capitalisation, as well as for a smaller subset of companies. The inclusion criteria for the 
smaller companies subset are subjective. Firstly, Corporate Monitor include some firms in the 
S&P/ASX300 index, which are not included in the S&P/ASX200 index, and described as 
"SRI positive". Secondly, some companies are included because they are included in 
important managed portfolios. Thirdly, some companies are included for other reasons at the 
discretion of Corporate Monitor. Companies to be included in this smaller subset must 
maintain relatively high ratings to remain covered (Walsh, personal communication, 17 
March, 2004). 
Because of the higher turnover of companies within the smaller subset of 
companies, most of the companies included in the sample used in the present study are 
constituents of the S&P/ ASX200 index.20 Hence, the subjective inclusion criteria of the other 
companies are not likely to adversely affect the quality of the sample as a whole. 
Rating Format and Methodology 
CSP ratings are provided on three categories, namely environmental, social and 
corporate governance performance. The criteria on which these ratings are based are outlined 
in Table 4. 1. 
20 Note that the S&P/ASX200 index includes the largest 1 00 companies plus an additional 1 00 companies, such 
that the index comprises companies of sufficient size and liquidity for use as an investable benchmark for the 
Australian equity market (Standard & Poor's, 2004). 
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Corporate Monitor construct CSP ratings using three main types of information: 
1. Details on the environmental and social impact of companies' products and
services;
2. Company reports on its contribution to the environment or society; and
3. Reports form third party sources (such as regulators, non-government organisations
and reputable commentators) on the firm's impact on the environment, contribution
to society or corporate governance practice.
Ratings are produced on a scale from one (low) to five (high). Interpretations of 
these ratings are provided in Table 4.2. With regard to rating methodology, Corporate 
Monitor state that "The process rewards companies that demonstrate a range of actions that 
overcome any inherent negative environmental or social impacts of their products and 
services. It also rewards companies whose activities have an inherently positive 
environmental impact or social purpose" (Corporate Monitor, 2003a). This could be 
interpreted as indicating that firms with no such negative impacts automatically receive high 
ratings, since they are not expected to solve issues that do not exist. However, this is not the 
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Table 4.1: Corporate Monitor CSP Rating Criteria 
Environmental performance 
• Environmental impact of
products and services,
including uranium, logging,
mining, greenhouse gas,
plastic, packaging,
recycling, genetically
modified food and energy
• Environmental reporting
• Environmental management
• Penalties for environmental
compliance
• Environment awards
• Pollution index
Social performance 
• Community relations and
philanthropy
• Human rights
• Indigenous issues
• Involvement in weapons and
defence equipment
• Products associated with
social problems, including
alcohol, tobacco and gaming
• Employment practices
Governance performance 
• Legal compliance, including
corporate governance, trade
practices and fair trading
• Instances of organised
shareholder activism or
complaints on behalf of
shareholders
• Governance awards
• CEO remuneration
• Non Executive Director
remuneration
• Auditor's remuneration for
services other than auditing
• Board committee structures
and independence
• Concentrated shareholdings
Source: Corporate Monitor (2003b) 
This rating methodology may indicate some bias in terms of what is considered to 
constitute the responsibilities of the firm, as it may be interpreted as being supportive of a 
philanthropic view of the firm where the firm is expected to include CSR as part of the 
corporate objective function because it holds obligations to society at large and not just to 
shareholders. Corporate Monitor do however make some adjustments to allow for significant 
differences in public expectations between firms and industries, and this is an important 
feature of the data in terms of the definition of CSP employed here and in view of what has 
been discussed in Chapter 2. 
The rating process takes into account each company's industry sector. Firms in 
sectors that are neutral in environmental or social impact are not expected to provide reporting 
on these issues in the same detail as firms in sectors that have higher environmental and social 
impact. Corporate Monitor (2003b) also advise that some adjustment is made for the size, 
lower profitability and shorter history of smaller companies. Ratings are sent to each 
company's CEO for their review prior to publication. Corporate Monitor (2003a) emphasise 
the validity of their data by pointing out that their data are not dependent on a company's 
willingness to respond to a questionnaire or an agreement to keep relevant information off the 
record. 
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case, and Corporate Monitor advise that only firms who are proactive to some extent receive 
high ratings (Walsh, personal communication, 17 March, 2004). 
Table 4.2: Interpretation of Corporate Monitor CSP Ratings 
This table displays the various rating levels of the Corporate Monitor CSP ratings with 
interpretations according to each rating category. (Source: Corporate Monitor, 2003b) 
Rating 
2 
3 
5 
Environmental 
performance 
Adverse 
Developing 
Compliant 
Sustainable 
Best Practice 
Social 
performance 
Adverse 
Disengaged 
Responsive 
Engaged 
Best Practice 
Governance 
performance 
Questionable 
Patchy 
Compliant 
Proactive 
Best Practice 
Information contained in each month's rating dates from 1 July 1999 (when 
Corporate Monitor began collecting CSP-related information), to the last day of that month. 
For companies listed after 1 July 1999 information is collected starting from the listing date 
(Corporate Monitor, 2003b).21  This means that ratings are adjusted monthly for changes in the
information that is available for each company. While it may be assumed that a significant 
part of the information contained in this latter period's ratings is likely to be new, it is equally 
likely that these ratings are mainly based on prior information in some cases. This procedure 
is logical and the stability of the CSP ratings reinforces the notion of CSP being a 
characteristics-type variable rather than a volatile tracking device. This means that it is 
difficult to isolate CSP ratings into separate periods, since they have very little variation and 
since they include both new and old information. Hence, it is full-period average CSP ratings 
that are used in the analysis. 
This has implications also for how missing data may be managed, because it implies 
that the first available rating can used to backdate the validity of ratings as far back as 1 July 
1999. The first rating in a series reflects information from this date until the time of the first 
rating, and although ratings might have been adjusted during this initial period if they were 
provided, the first available rating does give a very good indication of the company's CSP 
during this time.22 Hence, although the first ratings included in the dataset date from 1 August
2001, the information reflected in these ratings is up to two years old, and it seems plausible 
that those particular ratings are indicative of the companies' CSP over the previous two 
years.23
The Corporate Monitor CSP data set is sound for many reasons. Firstly, the data set 
covers a relatively large number of companies, covering companies of various sizes. This 
means that research using the whole data set may be less prone to the bias towards very large 
firms that is evident in the empirical literature. Note that problems of incomplete rating series 
within the subset of smaller companies imply that many of these are excluded from the 
21 Note that this changed in the September 2003 ratings (published in the October issue), where the information 
contained in the ratings is disclosed as being no older than from 1 st January 200 1 .  This does not affect the present 
study, since the data set used here does not include ratings after July 2003 . 
22 Corporate Monitor supports this assumption (Walsh, personal communication, 1 7  March, 2004). 
23 Note that ratings are published with a one-month delay. This is adjusted for in the analysis by using the date of 
each rating update rather than the date of publication. Apart from this, ratings are not likely to include any 
significant hidden time-delay. 
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sample. Nonetheless, a .  sample of 200 large companies provides better coverage of different 
size companies than most of the studies in the literature. (See Section 3.4. 1, where sample 
size of empirical studies is discussed.) Secondly, ratings are provided for a reasonable period 
of time. The relatively high frequency of the data means that time-series analysis might have 
been fruitful. However, the lack of variability in the data set prohibits such analysis, but 
facilitates other types of analysis which otherwise might be questionable. Thirdly, Corporate 
Monitor provide ratings on three categories, which is comparable to other types of CSP data 
used in the literature.24 The three CSP categories (environmental impact, social impact and 
governance practices) allow for investigating separate CSP-F AC relationships. This 
corresponds well with arguments provided in the literature suggesting that CSP-F AC 
relationships differ for different CSP categories (Rowley & Berman, 2000). Fourthly, 
information included is not biased by managers' own perceptions of their efforts and 
performance in pursuing CSP. Such bias is often problematic where CSP ratings are 
constructed using managers' self-reported information. 
4.1.2 CSP Ratings from Reputation Management 
Reputation Measurement Pty. Ltd. provide CSP measures for the top 100 of the 
Business Review Weekly annual list of the top 1000 Australian companies, on a yearly basis. 
These companies include both Australian and New Zealand publicly traded companies, 
private companies and government owned entities. Reputation Management therefore covers 
a relatively small sample of companies that are eligible for inclusion in the present study. The 
first ratings were provided in October 2000, and ratings have thereafter been published in 
2001, 2002 and 2003 (Reputation Management Pty. Ltd., 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2003b; 
2003). Rating categories have changed marginally from year to year. The 2000 and 2001 
ratings were provided for six categories, namely employee management, social impact, 
environmental performance, ethics, financial performance and market position (Reputation 
Management Pty. Ltd., 2000; 2001). In 2002 these categories were employee management, 
24 For example, the French rating agency AReSE provide CSP ratings on five criteria, including employee 
relations, shareholder relations, product quality, and community, environment (D'Arcimoles & Trebucq, 2001 ). 
Many commonly used U.S. CSP data sources include a higher number of CSP measures, such as the KLD 
ratings which covers seven categories (Waddock & Graves, 2000), and the Fortune ratings which covers eight 
categories (Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998). Many of these rating agencies provide ratings on issues that are more 
management-performance related than CSR-related, in addition to certain common CSR issues. 
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social impact, environmental performance, ethics and corporate governance, financial 
performance and management and market focus (Reputation Management Pty. Ltd., 2002). In 
2003 the categories were environmental impact, corporate governance, social impact and 
workplace practices (Reputation Management Pty. Ltd., 2003b). Note that only the ratings on 
environmental, social, ethics or governance and workplace practices performance were 
considered for inclusion in the analysis. In 2003 the previously named Reputation Index was 
renamed RepuTex. 
Rating Format and Methodology 
The information that is used to produce the CSP ratings from Reputation 
Management is gathered using voluntary self-reporting for companies who are willing to 
participate. In cases where companies do not wish to participate in the survey, Reputation 
Management researchers seek the requested information in the public domain. Reputation 
Management collaborates with a number of research groups concerned with stakeholder 
welfare in specifying the criteria on which companies are rated, as well as the actual rating 
process. Survey responses and additional information are translated into rudimentary CSP 
ratings by the participating research groups, and are collected by Reputation Management and 
aggregated into the final CSP ratings for each company. The broad criteria for each category 
and the research groups involved in the rating process are listed in Table 8.2, provided in 
Section 8.2 of the Appendices. 
CSP ratings from Reputation Management are presented as ordinal ranks between 1 
and 100 for the 2000, 2001 and 2002 datasets. The 2003 RepuTex ratings are presented as 
cardinal ratings on a scale from one to six. As well as specific rating on the various rating 
categories, overall ratings are provided reflecting performance on all categories. In the 2003 
RepuTex dataset the overall ratings are intended to relate to conventional credit rating scales, 
ranging from AAA ( outstanding) to D (inadequate). The rationale behind this is that CSR 
management is suggested to be linked to risk, and that CSP provides an indication of risk as a 
part of a company's total financial risk (Grossman, personal communication, 10 November, 
2003). This is consistent with theories offered in the literature (see for example Orlitzky & 
Benjamin, 2001). 
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The rating methodology employed by Reputation Management exhibits some 
positive attributes. The quality of CSP ratings may benefit by the many stakeholder interest 
groups involved in the rating process, implying extensive exposure to specific expertise in 
each area. A possible limitation does however arise from the fact that the information on 
which the ratings are based initially is provided via self-assessment by companies' 
management. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is a possible source of bias. This could also 
imply disclosure of information that otherwise would be unavailable in the public domain, 
which limits investors' opportunity to include such information in firm valuation. 
The timing of the information included in Reputation Management's ratings, and 
hence the period for which each CSP rating is valid, is difficult to determine. However, this is 
not likely to be an issue if CSP ratings reflect short-run stable firm characteristics often 
suggested in the literature (see for example Newgren et al., 1985). It is also difficult to create 
rating series over the four years where CSP ratings are provided, for various reasons. The 
constituency of each set of rated companies differs from year to year, company CSP ranks 
during the first three years vary significantly from year to year, and the change in rating 
format from ordinal ranks to cardinal ratings makes it difficult to compare 2003 ratings to 
earlier ratings. 
When only publicly listed companies are retained, the useful sample size for each 
year is 38, 48, and 57 companies from the 2000, 200 1 and 2002 data sets, respectively. 
Thirty-three companies have a complete set of ratings for all periods but, as mentioned earlier, 
these series are difficult to combine to create a useful rating series due to large variability in 
company ranks from year to year. Among the 33 publicly traded Australian companies with 
complete rating series, the average range of ranks awarded to the same company was 30.8 for 
workplace practices, 27.9 for environmental performance, 30.2 for social impact, and 37.6 for 
corporate governance. This is extremely high considering ranks range from 1 to 100 in total. 
The greatest range recorded is that of Westpac, which in 2000 started out with the very lowest 
corporate governance rank, at 100. In 2001 their rank had risen to number 18, and in 2002 
they had the second best performance on corporate governance, according to Reputation 
Management. Another example is WMC, which commenced at 99th rank on workplace 
practices in 2000, and gained a rank of 13 the next year. The issues discussed above indicate 
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that the RepuTex 2003 ratings are more suitable for inclusion in the sample than earlier 
ratings or combinations of ratings from different years. 
4.1.3 Comparing CSP Ratings from Corporate Monitor and Reputation
Management 
Given the differences in rating perspective and methodology of Corporate Monitor 
and Reputation Management it is useful to compare and contrast the CSP measures from each 
source, both in terms of rating methodology and in terms of rating distribution and 
correlations between the two datasets. Table 4.3 summarises the attributes of the two sets of 
CSP ratings, which were discussed in more detail in Sections 4. 1. 1 and 4. 1.2. 
In order to compare the actual ratings from Corporate Monitor and Reputation 
Management a sample of companies which are awarded ratings from both agencies was 
selected and investigated. Differences in average ratings and correlations between the two 
data sets were computed and tested for statistical significance, and the rating distributions of 
the two alternative ratings were compared. Details of these comparisons are provided in 
Section 8 .3 of the Appendices. 
In general, Corporate Monitor award higher ratings compared to Reputation 
Management. The difference is greatest in the environmental performance category, followed 
by the social performance category. The difference in governance performance ratings is not 
statistically significant. The correlations between the rating systems are significant, indicating 
some agreement in measuring CSP for the sampled companies. The correlation is strongest in 
the environmental category, followed by the correlation between the social performance 
measures from Corporate Monitor and Reputation Management. Governance ratings from the 
two datasets have a significant but low positive correlation. Hence, although Corporate 
Monitor are more generous when awarding CSP ratings compared to Reputation Management 
there is some level of agreement in how they measure relative performance. These differences 
could mean research findings are sensitive to the source of CSP ratings, but it is perhaps 
unlikely that findings would be widely conflicting given the significant correlations between 
the datasets. 
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Corporate Monitor's CSP ratings are more dispersed across the possible ratings 
compared to Reputation Management's CSP ratings, which are more concentrated around the 
low and middle ratings. The difference in rating distribution is particularly notable in the 
governance category, where Reputation Management award the rating of three to 83% of the 
dataset. This is a major drawback of the Reputation Management CSP data, since this makes 
it difficult to compare relative CSP with relative F AC measures. 
93 
Table 4.3: Comparing Important Aspects of CSP Ratings from Corporate Monitor and 
Reputation Management Pty. Ltd. 
Rating as�ect Cor�orate Monitor Re�utation Management 
Perspective 
Methodology 
Rating 
frequency 
Coverage 
Firms are assessed from an 
SRI point of view. 
Internal analysts assess 
companies on CSP criteria 
using information available 
in the public domain. 
Ratings are adjusted and 
published monthly since 
August 2001. 
Firms in the S&P/ASX 200 
index are covered, plus a 
Firms are assessed from a stakeholder 
group point of view. 
Reputation Management collaborate 
with research groups in determining 
rating criteria and constructing the 
actual ratings. CSP ratings are based on 
self-reported information and 
information available in the public 
domain. 
Ratings are published in once per year, 
each year for an updated list of 
companies. 
The top 100 of the Business Review 
Weekly annual list of Australian 
smaller subset of companies 
included on the basis of 
special SRI interest. 
companies are covered, which includes 
government organisations as well as 
public companies. 
Rating 
categories 
Rating format 
Rating 
distribution 
Companies are rated on 
environmental, social and 
corporate governance 
performance. 
Ratings are presented on a 
scale from 1 (low) to 5 
(high). 
Ratings are approximately 
normally distributed. 
Rating categories have changed slightly 
from year to year, but generally covers 
environmental, social, governance and 
workplace practices performance. 
Until 2003, ratings were presented as 
rank ordered ratings from 1 (high) to 
100 (low). The RepuTex 2003 ratings 
are provided on a cardinal scale from 1 
(high) to 6 (low). 
Ratings are clustered around the lower 
middle part of the possible ratings. 
The following section discusses the Corporate Monitor CSP dataset and the included 
sample in further detail. 
4.1.4 The Corporate Monitor CSP Dataset and Sample Inclusion Criteria
Monthly CSP data are collected from 1 August 2001 until 1 July 2003, forming two 
years' worth of data which cover 279 Australian companies in total, of which 2 1 1  are in the 
large size subset and 68 in the small size subset. Ratings are provided for every month, except 
for January. 25 The data collected exhibit two significant attributes. Firstly, the data series is
subject to a reasonable level of missing observations. Because missing data may imply that 
important information is omitted, some sample inclusion criteria are employed. Secondly, the 
rating series are very stable over time, implying that Corporate Monitor's CSP ratings are 
stable characteristics-type variables that change little over the sample period. The 
combination of the these two attributes implies that CSP rating series with missing data that 
are included in the sample should be adjusted to ensure fair comparison across companies' 
average CSP ratings. These issues are discussed in further detail below. 
Missing Data 
Of the 279 companies included in the total sample, 1 18 companies have some extent 
of missing data. Missing data in the data set occur for various reasons. Recall that ratings are 
provided for the constituents of the S&P/ ASX200 index at a given point in time plus a smaller 
subset of selected companies. Because companies drop in and out the S&P/ASX200 index 
they also drop in and out of the rating series. Ratings for the smaller companies subset are 
also subjected to incomplete data coverage. The reasons for companies dropping in and out of 
the small subset include delisting from the ASX due to company failure or failure of listing 
requirements, acquisitions and takeovers, a drop in ratings resulting in the company no longer 
being considered an SRI, or the company being included in the S&P/ ASX200 index, in which 
case it is still covered. Hence this latter event has no consequence in this context (Walsh, 
personal communication, 17 March, 2004). 
25 Ethical Investor magazine is not published for the month of January, and Corporate Monitor does not provide 
or publish ratings for January. 
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Table 4.4 illustrates that the incremental increases in sample size diminish as more 
missing data are accepted. Starting with a sample coverage of 58% under full restriction (no 
missing data accepted), a sample coverage of over 80% is achievable by including companies 
with four months of missing data or less, and coverage of 88. 5% is achievable by allowing up 
to eight months of missing data. Most of the missing data occurs in the beginning of the 
series. Because each monthly rating contains information dating back to July 1999 (where 
available), and ratings predominantly are stable and change very little over time, new ratings 
can backfilled to the beginning of the series. Missing data toward the end of the series are 
more problematic because there are no subsequent ratings to indicate the arrival of new 
information. Since company average CSP is compared to company F AC variables measured 
over the sample period ending 1 July 2003, it is important to minimise the risk of omitting 
important information that could relate both to CSP and F AC. 
Table 4. 4: Sample Size and Missing Data 
This table illustrates how sample size changes with various criteria for treatment of missing data, 
displaying the consequences of allowing up to eight months of missing data in total (this was set as 
an absolute upper limit of missing data accepted). 
Missing 
data 
Minimum % of points in 
Acceptance of missing no of Sample Small Large companies the 
data months size subset subset included sam�le 
No restriction 1 279 68 2 1 1 1 00.0% 783 
Full restriction 22 16 1  23 1 3 8  57.7% 0 
1 month missing (8 coys) 21  1 69 25 144 60.6% 8 
2 months missing (20 coys) 20 1 89 39 1 50 67.7% 48 
3 months missing (21 coys) 19  2 10  39 1 7 1  75.3% 1 1 1  
4 months missing (1 7 coys) 1 8  227 46 1 8 1 8 1 .4% 179 
5 months missing (6 coys) 1 7  233 47 1 86 83.5% 209 
6 months missing (8 coys) 1 6  241 50 1 91 86.4% 257 
7 months missing (2 coys) 1 5  243 5 1  1 92 87. 1%  27 1 
8 months missing (4 coys) 14  247 53 1 94 88.5% 303 
The final sample was selected on two criteria. Firstly, companies must not have 
more than six months of missing data in the data series, which excludes 38 companies from 
the sample. While including companies with up to six months of missing data increases the 
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sample size significantly, allowing more than six months of missing data increases the sample 
size only marginally. Secondly, companies must not have more than one month of missing 
data at the end of the series, which excludes an additional four companies from the sample. 
These criteria excludes 42 companies from the sample, producing a sample size of 237 
companies (189 from the large and 48 from the small subset) of which 76 have some extent of 
missing data. 26 
The Stability of CSP Ratings Over Time 
Table 4.5 shows the extent of variation in observed CSP rating over the full sample 
period for all 279 companies with CSP ratings. The proportions of companies with no 
variation in ratings are 71,  60 and 34 percent for environmental, social and governance 
performance, respectively. Most adjustments of environmental and social ratings are one­
point adjustments, indicating reasonably stable ratings in these categories. The greater extent 
of adjustment in the governance category is mainly due to the change in the rating system for 
governance from a 1-3 scale to a 1-5 scale. The data supplied by Corporate Monitor are re­
scaled to adjust for this change, and no additional adjustments were made. This re-scaling of 
governance ratings brings additional variability to the rating series, which does not reflect 
changes in companies' actual governance performance. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
actual governance performance is comparable to environmental and social performance in 
terms of actual variability over time. 
Table 4. 5: Extent of Time-Variation in Corporate Monitor CSP Ratings 
This table displays time variation in CSP rating series observed over the August 2001 -July 2003 
period, for the 279 companies for which Corporate Monitor CSP ratings are provided. 
Adjustments in 
ratings over the foil 
period 
No adjustment 
1 point 
2 point 
3 point 
4 point 
Total 
Environmental 
performance 
199 
72 
7 
1 
0 
279 
Social 
performance 
167 
91 
21 
0 
0 
279 
Governance 
performance 
94 
95 
65 
23 
2 
279 
26 A list ofall excluded companies is provided in Table 8.6 (in the Appendices), detailing the reason why each 
company is excluded from the sample. 
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Adjustment of Average CSP Ratings/or Companies with Missing Data 
Companies are compared by average full-period CSP ratings m the analysis. 
Missing data can cause bias in the calculated average CSP ratings where there is variability in 
the ratings. In these cases ratings that are higher or lower than the rest of the series will be 
overemphasised if only available data are used to calculate the average ratings. For example, 
Baycorp Advantage Ltd. has data missing for the first five months of CSP ratings, although it 
has been trading since 30 September 1998, and exhibits a one point adjustment in its 
environmental performance ratings. This company is provided a rating of two out of five for 
the sixth, seventh and eighth month, and then three out of five for the remainder of the series. 
Before augmenting the data the average full-period rating is 2.82, which overemphasises the 
higher rating towards the latter end of the sample period. Since the first available rating 
includes information dating back to July 1999, the initial rating reflects past CSP from July 
1999 to February 2002. Hence, the initial rating should be replicated backward to complete 
the series. After such augmentation the average CSP rating is adjusted down to 2.64. 
As illustrated in the above example, augmentation does not cause large adjustment 
in the average CSP ratings and is therefore not expected to have much effect on research 
findings. However, it does ensure fair comparison between companies' CSP over the sample 
period and augmentation is therefore performed where this is deemed appropriate. Of the 76 
companies with some extent of missing data, 25 companies exhibit no variation in the rating 
series, hence augmentation is not necessary. Ten companies have variation in the rating series 
immediately after missing data, hence ratings cannot be replicated backwards and 
augmentation is not appropriate. Forty-one companies have variation in the rating series but 
no changes immediately after missing data, hence ratings can be backfilled and augmentation 
is appropriate. Adjustment in the average CSP ratings in at least one rating category therefore 
affects 41  companies in total. Specifically, average environmental, social and governance 
performance ratings were adjusted for 16, 1 8  and 27 companies, respectively. 
The sample selection process and extent of adjustment of average CSP ratings are 
summarised in Figure 4. 1 .  Table 4.6 compares average CSP ratings before and after 
adjustment. The table shows that pre and post-adjustment averages are only marginally 
different, and that these differences are statistically not significant for all three categories. 
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Step 1: Sample Selection 
Corporate Monitor CSP data is 
available for 279 companies 
' 
237 companies are 
included in the sample 
------------------ -----------------
Step 2: Rating Adjustments 
, ,
76 companies have some 
missing data 
' 
41 companies have time-variation in 
ratings, but no variation immediately 
after missing data, hence average CSP 
ratings are adjusted 
38 companies are excluded because more than 
six months of data is missing in total 
4 companies are excluded because more one 
months of data is missing towards the end of 
the sample period 
161 companies have no missing data and 
do not need average ratings adjusted 
25 companies have no time-variation in 
ratings, hence adjustment is not necessary 
10 companies have variation in ratings 
immediately after missing data, hence 
adjustment is not appropriate 
Figure 4.1: Sample Selection and Augmentation of Rating Series 
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Table 4. 6: Comparing Average CSP Scores Before and After Adjustment 
This table compares changes in company average CSP scores resulting from augmenting incomplete
data series. This affects 41  companies in total, where environmental, social or governance average
scores are adjusted due to augmentation. No differences are significant at the 90 percent level. 
4.1.5 Sample Data Descriptions
This section provides description of the CSP ratings for all 237 companies included 
in the sample, using adjusted average CSP ratings for the 4 1  companies for which data series 
are augmented. Table 4.7 provides average ratings and standard deviation of average ratings, 
and the proportion of companies with no variation in monthly ratings. The average ratings are 
significantly higher for the smaller subset of companies in the environmental and social 
categories, whereas the difference is not significant in the governance category. Such 
differences are expected given the smaller subset of companies contains companies that are 
commonly held as SRis, and are likely to perform slightly better on CSP criteria than all 
companies on average. 
The standard deviations of average ratings are approximately one point, and indicate 
similar distributions in the large and small subsets. Average variation in companies' monthly 
ratings is significantly greater within the large subset compared to the small subset for the 
social and governance categories, but the difference is not statistically significant for the 
environment category. These differences may arise because larger companies generate more 
publicly available CSP-related information more frequently. The environment category 
exhibits the highest proportion of companies with no rating variation, followed by the social 
category and then the governance category. 
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Environmental 
performance 
Social 
performance 
Governance 
performance 
16 18 27 
2.85 2.54 2.86 
Number of average scores adjusted 
Average score before adjustment 
Average score after adjustment 2.77 2.51 2.82 
t-statistic of difference
Degrees of freedom
-0.2795
30
-0.0942
34
-0.1826
52
-0.09 -0.02 -0.04Average adjustment magnitude
Maximum observed adjustment -0.46 -0.22 -0.41
Table 4. 7: Statistics for the Included Sample of Corporate Monitor CSP Data 
This table displays summary statistics for CSP ratings of all 237 companies included in the sample.
Summary statistics are calculated using adjusted average ratings for the 4 1  companies where rating
series are augmented. Separate statistics are provided for the 1 89 companies originating from the
S&P/ ASX200 index (Large) and 48 companies from the smaller subset of rated companies (Small).
Differences between average scores for the large and small subset of companies are tested for
statistical significance, and significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, ** and
***, respectively. 
It is useful to investigate correlations between rating categories. If correlations are 
too high this may indicate that CSP characteristics are indistinguishable in practice, and that 
separate analyses for each CSP category will yield similar results. Correlations can otherwise 
indicate relationships between ratings in different categories. Correlations between the CSP 
measures in the included sample are provided in Table 4.8, and are calculated using average 
full-period ratings. The results support significant positive correlations between rating 
categories. Positive correlation may be expected, since companies that perform well in one 
category perhaps may be likely also to perform well in others due to scale and scope 
economies of CSP production (Mc Williams & Siegel, 2001 ). Although these correlations are 
significant, they are not very high, suggesting CSP ratings do measure different 
characteristics. Moreover, it means that cross-sectional regression models may be specified 
with all three CSP measures as independent variables without the risk of multicollinearity 
being too high. 
100 
Percent of 
SD of companies 
Mean of average with no 
Subset average ratings rating variation 
Large 2.68 1.07 68.5% 
Environmental Small 3.26 1.16 77.1% 
performance t-stat of difference -3.1269***
Degrees of freedom 69 
Average SD of 
companies' 
monthly 
ratings 
0.16 
0.11 
1.2139 
74 
2.72 0.97 0.24 50.3% 
3.56 0.69 0.09 81.3% Social 
performance -6.9716*** 4.5723*** 
Large 
Small 
t-stat of difference
Degrees of freedom 101 95 
2.71 0.90 0.39 24.3% 
2.88 0.81 0.31 39.6% Governance 
performance 1.6681 * 
Large 
Small 
t-stat of difference
Degrees of freedom
-1.2541
79 68 
Table 4.8: Full-period Correlations in Corporate Monitor 's Three CSP Categories 
This table displays Pearson correlations between environment, social and governance 
performance using average full-period CSP ratings for the 237 companies in the sample. 
Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, **  and ***  
respectively. 
The present study includes analyses that use parametric tools for statistical analysis, 
relying on all variables being normally distributed. Table 4.9 displays some descriptive 
statistics about the CSP ratings within the included sample. Environmental and social ratings 
are not skewed but very slightly platykurtic, and governance ratings are slightly positively 
skewed but mesokurtic. The CSP rating distributions are therefore approximately normally 
distributed. Hence, test results from parametric analysis will be reliable. 
Table 4.9: The Distribution of CSP Ratings Within the Included Sample 
This table displays descriptive statistics of the distribution of CSP ratings within the included 
sample. These statistics are based on average monthly CSP ratings collected between August 2001 
and July 2003, where average ratings are adjusted via data augmentation for 41 companies. 
Skewness and kurtosis gives an indication of the distributions of each variable. A perfectly normal 
distribution will have a value of zero for skewness and a value of three for kurtosis. 
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Performance 
Environmental 
Social 
Governance 
Environmental 
1.00 
0.28*** 
0.16** 
Social 
1.00 
0.27*** 
Governance 
1.00 
Social Governance 
Mean value 
Standard deviation 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Minimum score 
Maximum score 
Number of observation 
Environmental 
eerformance 
2.80 
1.11 
0.14 
2.26 
1.00 
5.00 
237 
eerformance 
2.89 
0.98 
0.11 
2.05 
1.00 
5.00 
237 
eerformance 
2.74 
0.89 
0.36 
2.45 
1.00 
4.91 
237 
4.2 Description and Assessment of the Financial Data 
The justification for including these FAC variables, details of how each is calculated 
and descriptions of the sample data are provided in the following sections. A brief discussion 
of alternative perspectives on firm valuation and performance measurement is provided in 
Section 8.5 of the Appendices. 
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Financial assets are typically evaluated on financial performance, risk, and other 
style-characteristics such as size and book-to-market value. Throughout this study these 
attributes are referred to as Financial Asset Characteristics (F AC). The F AC measures 
included in the analysis are listed in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: FAC Measures Included in the Analysis 
This table lists the F AC measures calculated and included in the analysis. Note that the market beta 
used to measure systematic market risk is estimated in a single-factor model whereas the Jensen 
alpha used to measure performance adjusted by factor covariation is estimated in a three-factor 
model. 
Financial asset characteristics 
Style characteristics 
Size 
Value 
Financial risk 
Total risk 
Systematic market risk 
Financial performance 
Unadjusted market performance 
Performance adjusted by total risk 
Performance adjusted by factor covariation 
Performance adjusted by characteristics­
matched benchmark performance 
Measures included 
Total market capitalisation 
Book-to-market value 
Standard deviation of monthly returns 
Market beta (single-factor) 
Total shareholder return 
Sharpe Ratio 
Jensen alpha (three-factor) 
Benchmark-adjusted performance 
4.2.1 FAC Data Collection 
Because the present study compares F AC data with the available CSP data, which 
forms the basis for the included sample, the F AC variables included in the analysis are 
sampled to match the available CSP data. The CSP data consist of series of monthly ratings, 
every observation being dated to the first day of the month, and consistency is ensured by also 
using monthly observations of financial variables, every observation being from the first day 
of the month. The CSP data cover the period from 1 August 2001 to 1 July 2003, but as 
discussed in Section 4. 1 ,  the information contained in these ratings dates back to 1 July 1999. 
Moreover, the stability of CSP ratings, implying that CSP reflects short-term stable firm 
characteristics, implies there is little need for restrictions in term of on the total sample period 
for the F AC variables. 
Because firms are evaluated as financial assets, F AC variables should ideally be 
measured over typical investment horizons. For equity, standard investment horizons typically 
include three-year, five-year and ten-year horizons. However, availability of data and issues 
in F AC estimation limit the possible timeframes of measurement. 
Firstly, many of the companies included in the sample have not been listed for as 
long as five years, which excludes ten-year F AC measures. Secondly, F AC measures 
requiring estimation by time-series regression are subject to limitations on the length of time 
period over which they are measured. Too few observations will give poor estimations, and 
too long time-periods will also give poor fit because firm characteristics are likely to change 
over longer time-periods. Consequently, financial data wer collected over a six-year period 
starting 1 August 1997 and ending 1 July 2003. All FAC measures are therefore calculated for 
the full six-year period and for two three-year periods from 1 August 1997 to 1 July 2000 and 
from 1 August 2000 to 1 July 2003, except Jensen alpha and market beta which are only 
estimated for the two three-year periods. (Model estimates over longer periods tend to yield 
low fit, but three-year periods (covering 36 monthly observations) are ideal for good 
estimation of these measures.) 
It is necessary to retrieve data for enough extra non-sample companies to enable 
calculation of the benchmark-adjusted performance measure. This calculation requires 
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financial data of 500 companies in order to construct 25 portfolios with 20 companies in each. 
In addition to the 237 companies in the investigated sample, 40 1 extra companies with data 
coverage over the sample period were identified by collecting constituents in the ASX All 
Ordinaries Index over the sample period. 
4.2.2 Style Characteristics 
Financial assets are typically evaluated by size and value, which are sometimes 
referred to as style characteristics. These characteristics are of interest from a financial asset 
perspective because the asset pricing literature presents strong evidence that these 
characteristics are important in explaining market return (Keim, 1986). Size is generally 
measured by the total market capitalisation, and value is generally measured by the ratio of 
book-to-market value. An asset with a high book-to-market value is classified as a value asset 
and an asset with a low book-to-market value is classified as a growth asset. In the asset 
pricing literature, small companies are reported to systematically outperform large companies, 
and value companies are found to systematically outperform growth companies (see, for 
instance, Keim, 1986).27 Consequently, these characteristics are important when evaluating
companies as financial assets, and particularly in the context of performance measurement. 
Size and value characteristics are measured here by the average monthly market 
capitalisation and book-to-market value, respectively, observed over the relevant time period. 
Book-to-market value may be calculated differently depending on the data provider and, for 
the purposes of the present study, book-to-market value is calculated as the ratio of net total 
assets to total market capitalisation. Companies' net total assets and total market capitalisation 
were collected from SIRCA and Datastream, respectively.28
27 A discussion of possible reasons behind such anomalies in asset returns falls outside the scope of the present 
study. A thorough and reasonably current examination of these issues can be found in Campbell (2000). 
28 Initially, data measuring book value were collected from both sources. Datastream provide measures of book 
value per share, which is provided with various adjustments to reflects changes between companies' periodical 
reports, whereas SIRCA provide net total assets sourced directly from companies' reports without adjustments. 
When comparing adjusted book value per share from Datastream with non-adjusted book value per share from 
SIRCA, very low correlations were found between the two datasets, suggesting that these datatypes are different. 
Net total assets data from SIRCA is used here because this data is more easily verifiable (by cross-referencing 
with annual reports) compared to the book value per share measures from Datastream. 
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4.2.3 Measures of Risk 
Measures of risk included in the analysis include total risk and market beta. Total 
returns variability represents total risk, of which some is diversifiable (non-systematic or 
firm-specific risk) and some is non-diversifiable (systematic risk). Total risk is measured by 
the standard deviation of monthly returns. Market beta is measured as the slope coefficient in 
a time-series model where excess asset return is regressed on the excess return on a market 
portfolio proxy (excess return referring to the return on an asset less the return on a risk-free 
asset). The market beta is therefore estimated by Equation 4. 1. 
Equation 4. 1 
where R1 is the return on an asset in month t, R1, is the return on a risk-free asset in month t, 
RM, is the return on the market portfolio in month t, a is the asset's constant abnormal return, 
f3 is the asset's market beta coefficient and e1 is a residual error term included for estimation 
purposes. The risk-free asset is proxied by a 10-year Australian Government bond and the 
market portfolio is proxied by the ASX All Ordinaries Index.29 The model is estimated by the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are corrected for 
using the White (1980) method and Cochrane-Orcutt (1949) procedure, respectively.30 
29 Note that the risk-free rate is often proxied by a short-term government security. The issue of such securities in 
Australia has declined substantially over the recent years, hence this proxy is no longer available for the risk-free 
rate. A longer-term bond is then the next best option. Note that long-term bond returns include expectations of 
inflation, which may be a source of variability that is not firm-specific and should be subtracted from companies' 
returns along with the risk-free rate. Hence, it may well be better to use long-term bonds in this context than 
short-term instruments. 
30 Although autocorrelation, and hence autocorrelation correction, does not really affect the value of the 
estimated parameters, it does affect the standard errors of these and hence the t-test. It has been suggested that 
autocorrelation should only be corrected for if good evidence can be provided that autocorrelation is actually 
present, as unnecessary correction procedures can sometimes cause more harm than using OLS on a model that 
may exhibit autocorrelation (Maddala, 200 1 ;  Studenmund, 2001 ). It has therefore been suggested that 
autocorrelation should only be corrected for when the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic (which tests for 
autocorrelation) definitely rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Hence, a model with a DW statistic 
in the inconclusive region should not be corrected for autocorrelation. This approach is followed throughout the 
analysis. Note that the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure involves model estimation by Generalised Least Squares 
(GLS) method. The R-squared statistic loses its interpretive value in GLS estimations, and hence it is always the 
original adjusted R-squared value from the uncorrected model that is reported. 
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4.2.4 Measures of Financial Performance 
The measures of financial performance in the analysis include total return to 
shareholders and three measures of risk-adjusted performance including the Sharpe Ratio, the 
Jensen alpha and benchmark-adjusted performance. 
Total Shareholder Return 
Total shareholder return includes dividend yield and capital gains to shareholders, 
and should be calculated to measure true changes in shareholder wealth. Total shareholder 
return therefore represents a raw performance measure not adjusted by risk or other 
characteristics found to explain asset returns. Data for measuring total shareholder return, 
estimated by equation 4.2, were collected from Datastream. 
Equation 4. 2 
where RI, P, and D represent total shareholder return index value, share price and dividend 
distribution, respectively, and subscripts t and t-1 represents current day and previous trading 
day, respectively. Total shareholder return is calculated as the percentage change in the return 
index value from one month to the next. 
Datastream use gross values for dividend distributions, where available, excluding 
tax and re-investment charges. Closing prices are adjusted for capital events and for general 
smoothing purposes are used in the calculations. Index values for new issues are initially 
based on an anticipated annualised dividend until data on the first actual dividend payment 
becomes available, at which point the RI value is calculated back to the base date (Thomson 
Financial's Datastream, personal communication, 8 April 2004). 
The Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio is a common industry performance measure, estimated in equation 
4.3 (Bodie, Keim & Marcus, 1999). It is a reward-to-variability ratio where excess return is 
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RI = RI * P, + D,t t-1 p 
t-1
scaled by the standard. deviation of excess returns over the sample period (Sharpe, 1963, 
1994). 
Equation 4.3 
where ER is the average excess return on an asset measured over the sample period, and is 
calculated using a 10-year Australian government bond representing the risk-free rate of 
return. O'ER is the standard deviation of excess returns observed over the sample period, and is 
calculated based on monthly excess returns. 
The Sharpe Ratio may be calculated for individual assets as well as for asset 
portfolios. When calculating the Sharpe Ratio for large portfolios the ratio will in effect 
measure the units of return rewarded for every unit of systematic risk, since non-systematic 
risk is assumed to be diversified away in large portfolios. The Sharpe Ratios for individual 
assets are however measures of units of return per units of total risk, including non-systematic 
risk. Sharpe Ratios are calculated only for individual companies in the analysis presented 
here, and not for portfolios, even in the part of the analysis where companies are sorted into 
large portfolios and evaluated as portfolios. This is because the analysis requires that 
differences in portfolio F AC measures are tested for statistical significance. Such statistical 
testing requires a measure of dispersion (that is, the standard deviation of observed values), 
hence it is only possible to test for differences between portfolios' average individual Sharpe 
Ratios. Another reason for this is that the Jensen alpha measures systematic risk-adjusted 
performance, hence it is permissible to also include a performance measure that adjusts 
performance by total risk . 
The Jensen Alpha 
The Jensen alpha (Jensen, 1968) is a performance measure where systematic or 
exposure risks are adjusted for in a time-series model similar to that presented in Equation 
4. 1. The Jensen alpha has been used to measure the performance of groups of companies and
individual companies in empirical research in the CSP-F AC literature (Gottsman & Kessler,
1998; Herremans, Akathapom & Mcinnes, 1993).
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The Jensen alpha is specified according to the number of regressors or factors 
accounted for. A single-factor alpha includes exposure to the market risk factor (hence the a
in Equation 4 . 1  is a single-factor Jensen alpha). The present study uses a three-factor alpha 
which includes exposure to the size and value factors in addition to the market risk factor, 
following Fama and French (1993). Size and value is adjusted for by regressing excess return 
on the difference in returns on small and large company portfolios (Rs1-RL 1) and low and 
high book-to-market value portfolios (Ro 1-R v1) ,  in addition to excess return on the market 
portfolio. The three-factor Jensen alpha is estimated by Equation 4.4. 
Equation 4.4 
where R 1 is the company total return for month t; R11 is the risk-free rate of return for month t,
measured by the return on a 10-year Australian government bond; RM, is the market return 
for month t, measured by the return on the ASX All Ordinaries Index; Rs 1 is the return on 
small companies for month t, measured by the return on the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries 
Index; RL ,  is the return on large companies for month t, measured by the return on the 
S&P/ASX 200 Index; Ra 1 is the return on growth companies for month t, measured by the 
return on the MSCI Growth Index; and R v1 is the return on value companies for month t,
measured by the MSCI Value Index. Of the estimated parameters, a is the three-factor Jensen 
alpha, the factor f3 's measure exposure to the respective risk factors, and e I is a residual error 
term included for estimation purposes. The Jensen alpha regression models are estimated by 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) method. As before, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation is 
corrected for using the White (1980) method and Cochrane-Orcutt (1949) procedure, 
respectively. 
The constituency and market coverage of the included market indices is listed in 
Table 4. 1 1 .  The ASX All Ordinaries Index provides an appropriate representation of the 
Australian market due to its large constituency and market coverage. The S&P/ASX 100 and 
S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries indices provide appropriate representation of large and small 
companies, respectively, since these indices cover approximately the top and bottom half of 
the included sample, respectively. The MSCI Value and Growth indices cover 85% of total 
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Estimation issues and the necessity of using CSP-sorted portfolios. 
As expected, model estimation using individual companies ' returns senes 
consistently produce very poor model fit. Returns variation in individual stocks is sufficiently 
noisy to produce adjusted R-squared values consistently lower than 20 percent.3 1  Hence, the
Jensen alpha models were estimated based on portfolio returns. The construction of these 
portfolios must be appropriate in the context of the analysis. Because company CSP and FAC 
measures therefore often are compared using portfolio values rather than individual 
observations, a relatively large number of portfolios is required such that parametric 
31 Single-company regressions were run on a test-sample of 50 companies. 
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market capitalisation, . which exceeds the coverage of the S&P / ASX 300 Index and are 
therefore appropriate for use in the present study. 
Table 4.11: Constituency and Market Coverage of Relevant Indices 
This table lists market indices relevant for the selection of factor proxies in the Jensen alpha model. 
Index constituency and market coverage ( as a percentage of total market capitalisation) is provided. 
All indices are value-weighted. This information is sourced from Standard & Poor's (S&P) (2004) 
and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) (2004). Note that the information from S&P and 
MSCI dates from 31 December 2003 and May 2004, respectively. Note also that the MSCI Growth 
and Value indices are constructed not only based on book-to-market value, but also earnings-price 
ratios and dividend yield. 
Index 
ASX All Ordinaries Index 
S&P/ASX 100 Index 
S&P/ASX 200 Index 
S&P/ ASX 300 Index 
S&P/ ASX Small Ordinaries 
MSCI Growth Index 
MSCI Value Index 
Constituency 
The largest 500 companies traded on the ASX 
A selection of 100 of the largest and most 
frequently traded stocks listed on the ASX 
The constituents of the S&P/ASX 100 Index 
plus an additional 100 stocks selected based on 
size and liquidity 
The constituents of the S&P/ASX 200 Index 
plus an additional 100 small-cap stocks 
The constituents of the S&P/ASX 300 Index 
that are not included in the S&P/ASX 200 Index 
Coverage 
95% 
73% 
78% 
79% 
6% 
The 50% of the largest listed companies with 
the lowest book-to-market value 
The 50% of the largest listed companies with 
the highest book-to-market value 
} 85% 
techniques may be applied with reasonable confidence. For analysis concerned with testing 
for FAC differences between companies with high, moderate and low CSP, FAC measures 
are instead calculated based on these large portfolios (further details are provided in Section 
4.3.4). The following discussion describes the method employed for constructing the 27 
smaller CSP-sorted portfolios used elsewhere in the analysis. 
Since CSP is the central factor of the analysis it is important that the portfolios are 
sorted based on CSP, such that each portfolio is as homogeneous as possible in terms of CSP, 
across all three categories. To achieve this, all companies in the sample are first ranked by 
environmental performance and split into three groups of high, moderate and low 
performance. Second, the companies within each of these groups are then ranked by social 
performance, and again split into three groups of high, moderate and low performance. Last, 
the companies within each of these nine sub-groups are ranked by corporate governance 
performance and split again into three groups of high, moderate and low performance. As a 
result, twenty-seven portfolios are constructed, each with similar CSP attributes. 
Since the sample contains 237 compames, the average portfolio size 1s 8.8 
companies. Though a small number for a portfolio, the objective of this procedure is to 
improve the estimation of the Jensen alpha model. Regression results indicate that this 
objective is met, as the average R-squared values for the 1997-2000 and 2000-2003 periods 
are 0.37 and 0.39, respectively. This is a significant improvement from the individual 
company regressions. Parts of the analysis are based on average CSP and FAC of the 27 CSP­
sorted portfolios rather than individual company observations. 
Further justification for the validity of the three-factor asset pricing model in Australia. 
The ability of the combination of size and book-to-market value to explain cross­
sectional asset returns was first identified by Fama and French (1992). These three factors are 
suggested to absorb all other important characteristics found to explain asset returns, such as 
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leverage and earnings-price ratios (Fama & French, 1992).32 Two studies in particular provide 
useful local evidence of the empirical support for the three-factor model in the Australian 
market. Halliwell, Heaney and Sawicki (1999) investigate the significance of size and value 
in asset pricing based on time-series techniques, and Faff (2001) performs a time-series 
version on the three-factor Fama and French (1992) model. Halliwell, Heaney and Sawicki 
(1999) and Faff (2001) both find evidence of the size and value effects supporting the 
findings of Fama and French (1992). Other significant factors have also been identified in 
Australian asset pricing. Hurn and Pavlov (2003) find evidence of a medium-term momentum 
effect, and Chan and Faff (2003) find evidence of a liquidity effect. Various seasonal effects 
are also indicated, including the January and end-of-financial-year effects (P. Brown et al., 
1983) and Australian and U.S. business cycles (Ragunthan, Faff, & Brooks, 2000).33 
The purpose of a good financial asset performance measure is to give a fair measure 
of market performance that is not biased by common factors associated with firm 
characteristics. Since seasonality is not related to firm characteristics ( except for its possible 
relationship with market beta), the inclusion or exclusion of a seasonality factors is arguably 
not important in the context of measuring relative performance across companies. The 
momentum effect is only important when measuring the isolated return on an asset over a 
specific period of time, for example in relation to a specific event. In these cases, abnormal 
return must be adjusted for the portion of the sample-period return that is attributed to pre­
sample period returns. In terms of the liquidity effect, liquidity may intuitively seem likely to 
be linked to size, as indicated by Beedles, Dodd and Officer (1988) but has been found to be 
more strongly related to book-to-market value and momentum (Chan & Faff, 2003). Hence, 
there is reasonably good evidence for assuming that market beta, size and value factors 
represent the most important financial asset characteristics, and therefore performance 
adjustment factors, in the context of Australian companies. 
32 Note that Fama and French (1992) found that the combination of size and value combine to capture variation 
attributed to the market beta, size, leverage, book-to-market value and earnings-price ratios in a cross-section of 
stock returns. Hence, size and value are possibly the most important factors to be considered when comparing 
returns across companies, but the market factor is still important in explaining time-variation in return. Hence, 
beta should be included in the three-factor Jensen alpha model. 
33 Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) find that returns in January are not statistically different from return in any other 
month. 
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Benchmark-Adjusted Performance 
Whereas the Jensen alpha is adjusted for factors found to explain cross-sectional 
variation in return based on factor return exposure, alternative methods that do not rely on 
exposure risk ( or factor return covariation) also exist for making such adjustments. The 
benchmark-adjusted performance measure based on characteristics-matched benchmark 
portfolios developed by Daniel et al. ( 1997) presents such an alternative. This performance 
measure is developed based on the evidence of Daniel and Titman ( 1997) who question the 
conclusions that Fama and French ( 1993) drew from their 1992 study on the cross-section of 
expected stock returns. From their findings Fama and French ( 1993) conclude that their 
evidence suggests the higher returns on stocks that are small and have low book-to-market 
ratios are compensation for higher systematic risk. Fama and French ( 1993) suggest that 
book-to-market and size are proxies for distress and that distressed companies may be more 
sensitive to business cycle factors than other companies. Daniel et al. ( 1997) identify other 
alternative explanations. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny ( 1994) suggest that 
the higher returns on high book-to-market stocks may be explained by investors extrapolating 
on past returns, and that they appeal to naive investors because they appear more glamorous 
than other stocks. They however also suggest that the return premia on these stocks are too 
large, and their covariances with macro factors too low, to be considered compensation for 
systematic risk. 
Daniel and Titman ( 1997) therefore suggest another explanation for the risk premia 
on these stocks. They find that the return patterns of characteristic-sorted portfolios are not 
consistent with a factor model, suggesting: 
"although high book-to-market stocks do covary strongly with other high 
book-to-market stocks, the covariances do not result from there being 
particular risks associated with distress, but rather reflect the fact that high 
book-to-market firms tend to have similar properties; e.g., they might be 
in related lines of business, in the same industries, or from the same 
regions" (p. 3). 
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They conclude that "high book-to-market stocks and stocks with low capitalizations have high 
average returns whether or not they have the return patterns (i.e., covariances) of other small 
and high book-to-market stocks" (p. 4). 
Daniel et al. (1997) use this evidence to create a performance measure that is not 
based on returns covariance with style factors, but rather on the characteristics of the firms 
themselves. In essence, this performance measure is the difference between the return on an 
asset and the return on a portfolio that is matched by this asset's characteristic. Hence it is in 
effect a characteristics-matched benchmark-adjusted performance measure. For simplicity this 
measure is referred to hereafter as benchmark-adjusted performance. Daniel et al. (1997) are 
concerned with measuring the performance on managed funds, and hence their model is 
somewhat more complex than what is needed when measuring performance for individual 
firms. However, their method can easily be applied to all assets. For example, Safieddine and 
Titman ( 1999) use characteristics-based benchmarks when measuring financial performance 
for companies that terminate take-over offers. 
Benchmark-adjusted performance is the return on an asset, less the return on a 
portfolio of assets with similar characteristics as the objective asset. The difficulty lies in the 
construction of appropriate benchmark portfolios. The characteristics-based benchmarks used 
in Daniel et al. ( 1997) include three different components. The average style component 
captures the size and value effect, the characteristics selectivity component captures manager 
stock selectivity ability, and the characteristic timing component captures fund managers' 
ability to correctly time the market. In the context of the present study only the average style 
component is of relevance. Furthermore, since the present study is concerned with individual 
stocks rather than fund portfolios, it is more appropriate to use a straightforward style 
measure rather than an average style measure. Hence, only Daniel et al.'s ( 1997) approach to 
adjusting for style-factors (that is, size and value) is described here. 
The calculation of appropriate benchmark-adjusted performance measures requires 
homogeneity of style-characteristics within each benchmark portfolio, and portfolios of 
reasonable size, so as not to place too much importance on individual asset returns within 
each portfolio. Daniel et al. ( 1997) create benchmark portfolios by first ranking companies 
listed on the NYSE by size, and dividing this list into quintiles. Then they rank each of these 
1 13 
size-quintiles by book-:to-market value, and split these into quintiles again. Lastly, since they 
are also concerned with a momentum effect, they divide each quintile into quintiles again, 
based on past returns. Hence, they construct 125 portfolios in total. They measure a fund's 
abnormal return by subtracting from its total return the return on a style-matched benchmark 
based on the average size, book-to-market value and past-returns of the assets held in the 
fund. 
Daniel et al. (1997) include momentum as a control variable because they are 
concerned with measuring the abnormal performance of managed funds over specific time 
periods. Since the present study is concerned with individual assets and timing is not 
important, only size and value are adjusted for.34
Constructing style-matched benchmark portfolios. 
Whereas Daniel et al. (1997) have access to a large universe of assets from which to 
construct a sample (given that their study concerns U.S. mutual funds), the equivalent 
universe of Australian assets is limited in comparison. For any month during the sample 
period, the highest number of identified listed companies with total market capitalisation, 
book-to-market value and total shareholder return data available (among companies included 
in the ASX All Ordinaries during the sample period) is 5 15. A total extended sample size of at 
least 500 companies per month was sought. However, limited data availability means the 
average monthly number of companies with complete information over the sample period is 
470, which provides benchmark portfolios containing an average of 18.8 companies. 
Portfolios are constructed on a quarterly basis as follows. Firstly, companies with 
missing size, value or returns data are excluded from the benchmark-adjusted performance 
calculation for that quarter, such that only companies with complete data are included. 
Secondly, the included companies are ranked by size and sorted into five portfolios such that 
each has approximately the same number of companies, all with similar size. Thirdly, each of 
these portfolios is ranked by book-to-market value and sorted into five portfolios again. This 
produces 25 portfolios of similar size and value characteristics. 
34 Timing is not so important in the context of the present study because companies are evaluated according to 
how they perform in general and not how they perform over very specific periods or around particular events. 
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Calculating benchmark-adjusted performance and dealing with extreme values. 
Benchmark-adjusted performance is calculated as follows. Firstly, the average return 
of each portfolio is calculated. This portfolio return then becomes the benchmark return by 
which individual company returns are adjusted. Benchmark portfolios are recalculated for 
each company so that it excludes the objective company in order to avoid 'double counting'. 
Like most sizable samples of companies' returns, the sample used in the present 
study is subject to outliers.35 When calculating benchmark-adjusted performance, outliers may 
cause significant problems given that portfolios are relatively small. The data were therefore 
checked for outliers and their sources as follows. Firstly, benchmark-adjusted performance is 
calculated on a quarterly basis.36 This may slightly reduce the size of extreme observations if 
for example an extreme high observation is followed by an extreme low observation ( or vice 
versa). Secondly, observations of monthly return exceeding 100 percent (in either direction) 
were excluded from the respective benchmark portfolios in order to minimise the effect that 
such large values have on benchmark-adjusted return. Hence, whenever such outlier 
observations appear within a portfolio, the benchmark returns for the other companies are 
calculated on the basis of all companies within that portfolio, except the company with the 
outlier, in that particular quarter (always excluding the objective company). The benchmark 
return of a company with an outlier observation is calculated as normal, such that the effect of 
the extreme return is still included for that company. Hence, there is no data 
misrepresentation, yet outliers are prevented from producing misleading performance 
measures for other companies. 
Quarterly returns exceeding 100 percent were observed for 16 of the 5 15 companies 
included in the extended sample during the sample period. Most of these were small growth 
companies, of which nine are included in the lowest quintile of both size and book-to-market 
35 Outliers may be a result of error or of genuine extreme values. If they are to be omitted it is best to exclude the 
company from the sample rather than just omitting the observation in question. However, such an approach 
implies some risk of data misrepresentation. Only including companies with "acceptable" data will give a false 
Eicture ofreality. All outlier returns were checked to exclude input error. 6 Note that the frequency of benchmark-adjusted performance calculations is independent of the frequency of 
portfolio rebalancing. 
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value. Of these quarterly return outliers, eight are between 100 and 15 0 percent, four are 
between 150 and 200 percent, and four are between 200 and 509 percent. 37
4.2.5 Sample Description of the FAC data 
Table 4.12 provides descriptive statistics for the F AC measures calculated and 
included in the analysis, based both on the full unrestricted sample and on a restricted sample 
where companies with outlier return observations are excluded. Issues of missing data and 
data distributions are discussed. 
Dealing with Lack of Data Coverage 
Among the 237 companies in the sample, only 156 companies have full coverage 
over the full sample period, leaving 8 1  companies with some extent of missing data. Official 
listing dates were acquired for all companies so as to eliminate the risk of reporting false gaps 
in the data. This procedure confirms that 8 1  companies were indeed listed after the 1 August 
1997. In these cases of incomplete data coverage it is necessary to establish a rule of how 
much missing data are allowed for each period. In this regard, an inclusion criterion of 18-
months minimum coverage for each three-year period was deemed appropriate. Unlike the 
case of missing CSP data, missing financial data simply means that the company is not listed 
during these periods. Hence, accepting moderate levels of missing data does not pose any 
problems in terms of data misrepresentation. 
Because of the sample selection process described in Section 4. 1.4 based on CSP 
data coverage, all companies have adequate F AC coverage for the most recent three-year 
period, but 176 of the companies in the sample are not provided with a size, total shareholder 
37 The difference in benchmark-adjusted performance of companies within the same size and book-to-market 
value quintiles, with or without adjustment, may or may not be statistically significant. For example, an outlier 
observation is observed in October 1997 of 1 1 3  percent (for Jubilee Mines NL). The average benchmark­
adjusted performance of the companies within the same portfolio is -5.61 percent without adjustment and 0.03 
percent with adjustment. The difference in this case is not statistically significant. In other cases the differences 
in average benchmark-adjusted performance before and after adjustment are statistically significant. For 
example, an outlier observation is observed in January 2001 of 1 98 percent (for Vecommerce Limited). The 
average benchmark-adjusted performance of the companies within the same portfolio is -8.20 percent without 
adjustment and 0.00 percent with adjustment. The difference in this case is statistically significant beyond the 99 
percent level. 
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return, Sharpe Ratio and total risk measures for the preceding three-year period, and 169 and 
170 companies are not provided with book-to-market value and benchmark-adjusted 
performance for this period, respectively.38 All companies are provided with a full-period 
measure, reflecting up to six years of trading data. 
Problems with Non-Normally Distributed Variables 
Parametric techniques require variables to be approximately normally distributed. 
Before any adjustments are made within the full sample of F AC measures, the distributions of 
these variables appear somewhat non-normal.39 Size, book-to-market value, total shareholder 
return, benchmark-adjusted performance and total risk measures are very positively skewed 
and leptokurtic. As mentioned, non-normal distribution in company size is a problem that can 
be rectified by transforming the data to log form. Return distributions ( and therefore the 
distributions of all variables based on return) are in this case non-normal because of outlier 
observations. Specifically, when four companies with extreme returns observations are 
omitted from the dataset these distributions appear approximately normal. For this reason, the 
empirical analysis is chiefly performed on a restricted sample, where the four companies with 
observed outliers are omitted, with some exceptions (please refer to the discussion of the 
methodology in Section 4.3 for further details).40 Descriptive statistics for the full unrestricted 
sample of F AC data, and for the restricted sample with these four companies omitted, are 
provided in Table 4. 12. The following descriptions of the data are based on the restricted 
sample. 
38 Coverage is different for market-based data, such as size and total shareholder return and therefore total risk, 
and book-to-market data, which depend on accounting information. This is because accounting-based 
information is provided at periodic intervals and reflects historical information that may be valid for periods 
before the listing date. Since benchmark-adjusted performance measures are calculated quarterly, requiring 
complete returns for each quarter, the coverage for this measure is slightly less than for book-to-market value. 
39 Certain tools may be used to test whether distributions are approximately normal. It is possible, for example, 
to calculate a standard error of kurtosis and skewness, and then apply normal parametric tests to determine 
whether measures of kurtosis and skewness fall outside the confidence interval. This technique appears to have 
originated with Tabachnick & Fidell (1 996), and a summary provided by Brown (1997). 
40 These four outlier companies are Ambri Ltd, A VT Holdings, Ellex Medical Lasers Ltd, and Virotex 
International Ltd. Ambri Ltd recorded a fifteen-fold increase of its share price on 1 September 200 1 .  A capital 
consolidation was conducted before this date, which appears not to have been adjusted for correctly by 
Datastream. A VT Holdings recorded a 524 percent increase of its share price on 1 April 2000 due to trading 
being suspended since May 1998. This is therefore a genuine outlier. Ellex Medical Lasers Ltd recorded a 393 
percent increase of its share price on 1 .  August 2001 due a capital consolidation, which appears not to have been 
adjusted for correctly by Datastream. Virotex International Ltd recorded a 488 percent increase of its share price 
on 1 March 2000, and this appears to be a genuine outlier. No attempt is made to adjust these returns. 
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Table 4. 12: Descriptive Statistics for F AC Measures for the Unrestricted and Restricted 
Sample 
This table displays two panels of summary statistics for all calculated F AC measures that are 
measured on an individual company basis, based on the on the full sample of 237 companies and a 
restricted sample of 233 companies where four are omitted due to outlier returns observations. The 
columns display the period over which each measure is calculated, the mean value within the sample,
the standard deviation (SD) of observations, a measure of skewness (SK) and kurtosis (KS), lowest
and highest observation (Min and Max), and number of observations (N). Skewness and kurtosis 
gives an indication of the distributions of each variable. A perfectly normal distribution will have a 
value of zero for skewness and a value of three for kurtosis. The rows display measures of size 
(measured by average monthly total market capitalisation in millions of dollars) and log of size 
(based on total market capitalisation in dollars), book-to-market value (measured by average monthly 
observations), total shareholder return (measured as annualised average monthly return), total risk 
(measured by the standard deviation of monthly returns), benchmark-adjusted performance 
(measured as annualised average monthly return), and the Sharpe Ratio (measured as average 
monthly excess total return divided by excess total risk). Statistics are also provided for the Jensen 
alpha (Alpha, measured as average monthly abnormal return) and the market beta (Beta, measured as 
the slope coefficient between excess return and the market factor), which are both calculated based 
on 27 CSP-sorted portfolios, and only based on the restricted sample. 
Panel 1: Unrestricted sample statistics 
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FAC Period Mean SD SK KS Min Max N 
1997-2003 2,129 5,465 4.61 26.13 4.49 40,968 237 
Size (market 
capitalisation) 2000-2003 2,376 6,206 4.74 27.69 4.49 48,387 237 
1997-2000 2,307 5,490 3.86 18.68 1.47 33,549 176 
1997-2003 8.62 0.81 -0.04 2.86 6.65 10.61 237 
Log size 2000-2003 8.65 0.83 -0.02 2.83 6.65 10.68 237 
1997-2000 8.61 0.87 -0.11 2.76 6.17 10.53 176 
1997-2003 0.68 0.63 2.93 20.50 -0.93 5.71 237 
Book-to-
market value 2000-2003 0.72 0.68 2.55 16.08 -1.07 5.71 237 
1997-2000 0.59 0.60 0.68 14.49 -2.86 3.88 169 
Total 1997-2003 13.2% 39.0% 7.09 86.95 -88.0% 478.7% 237 
shareholder 2000-2003 5.5% 46.5% 4.35 47.04 -113.8% 478.7% 237 
return 1997-2000 24.9% 41.9% 1.57 5.88 -42.8% 197.2% 176 
1997-2003 0.0459 0.143 3.93 -0.42 0.58 237 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 0.0400 0.203 2.70 -0.42 0.60 237 
1997-2000 0.0615 0.198 
-0.11
0.21
0.15 2.85 -0.43 0.66 176 
1997-2003 12.1% 43.9% 5.80 64.48 -90.5% 495.1% 237 
2000-2003 48.3% 4.76 49.81 -114.5% 495.1% 237 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance 1997-2000 
-1.7%
32.4% 40.1% 1.25 6.63 -82.6% 213.5% 170 
1997-2003 15.1% 18.3% 9.84 126.35 3.0% 255.2% 237 
Total risk 2000-2003 13.8% 17.7% 10.88 146.11 3.0% 255.2% 237 
1997-2000 14.2% 12.4% 3.19 16.53 4.2% 88.4% 176 
Description of the Sample of FAC Data 
Many companies are not provided with FAC measures for the 1997-2000 period due 
to being listed well into the sample period. This means that more emphasis should be placed 
on FAC measures for the 2000-2003 period compared to the 1997-2000 period. The full 
period measure will in effect include important features of the 1997-2000 period, but 
emphasise the 2000-2003 period for companies with missing data. 
Total shareholder returns, and hence all other financial performance measures, 
exhibit a strong reversal between the 2000-2003 and 1997-2000 periods. Returns are 
generally higher over the 1997-2000 period than over the 2000-2003 period. One factor that 
could contribute to the reversal of returns between the two three-year periods is initial public 
offerings (IPOs). As indicated earlier, 159 companies (about 67% of the sample) were listed 
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Panel 2: Restricted sample 
FAC Period Mean SD SK KS Min Max N 
1997-2003 2,165 5,505 4.57 25.70 4.49 40,968 233 
Size ( market 
capitalisation) 2000-2003 2,416 6,251 4.70 27.23 4.49 48,387 233 
1997-2000 2,334 5,516 3.84 18.46 4.74 33,549 173 
1997-2003 8.647 0.802 -0.04 2.94 6.65 10.61 233 
Log size 2000-2003 8.675 0.814 -0.03 2.90 6.65 10.68 233 
1997-2000 8.635 0.848 -0.02 2.65 6.68 10.53 173 
Book-to-
1997-2003 0.688 0.636 2.91 20.31 -0.93 5.71 233 
market value 2000-2003 0.722 0.686 2.53 15.91 -1.07 5.71 233 
1997-2000 0.586 0.603 0.67 14.42 -2.86 3.88 168 
Total 1997-2003 10.4% 23.4% -0.55 4.93 -88.0% 76.7% 233 
shareholder 2000-2003 3.2% 33.3% 4.35 -113.8% 121.1% 233 
return 1997-2000 23.1% 39.0% 
-0.51
1.43 5.43 -42.8% 174.0% 173 
1997-2003 0.0443 0.144 3.90 -0.42 0.58 233 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 0.0408 0.202 2.72 -0.42 0.60 233 
1997-2000 0.0603 0.200 
-0.08
0.23
0.16 2.82 -0.43 0.66 173 
1997-2003 8.4% 26.8% -0.78 4.36 -90.5% 78.8% 233 
2000-2003 33.3% 3.86 -114.5% 102.1% 233 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance 1997-2000 
-4.4%
31.3% 37.7% 
-0.32
0.93 5.46 -82.6% 185.9% 169 
Total risk 2000-2003 0.31% 0.79% 3.02 -1.69% 1.32% 27 
1997-2000 1.59% 1.84% 
-0.89
1.84 6.30 -0.65% 7.77% 27 
1997-2003 13.4% 7.8% 1.19 3.78 3.0% 41.7% 233 
2000-2003 12.5% 7.2% 1.34 4.92 3.0% 41.3% 233 Size (market 
cal!italisation} 1997-2000 13.2% 9.4% 1.99 6.77 4.2% 54.1% 173 
2000-2003 1.21 0.59 0.60 2.55 0.22 2.63 27 
1997-2000 1.03 0.43 0.60 2.68 0.32 2.09 27 
sometime during the sample period. IPOs are known to be subjected to frequent mispricing 
and hence abnormal return around the listing date. This makes it difficult to measure actual 
non-misleading performance for shares until they have traded for a while (for general 
discussions on IPOs and mispricing issues, see for example Bodie, Keim & Marcus, 1999; 
Copeland & Weston, 1988). This means that the earlier period (1997-2000) may produce 
performance measures that are slightly misleading due to the high number of IPOs during this 
period. IPOs are typically underpriced, hence they tend to have abnormally high returns 
during the initial trading period. However, when isolating those companies with complete 
coverage over the full six-year period and recalculating correlation between the two three­
year periods, the correlation is still strongly negative (-0.40). Hence it does not seem that this 
reversal-effect can be blamed on new issues. 
Distribution of the 27 CSP-Sorted Portfolios 
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, parts of the analysis are based on a set of 27 portfolios 
with similar CSP attributes. If parametric techniques are to be employed to investigate the 
properties of these portfolios it is obviously also necessary that the portfolio average F AC 
values are approximately normally distributed. Furthermore, the usefulness of these 27 
portfolios depends on relatively homogeneous FAC, as well as CSP, of the constituent 
companies within each portfolio. If portfolios are very heterogeneous in terms of F AC this is 
likely to result in non-normal distributions of portfolio average F AC measures. The 
distributions of the portfolio F AC variables are however approximately normally distributed. 
This supports the use of parametric techniques, and implies that the portfolios are useful for 
investigating CSP-F AC relationships. 
4.3 Methodology 
This section discusses the methodology of the empirical analysis of the present 
study. The discussions proceed as follows. Firstly, the specific research questions addressed 
are listed. Secondly, the method employed for accommodating industry-contingent CSP-F AC 
relationships is discussed, as part of the analysis incorporates such an approach. The 
methodology behind each research question is then discussed in turn. 
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4.3.1 The Research Questions 
Five specific research questions are addressed in this study. The type and range of 
research questions that can be addressed are restricted by the available data, which are 
discussed in detail in Section 4. 1 .  The five research questions to be addressed are: 
Q 1 : Is there a correlation between corporate social performance and financial asset 
characteristics in a cross-section of companies, and do these differ across 
samples formed based on company size, age and industry group classification? 
Q2: Do firms with different levels of corporate social performance exhibit different 
financial asset characteristics? 
Q3 : Does corporate social performance explain cross-sectional variation in financial 
asset characteristics, and does the ability of corporate social performance to 
explain financial asset characteristics differ across industry groups? 
Q4: Do financial asset characteristics explain cross-sectional variation in corporate 
social performance, does the ability of financial asset characteristics to explain 
corporate social performance differ across industry groups, and are there fixed 
industry group effects in such models? 
Q5: Does corporate social performance add significant explanatory power to a three­
factor cross-sectional asset pricing model? 
Research question one, three and four are addressed both on the basis of the entire 
sample and within sections of the sample on the basis of industry classification. 
4.3.2 Allowing for Industry-Contingent CSP-FAC Relationships 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature presents convincing theories that CSP­
financial characteristics relationships are industry contingent. Chapter 3 reviews the empirical 
literature concerned with CSP-financial characteristics relationships, identifying two studies 
where some level of industry contingency is accommodated in the research methodology, 
namely Herremans, Akathapom and Mclnnes (1993) and Spencer and Taylor (1987). 
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Evaluating Two Altemative Approaches 
Herremans, Akathapom and Mclnnes (1993) present a model where industries are 
sorted into two groups according to level of social conflict. Within each group, companies are 
sorted into high and low-CSP portfolios and differences in financial characteristics between 
pairs of CSP-level portfolios are tested for statistical significance for each industry group. The 
study is successful in that it presents significant differences in financial performance and risk 
when comparing high and low-CSP companies within the high-conflict group, but no 
corresponding significant differences within the low-conflict group. 
Although the study is 'successful' in this sense, there are certain aspects of the 
methodology that warrant further investigation. The method with which industries are sorted 
is as follows. A sample of96 companies, each provided with a single aggregate CSP measure, 
is sorted into 21  industries. An average CSP value is calculated for each industry, and 
industries are then sorted by average CSP. The industries with the highest average CSP are 
placed in the low-social conflict group, and the industries with the lowest average CSP are 
placed in the high-social conflict group. The underlying idea is that high CSP indicates no 
serious social issues controversy, whereas low CSP indicates presence of social issues 
controversy. 
This assumption in itself is questionable. Its appropriateness would depend on the 
methodology behind the construction of the CSP measure, because it may not be that the lack 
of social conflict issues automatically results in high CSP. Also, it could well be that some 
industries are exposed to social issues, and that constituent companies understand this and 
therefore invest in activities to improve their CSP. In that case, these companies may well 
earn high CSP measures from rating agencies, hence the industry will exhibit high average 
CSP even if it is a high-social conflict industry. In fact, while Herremans, Akathapom and 
Mcinnes (1993) make a significant contribution by representing an important attempt of 
allowing for CSP-F AC contingencies, they are in effect only testing whether there is a F AC 
difference between high and very high-CSP companies and between low and very low-CSP 
companies. Another source of concern is heterogeneity in CSP within industries. Herremans, 
Akathapom and Mcinnes (1993) provide a complete list of all companies and their CSP 
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measures. This list does indicate very low homogeneity m CSP within industries. No 
indication is given that this is a cause of concern. 
Nonetheless, a pilot study was performed replicating Herremans, Akathapom and 
Mclnnes's (1993) method. Firstly, companies were sorted by industry groups as classified by 
the Global Industry Classification System (GICS), which sorts Australian listed companies 
into 24 industry groups (for simplicity, industry groups will be referred to as industries 
hereafter, and the term industry as used here is therefore not equivalent to the term industry as 
used in the GICS system, which is much more specific compared to the industry group 
categories). 
A list of industries is provided in Table 4. 13 , with the number of companies 
included in each industry, as well as the average and range of CSP measures within each 
industry (note that one of the GICS industry groups, the property trusts group, is not 
represented in the sample, hence only 23 groups appear in the table). As observed in 
Herremans, Akathapom and Mclnnes (1993), this table displays a relatively wide range of 
CSP within each industry. This is interpreted as an indication that within-industry companies 
are not homogeneous enough to justify splitting industries into high and low-conflict groups 
using average industry CSP measures. 
Herremans, Akathapom and Mclnnes's (1993) method of determining level of 
conflict was attempted modified in order to address the problems in using level of CSP to 
measure level of conflict. If an industry is not particularly exposed to conflict, constituent 
companies are perhaps expected to be unlikely to receive very high or low ratings in the 
relevant CSP category. Hence the sample could be sorted by minimum within-industry CSP 
and by range of CSP ratings within industries. Both these methods are however questionable 
because, as argued earlier, high-conflict industries may exhibit high minimum CSP if all 
constituent companies are responsive. Also, industries are very different in terms of number 
of constituents, hence large industries are much more likely to have wider CSP range than 
small industries, and CSP range will not be an appropriate measure of conflict. 
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Table 4. 13: CSP Properties of the Sample sorted into the 23 GICS Industry Groups 
This table displays the CSP properties of the sample (less the four outlier companies) when sorted
into the GICS industry groups. For each industry group, the number of included companies (n) is
displayed, as well as the average (ave) CSP value and CSP range within each group, for each CSP
category. 
Environmental Social Governance 
eerformance �erformance eerformance 
Industry n ave range ave range ave range 
Automobiles & Components 3 3 .21 2.00-4.00 2.25 2.00-2.50 2.95 2.00-3 .91 
Banks 9 3 . 1 1 2.00-5.00 4.07 3 .00-5.00 3 . 1 2  2.32-4.09 
Capital Goods 8 2.98 1 .00-5 .00 2.88 1 .00-4.50 2.96 2.00-4.32 
Commercial Services & Supplies 8 3 .68 2.00-5.00 2.87 1 .4 1 -3 .91  2.54 1 . 1 8-3 .9 1 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 2 2.94 2.00-4.00 2.6 1  2.00-3 .82 2.52 1 .64-3 .91 
Diversified Financials 6 2.87 1 .00-4.00 3.24 1 .00-4.05 3 .06 2. 14-4.00 
Energy 1 0  1 .82 1 .00-4.00 2.94 1 .00-5.00 2.90 1 .00-3 .91  
Food & Staples Retailing 4 3 .72 3.00-4.00 3 .55 1 .00-5.00 3 .06 2.00-4.68 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 10  3 .67 1 . 59-5 .00 2.5 1 1 .00-5.00 2.96 1 .00-4.32 
Health Care Equip. & Services 1 1 2.64 2.00-5.00 3 .33 1 .86-5.00 2.94 1 . 82-4.27 
Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 6 2.97 1 .00-4.27 1 .73 1 .00-3 .95 3 .29 2.36-4.55 
Insurance 5 3 .57 2.86-4.00 3 .94 3 .00-5.00 2.29 1 .00-3 .32 
Materials 34 2.34 1 .00-5.00 2.72 1 .77-4.59 2.91 1 .00-4.91 
Media 1 3  2.76 2.00-4.00 2.65 1 .73-4.00 2.58 1 .00-3 .91  
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech. 6 2.23 1 .55-3 .00 3 .55 1 .9 1 -4.00 2.90 2.00-4.91 
Real Estate 3 2.45 1 .50-4.00 3.39 2.00-4. 14  2.61 1 . 50-3 .91  
Retailing 6 2.48 1 .00-3.77 2.62 2.00-3.64 2.62 1 .00-3 . 82 
Semiconductors & Semic. Equip. 1 1 .23 2.00 2.00 
Software & Services 14  2.95 2.64-4.00 2. 1 5  1 .59-2.95 2.05 1 . 55-2.95 
Technology Hardware & Equip. 4 2.57 2.00-3 .00 2.00 2.3 1 1 .95-2.95 
Telecommunication Services 8 2.61 2.00-5.00 2.45 2.00-3 .59 2. 1 8  1 .45-3 . 14  
Transportation 1 0  1 .8 1  1 .00-2.77 2.55 2.00-4.00 2.2 1 1 .68-3 .09 
Utilities 8 4.28 2.82-5.00 3.24 2.23-4.76 2.76 1 . 62-4.00 
A pilot study replicating the methodology of Herremans, Akathaporn and Mcinnes 
(1993), using the original and alternative approaches of classifying industries by CSR 
conflict, yielded little useful information and indicated problems with the methodology. The 
alternative and more industry specific approach provided by Spencer and Taylor ( 1987) was 
therefore investigated. In sum, their approach presents fewer methodological problems and 
yields clearer results. 
Spencer and Taylor (1987) sort companies into industry groups, and then apply what 
they call a 'within-and-between analysis'. Hence, the analysis is performed based on the 
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actual industries, and does not require sorting industries into high and low conflict groups. 
Significant between-industry CSP differences are accommodated for by allowing for industry 
group fixed effects (by including intercept dummies) in the cross-sectional regression model 
where CSP is regressed on F AC, as part of addressing research question four. 
The within-industry analysis tests for a CSP-F AC relationship within each industry. 
This, of course, requires that industries each have a reasonable number of constituent 
companies. Spencer and Taylor (1987) do not disclose the distribution of the sample of 130 
companies into the 13 industries used in the study, but an average industry size of ten does 
indicate small industry size. 
As argued, a within-industry analysis requires a reasonable number of constituents 
within each industry, and if possible relatively similar numbers of constituents across 
industries (although this is not strictly necessary it does ensure some consistency). The 
problem with the 23 GICS industries is of course the very uneven distribution of companies, 
and the fact that, even if distributions were even, the average number of constituent 
companies would only be about 10. If parametric techniques are to be used within industries, 
groups of 10 companies are too small. This means the 23 GICS industries must be 
amalgamated into a smaller set of larger industry groups on the basis of suggested CSP-F AC 
contingency factors. The framework of Rowley and Berman (2000) and some related aspects 
from consumer behaviour, discussed hereunder, are used for this purpose. A within-industry 
analysis appears to be most appropriate for inclusion in the present study, using industry 
groups constructed with suggested CSP-F AC contingency factors in mind. 
A Framework/or Constructing Industry Groups with Similar CSP-FAC Contingency 
Factors 
Rowley and Berman (2000) provide an in-depth discussion of possible CSP-F AC 
contingency factors. They sort such factors into five main groups, including firm 
characteristics, issue conditions, industry characteristics, stakeholder environment, and 
institutional context. Rowley and Berman (2000) discuss these factors mainly from an 
institutional stakeholder perspective, and determinants of consumer CSP demand are not 
discussed in detail. The consumer behaviour literature may provide useful input about the 
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sources of consumer value and perceived risk, which is important in understanding the extent 
to which consumers demand CSP, and at what price. 
Firm characteristics include firm reputation, size and the importance of branding. 
Rowley and Berman (2000) suggest that the public is more ready to act when a company 
already has a poor CSP reputation. Hence, firms with a history of poor CSP will face a 
potentially stronger CSP-financial characteristics relationship compared to other firms. Size 
may also matter, since activist groups typically target large firms rather than small firms 
because their efforts are likely to be rewarded with greater attention in the public domain. 
Also, some firms deliberately position and brand themselves as high CSP firms, which is 
likely to invite social scrutiny (Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
Issue conditions include the perceived cause of harm, the perceived severity of harm 
and the credibility of the problem owner or interpreter. A firm must be perceived as being the 
cause of a particular problem, or it will probably not be specifically targeted by stakeholder 
activists. The effect on a CSP-financial asset characteristics relationship will be strengthened 
where the perceived severity of harm is great. This may be why uranium mining and nuclear 
power are such sensitive issues, since the potential harm of related accidents or 
mismanagement is perceived to be extremely serious. Furthermore, a firm must be identifiable 
as the credible owner or interpreter of the problem (Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
Industry characteristics include product type, exposure and social role or 
importance. In terms of product type, the nature of a CSP-financial characteristics relationship 
may depend on where in the value-chain a firm operates. Companies whose business is 
mainly derived from the business sector are less prone to public scrutiny compared to 
companies for whom the private customer represents an important portion of business. This 
may suggest that private customers use different decision processes when making purchase 
decisions compared to industrial customers. Some industries also have higher exposure in the 
public domain than others. Some industries are more exposed to public scrutiny because their 
operations or purpose are perceived to be of particular importance. For example, the resources 
sector includes companies in control of large amounts of natural resources, and whose 
operations are prone to environmental controversy. Conversely, in terms of social role or 
importance, some economies rely heavily on certain industries that may be controversial in a 
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CSP sense. In these cases, the public may be more accepting of controversial activities 
(Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
Lawson et al. (1996) provide a discussion on the distinction between private and 
industrial consumer behaviour, suggesting several important differences. They suggest 
industrial consumers are likely to make decisions based on convenience, service and cost, or 
other more 'rational' logic, following structured processes. Industrial consumer decision 
processes are often complex and formal and may involve lengthy negotiations. 
Although industrial consumers do attach some personal risk to purchase decisions, 
these risks are different from those assumed by private consumers. Industrial consumers 
appear to assume mainly psychological and social risks of purchase decisions, in that a poor 
decision will imply personal dissatisfaction and a strained relationship between the buyer and 
the users of the product. Private consumers are more exposed to physical, financial, and 
functional risk than are industrial consumers. Private consumers also follow less structured 
decision processes that are personal and informal, based on rational and emotional motives. 
Whereas industrial consumers only bear some of the risks implied by poor decision-making, 
private consumers bear all risks themselves. Consumers may not always act rationally in 
terms of reflecting the severity or extent of a problem, but rather reflecting how they perceive 
themselves to be affected by potential harm. Industrial and private consumption is driven by 
different motives. Industrial consumption is driven primarily by organisational need and 
rational motives, whereas private consumption is driven primarily by personal and social 
motives (Lawson et al., 1996). 
Consumer behaviour theory also makes distinctions between different types of 
purchase processes. Firstly, processes may be high or low involvement, and planned or 
unplanned (Lawson et al., 1996). Planned high-involvement situations imply extensive 
problem solving processes and importance of brand loyalty (for example cars and 
whitegoods). Planned low-involvement situations imply routine or limited problem solving 
processes (for example, groceries). Unplanned high-involvement situations imply impulsive 
intense processes (for example, jewellery and fashion), and unplanned low-involvement 
situations imply casual variety seeking processes (for example, groceries). Hence, the type of 
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product in terms of the purchase process involved may determine how important CSP is to 
consumers. 
Several factors may affect which type of decision process applies in purchase 
decisions. For instance, market conditions and perceived risk are important factors in this 
context (Lawson et al., 1996). Availability of information and the level of competition affect 
the perceived importance of information search and decision-making. Where consumers are 
faced with little choice, CSP is likely to be less important. Consumers and other stakeholders 
may in these cases pursue possible social objectives by means of other stakeholder actions 
(for example, via political activity). 
Rowley and Berman (2000) suggest that the perceived risk of harm and the 
perceived severity of harm may be important in determining how CSP and financial 
characteristics are related. The important word in this context is "perceived", indicating, as 
consumer behaviour suggests, that consumers' actions do not necessarily reflect the actual 
extent or severity of a problem. Perceived purchase risk includes financial risk, functional 
risk, physical risk, social risk and psychological risk (Jacoby & Kaplan, 1989). Certain types 
of goods and services involve certain types of perceived risk. For instance, perceived financial 
risk would be prominent in dealings with financial institutions, perceived functional risk 
would be prominent for whitegoods, perceived physical risk would be prominent for health 
services and foods, perceived social risk would be prominent for life-style type products and 
services such as hi-fi equipment, fashion and cars, and perceived psychological risk would be 
prominent for services such as education. It could be that CSP matters in lowering some of 
these perceived risks. 
The fourth CSP-financial characteristics contingency factor suggested by Rowley 
and Berman (2000) is the stakeholder environment, which comprises stakeholder 
characteristics, within stakeholder-group dynamics and stakeholder network characteristics. 
This factor is suggested to be important because exposure to stakeholder activism, and 
thereby CSP-financial characteristics relationships, depends on how well organised 
stakeholder groups are, how active they are, their legitimacy, their proximity and how much 
'power' they hold in relation to the firm in question. 
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Lastly, the institutional environment factor comprises systemic trust and monitoring 
mechanisms. This relates to the degree of government intervention and how well stakeholders 
are protected from harm by special government agencies and the extent to which stakeholders 
trust that their interests and welfare are protected by these (Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
The Construction of Seven Industry Groups 
A mix of Rowley and Berman's (2000) CSP-F AC contingency factors and aspects 
of consumer behaviour theory is used to sort the 23 industries into seven industry groups, 
labelled commercial goods and services, energy related, habit consumption, situational 
(lifestyle) consumption, materials, necessity services and technology. The classification 
method is discussed in tum, and is based on the following factors: 
1. Presence of important CSR issues 
2 .  Type of consumers (industrial or household sector) 
3 .  Extent of choice and consumers' ability to intervene directly (via demand) or 
indirectly (via organised stakeholder and political action) 
4. Consumer purchase process (frequency and level of involvement; rational or 
emotional decision-making) 
5. Perceived risk of harm, type of risk-factors (financial, functional, physical, social, 
psychological) and reliance on reputation (high or low credence) 
First, industries are sorted into two basic categories, namely a resources-related and 
an industrial companies group. The resources group companies are unique in terms of 
important CSP-F AC contingency factors as they are more likely subject to environmental 
controversy. Two groups are then formed within the resources-related category, namely 
materials and energy related industries. The materials industry group consists only of the 
materials industry, which is large enough to be analysed as an individual sample. These 
companies supply solely to the industry and stakeholders in the household sector have 
therefore no opportunity of directly intervening via their demand, and must intervene via 
organised stakeholder or political action where possible. In terms of the risk of potential harm 
and the severity of harm, environmental problems in the materials industry are often difficult 
to detect. Identifying the owner of the problem may be difficult, and it may also take 
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considerable time before problem symptoms are detected. This means a certain amount of 
responsibility is placed on companies in terms of being proactive and dealing with potential 
problems before they become real problems, and merely being reactive may not be sufficient. 
Energy related industries include the energy, transport and utilities industries. These 
are grouped together because they are subject to possible controversy in terms of pollution 
and development and use of alternative and sustainable sources of energy. The potential 
harm-factors are similar to those of the materials industry, in that it may be difficult to 
identify the owner of the problem, that problems may take considerable time to become 
visible, and that consequences of harm may be considerable. Again, consumers are not 
affected directly and physically by harm, but indirectly and perhaps to a greater extent 
psychologically out of concern for the welfare of future generations. Also, these industries all 
provide very limited choice, if at all, to consumers. In effect, consumers have little 
opportunity to intervene directly via their consumption patterns. These industries are also 
dominated by very large companies, and sometimes monopolies, which are expected to be 
closely regulated by government agencies. 
The industrial group is divided into industries that mainly supply to industries 
(referred to here as pure industrials) and industries that supply directly to consumers (referred 
to here as consumer industrials). This distinction is made because consumer behaviour 
suggests organisational and private purchasing behaviour exhibit important differences 
(Lawson et al., 1996). The pure industrials are further split into a commercial goods and 
services group and a technology goods and services group. 
The commercial goods and services group include the capital goods, commercial 
services & supplies, health care equipment & services, and real estate industries. These 
industries are grouped because they supply only to industries. Consumers may be affected by 
the operations of these companies, but they are seldom able to directly influence their 
operations. These industries are not subject to any obvious or prominent CSR controversies. 
The technology goods and services group includes the semiconductor and 
semiconductor equipment, software and services, technology hardware and equipment, and 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. These industries are grouped together because, 
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like the commercial goods and services industries, they also mainly supply to other industries, 
with some exceptions. They do in some cases supply to the household sector (for example, by 
supply of pharmaceuticals), but these industries all supply very high credence goods and 
services.41  Moreover, potential harm is likely to affect end-consumers, although they may 
appear powerless in determining the presence and true consequences of such harm. Because 
of the importance of credence, these industries may be subject to certain ethical issues (for 
example in terms of deliberately introducing 'bugs' into software, or using controversial 
research methods in medical research, or supplying poor quality drugs). Hence, reputation is 
likely to be important. 
The consumer industrials group is in a class of its own because they directly affect 
household consumers, and they can be directly affected via consumer demand. Commercial 
consumers are typically more equipped to make informed decisions compared to household 
consumers. Hence, government agencies exist to deal with problems of information 
asymmetries. To the extent that consumers trust the efficiency of such agencies, this will 
decrease the perceived risk of harm to consumers. Whereas commercial consumers are more 
likely to follow rational decision processes with functional and economic objectives, 
household consumers ( consumer industrials) often follow more complex processes. 
Consumers also follow rational processes, focussing on functionality and economics, but 
sometimes also emotional processes, focussing on fulfilling social needs of belonging, respect 
and admiration, and self-actualisation. Furthermore, consumer behaviour distinguishes 
between purchase behaviour driven by routine and habit for low-involvement frequent 
purchases, and purchase behaviour that may take extensive effort and search for infrequent 
high-involvement purchases. 
The consumer industrials group is divided into three smaller industry groups, 
labelled the habit consumption, situational or lifestyle consumption and necessity services 
groups. The main distinction between these groups is based on the type of purchase 
behaviour, decision processes and type of perceived risk. 
41 This term is used in the marketing literature to identify goods and services where the customer has limited 
means of evaluating the quality, and sometimes even the basic functions, of a good or service. The term high 
credence is used because it reflects the need for consumers to 'trust' that the good or service will perform as 
promised. Andersen and Phillipsen ( 1998) present an in-depth discussion on the properties of credence goods 
and services. 
1 3 1  
The habit consumption group includes the food, beverage and tobacco; food and 
staples retailing; and media industries. These industries are combined because they all supply 
products and services that are typically purchased frequently, with rational motives, using 
routine or habit decision processes. These are not necessarily low-involvement decisions, 
however. Most people choose with care the type of food they consume, what newspaper or 
magazines they subscribe to, and what TV programs they watch, but once these basic patterns 
are developed replacement purchases are likely to be low-involvement decisions. Consumers 
face a great extent of choice when making these decisions, and are usually very well informed 
in terms of the function and quality of goods and services and the consequences of 
consumption. Hence, consumers face little functional or physical risks. However, consumers 
and other stakeholders may be concerned with negative aspects of consumerism, giving rise to 
issues such as recycling and waste minimisation. Consumers are likely to follow rational 
decision processes when making such routine purchases, focussing on functionality and 
economy rather than other emotional motives, but may also be influenced by conscience when 
faced with the choice of, for example, recycled and non-recycled paper products. (Hence there 
may be some psychological risk.) Consumers can react very quickly when dissatisfied and 
face very low switching costs. According to these observations, market forces should work 
very quickly to align companies' operations with consumers' expectations. 
The situational or lifestyle consumption industries include the automobile and 
components; consumer durables and apparel; retailing; and hotel, restaurant and leisure 
industries. These industries are combined together because they provide goods and services 
that are generally purchased relatively infrequently, with high involvement, and with 
relatively high levels of risk. Most of these goods and services are 'situational' because 
motivation is typically determined by lifestyle. Cars, furniture, fashion and travel are all to a 
certain extent experience-goods, and motivation is typically emotional rather than rational. 
Hence, perceived risk is more likely to include social and psychological risk. Branding is 
therefore important in these industries. Again, consumers are faced with a great extent of 
choice and are well informed about the functions and quality of goods and services. However, 
switching costs are typically high, since these goods and services often involve significant 
financial costs. Purchase decisions may therefore also involve some financial risk. 
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The necessity services industry group include the bank, diversified financials, 
insurance and telecommunication services industries. These industries are combined together 
because they all provide necessity services to the household sector. Purchase decisions are 
therefore not driven by "want" as much as by "need". Purchase decisions are likely to be 
mainly rationally motivated, focussing on economy and functionality. These are also high 
credence services, and it may be difficult for some consumers to evaluate the actual function 
and quality of services. Customers are likely to value reputation and trust because perceived 
financial risk is likely to be very high. This is exacerbated by possible high switching costs 
(both in terms of fees and inconvenience). Banks and telecommunication companies may 
appear to have a reputation of poor customer service and to be suspected of unfair pricing 
practices, hidden fees and anti-competitive behaviour. 
This classification system represents a possible approach to categorising industries 
by CSP-financial characteristics factors. The approach employed here follows important 
aspects of possible CSP-financial characteristics contingency factors suggested by Rowley 
and Berman (2000) and implied by consumer behaviour theory. A visual model of this 
industry categorisation process is provided in Figure 4.2. 
Preliminary Observations About the Industry Groups 
It is useful to examine the CSP and F AC properties of the seven constructed 
industry groups. Average CSP and F AC values within each industry group are reported in 
Table 4. 14, indicating some variation across industry groups. Environmental performance 
ranges from 2.34 in the materials group to 3.26 in the habit consumption group. Social 
performance ranges from 2.39 in the situational (lifestyle) consumption group to 3.39 in the 
necessity services group. Governance performance ranges from 2.49 in the technology goods 
and services group to 2.91 in the materials group. 
133 
to = 
"O .... 
..__ Q 
� 
Cl. 
t: 
---
Resources 
related 
• Subject to
environmental
controversy
• Consumers may
intervene only by
organised
stakeholder
activism and
political lobbying
Pure .__ 
industrials 
• Supply to industrials
• Low consumer
influence
• Low level of
stakeholder activism
Consumer --
industrials 
•
• 
• 
Consists of industries
where consumers
make purchase
decisions
Subject to government
intervention via
consumer protection
agencies
Consumers are directly
a ffe ct e d b y these
industries
• Consumers are able to
intervene directly by
switching suppliers
• Decisions are not
always strictly rational
Materials (38)
• Issues of sustainable use of land
• Supplies only to industry
• Rational decision making
� Energy related industries (31) �= -
-
• Issues of pollution and sustainable
energy sources
• End consumers have limited choice
• Rational decision making
r--
- Commercial goods & services (47) r--r---
• No obvious CSR issues
• Rational decision making r--
Technology goods & services (39) --
• Possible ethical issues
• High credence
• Rational decision making -n Habit consumption (31) r--r--
• High-frequency, low-involvement purchase -
• High level of consumer choice and information
• Issues of sustainable consumption (recycling)
• Low perceived risk
• Rational decision making
r--
� Situational consumption (20) � 
r--
-
• Low-frequency, high-involvement, high
financial cost purchases
• High level of consumer choice and information
-• High financial, functional, social andpsychological risk
• Emotional decision making
� 
r--
Necessity services (31)
r--r--
Materials 
Energy 
-• L1m1ted mformat1on 
Transport 
Utilities 
Capital Goods 
Comm. Services 
Health Care E&S 
Real Estate 
Semicond.&SE 
Software & Serv. 
Techn.H/ware&E 
Pharm.& Biotech. 
Food,Bev&Tob 
Food&StplRet 
Media 
Autom.&Comp. 
Cons.Dur.&App. 
Retailing 
Hot,Rest&Leisure 
Banks 
Div.Financials 
Insurance 
Telecom.Services 
• Low-frequency, high-involvement purchase
• Perceived high switching costs
• High credence and high financial risk
• Rational decision making
• Some controversy on customer service and fair pricing issues
Figure 4.2: Industry Groups Sorted by CSP-FAC Contingency Factors 
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Table 4.14: Average CSP and FAC Values for Industry Groups 
This table displays average CSP and F AC values for each of the seven industry groups constructed 
for use in parts of the analysis. The seven industry groups include commercial goods and services 
(COM), energy related industries (ENE), habit consumption industries (HAB), situational (lifestyle) 
consumption industries (LIF), materials (MAT), necessity services (NEC), and technology industries 
(TEC). Environmental, social and corporate governance performance (ENV, SOC, GOV) are 
measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 2003. Size is measured by 
average monthly total market capitalisation (here in millions of dollars), value is measured by 
average monthly book-to-market value, total shareholder return is measured by annualised average 
monthly returns, Sharpe Ratio is measured by average monthly total excess return divided by 
standard deviation of monthly returns, benchmark-adjusted performance is measured by annualised 
average monthly abnormal return, and risk is measured by standard deviation of monthly returns. All 
financial variables are measured over a full six-year period (1 August 1997-1 July 2003), as well as 
two three-year periods (I August 2000-1 July 2003 and I August 1997-1 July 2000). 
Period COM ENE HAB LIF MAT NEC TEC 
Size (market
ENV 3.04 2.69 3.26 2.85 2.34 2.99 2.51 
capitalisation
 
) SOC 3.08 2.92 2.71 2.21 2.72 3.39 2.81 
GOV 2.80 2.63 2.80 2.92 2.91 2.72 2.49 
1997-2003 1039 1244 2834 879 2144 7109 323 
Log size 2000-2003 1192 1441 3017 986 2337 8018 381 
1997-2000 1022 1289 2927 784 2303 7337 295 
1997-2003 0.5791 0.6840 0.7206 0.4962 0.9399 0.8796 0.4824 Book-to-
market value 2000-2003 0.5641 0.7301 0.7804 0.5066 0.9710 0.8901 0.5788 
1997-2000 0.6619 0.5561 0.6773 0.4490 0.7028 0.5572 0.3403 
Total 1997-2003 8.27% 12.12% 4.90% 11.89% 14.13% 8.35% 13.38% 
shareholder 2000-2003 3.79% 11.61% 4.84% 5.91% 15.57% -2.49%
return 1997-2000 20.25% 14.22% 7.28% 26.69% 8.97% 29.77% 
-15.21%
65.61%
1997-2003 0.0237 0.0741 0.0191 0.0716 0.0687 0.0604 0.0121 
0.0257 0.1057 0.0339 0.0750 0.1334 0.0190 Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003
1997-2000 0.0427 0.0252 0.0207 0.1183 -0.0369 0.1400 
-0.0850
0.1802
Benchmark- 1997-2003 7.20% 13.75% 4.64% 4.62% 16.95% 6.52% 3.55% 
adjusted 2000-2003 -3.70% 3.81% -3.82% -4.01% 9.56% -9.44%
performance 1997- 33.03% 30.62% 20.64% 22.32% 23.57% 35.19% 
-23.18%
57.05%
1997-2003 14.94% 11.02% 10.10% 11.44% 12.03% 11.86% 20.16% 
Total risk 2000-2003 13.79% 10.74% 10.24% 10.37% 11.63% 10.56% 17.70% 
1997-2000 14.66% 10.84% 8.67% 11.69% 12.07% 11.89% 22.65% 
There is significant variation in terms of F AC across industry groups. Average 
company size (measured for the full six-year period) ranges from $323 million in the 
technology goods and services group to $7.109 billion in the necessity services group. 
Average book-to-market value (measured for the full six-year period) ranges from 0.48 in the 
technology goods and services group to 0.94 in the materials group, and differences across 
industry groups are small in general. 
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Total shareholder return (measured for the full six-year period) ranges from 4.9 
percent in the habit consumption group to 14. 1  percent in the materials group. Returns are 
quite different between industries. Moreover, the table shows that the return reversal effect is 
very strong in some industry groups (the technology and necessity services groups in 
particular) and is much weaker in others (such as the energy-related and habit consumption 
groups). All of these exhibit high return in the 1997-2000 period and low return in the 2000-
2003 period. The reversal follows an opposite pattern in the materials group, where returns 
are high in the 2000-2003 period and lower in the 1997-2000 period. The Sharpe Ratios 
follow similar patterns, with the exception of the energy related group, where the direction of 
the reversal has changed, and performance is higher in 2000-2003 than in 1997-2000. The 
benchmark-adjusted performance measures follow a similar pattern to total shareholder 
return. The direction of the reversal is changed in the materials group, for which benchmark­
adjusted performance is higher in 1997-2000 than in 2000-2003. 
Average total risk is quite similar for the energy related, habit consumption, 
situational (lifestyle) consumption, materials and necessity services industries. Average risk is 
higher in the commercial goods and services industry, and about twice as high in the 
technology goods and services group compared to the other groups. 
The following sections discuss the five research questions addressed in further 
detail, describing in turn the methods by which each research question is addressed. 
4.3.3 Investigating Correlations Between CSP and FAC 
It is practical to start an investigation into a possible relationship between CSP and 
F AC by employing broad and general analyses and progress by using more specific tools and 
methods. Such is the approach taken here. Hence, the analysis begins by investigating the 
evidence for general bi-variate relationships between CSP and F AC, using cross-sectional 
correlations. This part of the analysis uses ordinal or ranked data, and research question one is 
addressed by calculating Spearman Rank correlations between CSP and F AC and testing 
these for statistical significance. The use of ranked data means some information is lost (in 
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terms of density of CSP ratings), but the advantage of using ranked data is that all companies 
may be included in the analysis, also companies with extreme FAC values. 
The null hypothesis tested is 
HJ. 10 : There is no cross-sectional correlation between ranks of CSP and FAC measures. 
Spearman Rank correlations are calculated ( 1) among the full sample of 237 
companies, (2) among the 100 largest companies in the sample (by average full-period market 
capitalisation), (3) among the 137 smaller companies in the sample, (4) among the 156 
companies with full period trading data (listed prior to 1 August 1997), (5) among the 8 1  
companies with limited coverage (listed after 1 August 1997) and (6) within each of the seven 
constructed industry groups. This allows both for industry-group contingent CSP-F AC 
relationships and also for company size and age contingent CSP-F AC relationships. 
Note that the large versus small companies and full versus limited coverage 
distinctions result in different samples. The full coverage sample consists of 72 and 84 
companies from the large and small companies sample, respectively, and the limited coverage 
sample consists of 28 and 53 companies from the large and small companies sample, 
respectively. Hence, the proportions of large and small companies in the full coverage and 
limited coverage samples are similar. Although the smaller 137 of the sampled companies are 
referred to as the 'small companies' these are mainly constituents in the S&P/ASX300 Index. 
Hence, these are not very small, but are possibly comparable with the constituents in the 
S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index, which cover the constituents in the S&P/ASX300 Index 
that are not constituents in the S&P/ASXlOO Index. 
A second hypothesis to be tested is therefore: 
H 1. 2 0: Cross-sectional correlations between ranks of CSP and F AC measures do not differ 
between samples formed based on company size, age or industry classification. 
Recall that all CSP and F AC measures are calculated for companies on an individual 
basis, except for Jensen alpha and the market beta. Hence, for the majority of the F AC 
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measures CSP and F AC are compared using individual company ranks. A different procedure 
is applied when comparing CSP with Jensen alphas and market betas. Firstly, Jensen alpha 
and the market betas are estimated for the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios rather than for individual 
companies (refer to Section 4.2.4 for details of how these portfolios are constructed). Hence, 
there is only one value for the Jensen alpha and market beta for each portfolio. To create 
corresponding CSP measures, an average CSP measure is calculated for each portfolio based 
on the CSP of the constituent companies. The 27 portfolio alphas, betas and CSP measures 
are then ranked, and correlation coefficients are calculated between each pair of CSP and 
FAC ranks. 
Because Jensen alphas and market betas are calculated based on CSP-sorted 
portfolios and irrespective of industry group, these measures are only included as part of the 
full sample analysis and not in the analysis of specific samples based on size, age and 
industry. 
The following sections discuss the five research questions addressed in further 
detail, describing in turn the methods by which each question is addressed. 
4.3.4 Investigating FAC Differences Between Firms with Different CSP 
Levels 
Another very general approach to investigating the evidence of a CSP-F AC 
relationship involves comparing groups of companies with different levels of CSP. This 
approach implies a useful feature. As discussed in Chapter 3, two empirical studies identify 
inverted U-shaped relationships between CSP and financial performance, where companies 
with moderate CSP perform better than companies with relatively high and low CSP 
(Bowman & Haire, 1975 ; Sturdivant & Ginter, 1977). This implies that analyses that test for a 
linear CSP-F AC relationship may provide weak results. The objective of research question 
two is therefore to investigate the relative F AC properties of portfolios with different levels of 
CSP, allowing for some non-linearity. 
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Research question two is addressed by comparing the F AC properties of high, 
moderate and low-CSP portfolios. The null hypothesis tested in this part of the analysis is 
therefore: 
H20: Portfolios of high, moderate and low CSP exhibit uniform F AC. 
Constructing High, Moderate and Low-CSP Portfolios 
High, moderate and low-CSP portfolios are constructed based on environmental, 
social and corporate governance performance. Due to the effect of outlier observations on the 
distributions of F AC variables, this analysis is based on the restricted sample of 233 
companies (where the four companies with the most extreme returns observations are 
omitted). Because there are three CSP categories, three sets of high, moderate and low-CSP 
portfolios are formed. For each category, the sample is ranked by CSP, and then divided into 
three portfolios of approximately equal size. The rating details for each group are presented in 
Table 4. 15. The differences in portfolio size are a result of uneven distributions in the CSP 
ratings. 
Table 4. 15: Summary Statistics for the High, Moderate and Low Corporate Social 
Performance Portfolios 
This table displays summary statistics for the high, moderate and low-Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) portfolios. Note that CSP scores range from one (low) to five (high). These 
portfolios are formed from the full sample, omitting the four companies with largest outlier 
observations. 
Number of 
CSR companies Average 
Category CSP group included CSP score CSP range 
Environmental High CSP 72 4. 14  3 .05-5.00 
performance Moderate CSP 77 2.86 2.4 1 -3 .00 
Low CSP 84 1 .60 1 .00-2.00 
Social High CSP 75 4.05 3 .50-5.00 
performance Moderate CSP 76 2.85 2. 14-3 .45 
Low CSP 82 1 .82 1 .00-2.00 
Corporate High CSP 73 3 .82 3 .05-4.91 
governance Moderate CSP 83 2.68 2.05-3 .00 
performance Low CSP 77 1 .80 1 .00-2.00 
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Estimating Jensen Alphas and Market Betas for the High, Moderate and Low-CSP 
Portfolios 
Jensen alphas and market betas are estimated based on the high, moderate and low­
C SP portfolios' respective returns. Hence, one Jensen alpha and market beta is estimated for 
each portfolio. The results from these regressions are reported in Table 4 . 16 .  This table 
indicates that the Jensen alpha models are estimated with relatively good fit for the high, 
moderate and low-CSP portfolios. Adjusted R-squared values range from 0.62 to 0.85, and 
are generally higher for the 2000-2003 regressions than for the 1997-2000 regressions. For the 
2000-2003 period, alphas are positive and significant only for the high governance and low 
environmental performance companies. For the 1997-2000 period, alphas are always positive, 
and significant for all portfolios except for the high-environmental performance portfolio. 
Table 4. 16: Jensen Alphas and Factor Betas for the High, Moderate and Low-CSP 
Portfolios 
This table reports monthly Jensen alphas and factor betas estimated using the model 
R, - R ft = a + /3M (RM, - R ft ) + /38 (R81 - RLt ) + f3v (R0, - Rv, ) + e, 
These are estimated based on portfolios formed from a sample of 233 companies (omitting
four companies with return outliers). Portfolios of high, moderate and low CSP companies
are formed by first sorting companies by CSP ratings, then dividing the sample into three
portfolios including approximately equal number of companies. Statistical significance at the
90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, **  and ***, respectively. 
CSP category Portfolio Adj. R2 a; PM Ps Pv 
0.77 0.0046 0.87*** 0.71 *** 0.07 High 
Environmental Moderate 0.85 0.0017 1.43*** 0.81 *** 0.08 
ff) Low 0.69 0.0099* 1.23*** 1.36*** 0.15 = High 0.42 0.0156 1.11 *** 0.95*** 0.33 = 
N Social Moderate 0.80 -0.0002 1.13*** 0.81 *** 0.05 I = = Low 0.84 -0.0016 1.32*** 1.04*** -0.01= 
N High 0.78 0.0083*** 0.91 *** 0.55*** 
Governance Moderate 0.55 0.0106 1.07*** 1.27*** 
Low 0.85 -0.0021 1.51 *** 0.99*** 
-0.07
0.28
0.01
0.63 0.0079 0.88*** 0.33*High 
Environmental Moderate 0.81 0.0281 *** 0.64***= Low 0.63 0.0152** I.I
S***
0.97*** 0.58***
-0.02
0.35***
0.11= High 0.49 0.0128** 0.69*** 0.38* 0.17 = 
N Social Moderate 0.71 0.0167*** I.OS*** 0.54*** -0.03I 
=-- Low 0.76 0.0204*** 1.25*** 0.63*** 0.27**=--
High 0.70 0.0077** 0.79*** 0.38*** 0.11 
Governance Moderate 0.54 0.0195
*** 0.89*** 0.37 0.25*
Low 0.67 0.0233*** 1.35*** 0.82*** 0.06 
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Market betas are all significant beyond the 99 percent level. Betas are expected to 
tend toward one when portfolio size is increased towards the full market portfolio, so this is as 
expected. Hence, it is usually the magnitude of the market betas that are of interest, since they 
are expected to be significantly different from zero. The lowest betas are consistently found 
for the high-CSP portfolios, and the highest betas are predominantly found for the low-CSP 
portfolios (suggesting a negative relationship between CSP and beta). 
Although the focus here is not on evaluating explanatory power of the size and value 
factors, it is worth noting that the size-factor coefficients are consistently positive and 
significant in both periods, whereas the value-factor coefficients are not significant. Hence, 
time series of returns appear to be explained mainly by the market factor and the size factor, 
and less so by the value factor. 
Research question two is addressed, and hypothesis H20 tested, by comparing the 
average F AC measures of the high, moderate and low-CSP portfolios. Portfolio differences 
are tested for statistical significance by the standard t-test. All F AC measures, except alphas 
and betas, are based on individual company values. Hence, portfolio cross-sectional average 
values and standard deviations are used to test for statistical significance. Jensen alphas and 
market betas are based on average time-series values and the standard deviations of these.42
4.3.5 Investigating Whether CSP Explains FAC 
Research questions one and two both investigate bivariate CSP-F AC relationships. 
Research questions three, four and five are more specific and investigate the evidence for 
various multi-variate CSP-F AC relationships. Research question three is concerned with the 
ability of a combination of the environmental, social and governance performance to explain 
cross-sectional variation in various F AC measures. Research question three is therefore 
addressed by Equation 4.5, based on the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios. 
42 Normally, Jensen alphas and market betas are subject to tests of statistical significance in themselves, that is, 
testing whether or not the null hypothesis of zero parameters can be rejected. Any parameters for which this null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected are therefore assumed zero. However, the test of portfolio differences is not 
concerned with whether or not parameters significantly different from zero or not, but rather whether two 
parameters are significantly different from each other. Hence, in order to test hypothesis H20, it is necessary to 
perform a t-test comparing the two parameters in question, using the time-series standard errors of each 
parameter. 
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FAC; = YO + Y ENV (CSPENV i )  + Y soc (CSPsoc i )  + Y GOV (CSP GOV i )  + e;' ' ' Equation 4. 5 
where FAC ; is the average FAC measure of portfolio or company i, CSP ENV, CSP soc and 
CSP aov are average environmental, social and governance performance ratings for portfolio 
or company i, r measure the sensitivity to CSP measures, except r O which is an intercept 
term, and e ; is a residual error term included for estimation purposes. This model is referred 
to hereafter as the F AC-CSP model.43
Using portfolio averages rather than individual company observations presents two 
main advantages. Firstly, models estimated on portfolio values exhibit much better fit than 
models estimated on individual company observations, because individual observations are 
very noisy. Secondly, by basing this part of the analysis on portfolios Jensen alphas and 
market betas can be included among the F AC variables. 
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, the sample is sorted into 27 portfolios with similar 
environmental, social and corporate governance performance. These portfolios are 
constructed with the objective of creating groups of companies with reasonably homogeneous 
CSP attributes. This does not necessarily mean that the F AC attributes of companies within 
each portfolio are similar, but this limitation will have to be accepted. Portfolio F AC are 
measured by average F AC values of portfolio constituents. If CSP and F AC are unrelated, 
average F AC values for these portfolios will not be very different, and any differences will be 
random. 
The F AC-CSP models are estimated based on individual company observations 
when estimated within each of the seven industry groups. This implies, firstly, that model fit 
may be lower due to noise, though at the same time this may improve model fit due to smaller 
sample sizes and, secondly, that alphas and betas are not included in the within-industry group 
analysis. 
43 Similar models have been used in the literature to compare financial and non-financial variables, by for 
example Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Gallagher (2003). 
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The F AC-CSP model tests the extent to which cross-sectional variation in F AC 
measures are explained by cross-sectional variation in CSP. There is no theoretical basis for 
suggesting that CSP alone should explain F AC variation, and in that sense the model is 
underspecified. However, the objective here is not to search for factors that explain as much 
as possible of the variation in F AC, but rather whether CSP explains a significant portion of 
the variation in F AC. The null hypotheses tested here are therefore 
HJ. lo: 
HJ.2o: 
CSP does not explain significant cross-sectional variation in F AC; and 
The ability of CSP to explain cross-sectional variation in F AC does not depend on 
industry group classification. 
As with the Jensen alpha regression models, the F AC-CSP models are estimated by 
OLS. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are corrected for using the White (1980) method 
and Cochrane-Orcutt (1949) procedure, respectively. (Autocorrelation is only adjusted for 
when the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates autocorrelation.) 
Significant F-statistics for the regression models will indicate rejection of hypothesis 
HJ. lo, and differences in F-statistics across industry group models will indicate rejection of 
hypothesis HJ.2o. Significant slope coefficient (r's) will indicate significant linear 
relationships between CSP and F AC. Multicollinearity between the CSP measures may 
however cause problems with interpreting the slope coefficients. In order to establish the 
extent of this problem it is useful to calculate correlations between the CSP variables used 
within the full sample, where average ratings for each of the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios are 
used, and within industry groups, where average ratings of each individual company are used. 
Correlations are provided in Table 4. 17. 
Correlations between the CSP variables are not high for the portfolios used in the 
full sample regression models, and only the correlation between social and governance 
performance is significant. Much higher and more significant coefficients are found within 
the industry groups, and all groups except the lifestyle consumption group are somewhat 
affected by significant correlations. Correlations are mostly positive, but there is a noteworthy 
significant negative correlation between environmental and social performance within the 
technology group. The fact that most industry groups exhibit high and significant correlations 
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between at least two . CSP variables implies that care must be taken when interpreting CSP 
slope coefficients. The probability of multicollinearity is high, and this affects the reliability 
of the estimated slope coefficients. This problem is not so apparent for the full sample 
regression model, and slope coefficients are interpreted with reasonable confidence. 
Table 4. 1 7: Correlations Between CSP Variables used in FAC-CSP Regression Models 
This table displays Pearson correlations between CSP variables used in the F AC-CSP regression
models. The full sample model is estimated on the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios, hence the correlations
displayed in the first row are between average portfolio CSP ratings. The industry group model is
estimated on individual company ratings, and correlations in the other rows are therefore calculated
based on these. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, * *  and
** *, respectively. 
4.3.6 Investigating Whether FAC Explains CSP 
Whereas research question three is concerned with the ability of a combination of 
CSP measures to explain cross-sectional variation in F AC, research question four is 
concerned with the ability of a combination of F AC measure to explain cross-sectional 
variation in specific CSP measures. This means it is possible to look at each CSP variable in 
isolation and investigate whether a combination of F AC variables explains variation in 
environmental, social and governance performance, in tum. This is useful given the relatively 
high correlations between the three CSP measures. This also facilitates additional adjustment 
of possible CSP-F AC relationships, since variables reflecting all F AC factors are included 
simultaneously as explanatory variables. 
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Environmental 
and social 
eerformance 
Environmental 
and governance 
eerformance 
Social and 
governance 
eerf ormance 
0.19 0.33* 
0.18 0.49*** 
0.29 0.44** 
0.45** 0.29 
0.30 
0.22 
0.32 
0.41 ** 
0.44** 
0.29 
0.29 
0.29* 
0.56*** -0.19
Full sample (portfolios) 
Commercial goods and services 
Energy-related industries 
Habit consumption industries 
Lifestyle consumption industries 
Materials industries 
Necessity services industries 
Technology industries -0.38** -0.24
-0.22
0.36**
0.13
0.44***
The combination of F AC variables on which each CSP variable is regressed should 
cover all important types of F AC, hence a measure of size, value, risk, and financial 
performance are included as explanatory variables. There are however four different measures 
of financial performance and two different measures of risk to choose between. Hence, 
models are estimated with different combinations of F AC variables using Equation 4.6. As 
with the F AC-CSP model, this model is also estimated (1) based on the entire sample (less the 
four outlier companies), where the estimation is based on the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios, and 
(2) within each industry group, where the estimation is based on individual company 
observations. 
CSP;,J = 00 + Bs (size ; ) + Bv (b I m 1 ) + BR (risk;,m )  + BFP (FF;,, ) + e; Equation 4. 6 
where CSP;J represents the average environmental, social and governance performance of 
portfolio or company i (included in tum), size; is the average total market capitalisation (log) 
of portfolio or company i, b/m ; is the average book-to-market value of portfolio or company i, 
risk ;,m is the average total risk or market beta of portfolio or company i, FP ;,/ is the financial 
performance of portfolio or company i measured in tum by total shareholder return, the 
Sharpe Ratio, the Jensen alpha and benchmark-adjusted performance, (ls measure the 
sensitivity to F AC, except 8 o which is the intercept term, and e ; is a residual error term 
included for estimation purposes. This model is hereafter referred to as the CSP-F AC model. 
The CSP-F AC model is estimated as follows. Since there is only one size and value 
measure included in this study, all models are estimated with total market capitalisation and 
book-to-market value as size and value measures, respectively. Since there are two available 
risk measures, CSP-F AC models are first estimated by including size, value and either total 
risk or market beta as explanatory variables. The risk measure yielding the best model fit is 
then kept in the full CSP-FAC model. Next, each financial performance variable is added to 
the model in tum (with the appropriate risk measure included). Hence, the F AC variable 
combination that best explain each CSP variable is determined. 
Because Jensen alphas and market betas only are estimated for the 2000-2003 and 
1997-2000 periods, and not for the full six-year period, models are only estimated for these 
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two three-year periods. Furthermore, because alphas and betas are not estimated for the 
within-industry group analysis they are not included in this part of the analysis, which also 
means that these models are estimated both for the full-period and for the two three-year 
periods. The same conditions apply for the estimation process as described in Section 4.3.5 
(models are estimated by OLS, except where autocorrelation is present, and heteroskedasticity 
is controlled for). 
This part of the analysis tests the hypotheses 
H4. 1 o: A combination of size, book-to-market value, financial performance and risk does 
not explain significant cross-sectional variation in CSP; and 
H4.20: The ability of a combination of size, book-to-market value, financial performance 
and risk to explain significant cross-sectional variation in CSP does not differ 
across industry groups. 
Significant F-statistics will imply hypothesis H4. 1 o is rejected, and differences in F­
statistics across industry groups will imply hypothesis H4.20 is rejected. Significant slope 
parameters will indicate significant linear relationships between the respective CSP and F AC 
measures. 
Testing for Industry Group Fixed Effects 
Four versions of the CSP-F AC model are estimated. The first two versions are 
already indicated, as the model is estimated based on ( 1) the average CSP and FAC measures 
of the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios and on (2) the CSP and F AC measures of individual 
companies within each industry group. Two other versions are also estimated. The third 
model is estimated allowing for fixed industry-group effects, that is, industry-group dummy 
intercepts are included in the model. Because industry group classification is included this 
extended model is estimated using individual company observations rather than portfolio 
observations. This means again that Jensen alphas and market betas are omitted from the set 
of included variables. Hence, the third model is an extended model specified in Equation 4.7. 
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CSP;,1 = ¢0 + ¢ENE ($NE; ) + 'PnAB ( HAB; ) + 'PuF ( LIF; ) + 'PCMAT (MAI;) + 
fPNEc(NEC; ) + 'PrEc(TEC; ) + ¢s(size; ) + ¢v(value; ) + ¢R (risk;,m ) + ¢FP (FP;., )  + e; 
Equation 4. 7 
where ENE ;, HAB ;, LIF ;, MAT ;, NEC ;, and TEC ; are dummy variables indicating industry 
group classification of each company i into the energy related, habit consumption, lifestyle 
consumption, materials, necessity services and technology industry groups, respectively. The 
parameter </Jo is the model intercept (which effectively is the intercept of the reference group, 
which is the commercial goods and services group), and the industry ¢,s are the industry­
specific intercepts terms. The model is otherwise estimated as for the within-industry CSP­
FAC model. 
The objective of estimating the extended CSP-FAC model is to test whether model 
specification is best with or without industry-group fixed effects. If the extended model 
explains cross-sectional variation in CSP better, this means that there are significant industry 
group fixed effects in the cross-section of CSP. An additional null hypothesis is therefore 
H4.3o: There are no significant industry group fixed effects in the full-sample CSP- FAC 
model. 
In order to test hypothesis H4.30 it is necessary also to estimate the original CSP­
FAC model (as specified in Equation 4.6) using individual company observations also, in 
order to compare the two models. This is then the last of the four models estimated to address 
research question four. Hypothesis H4.3o is tested by a special F-test that compares the R­
squared values of the two models, with and without fixed effects.44 
44 This F-test is calculated F = (RSSc - RSS) / M (Studenmund, 200 1 ), where RSSc is the residual sum of 
RSS /(n - K - 1) 
squares for the restricted model (which is here the model without the fixed industry group effects), M is the 
number of variables omitted in the restricted model, and (n-K-1) is the degrees of freedom of the extended 
model. Alternatively, RSS may be replaced by the R-squared value for the respective models (Greene, 2000), 
which will yield the same F-test statistic. 
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4.3. 7 Investigating Whether CSP Adds Explanatory Power to a 
Conventional Asset Pricing Model 
As discussed in Section 4.2.4, the asset pricing literature has identified several 
factors that explain variation in financial asset return. The most prominent factors among 
these are market beta, size and book-to-market value, most prominently identified by Fama 
and French (1992) as the most important factors in explaining cross-sectional variation in 
asset returns. Research question five tests whether CSP adds significant explanatory power to 
a basic Fama-French style cross-sectional asset pricing model. In other words, this part of the 
analysis tests whether CSP measures contain significant information that explains cross­
sectional variation in returns, and that is not conveyed by market beta, size and book-to­
market value. 
The Fama and French ( 1992) three-factor asset pricing model is replicated here 
using the same 27 CSP-sorted portfolios that are used when addressing research questions 
one, three and four. Note that the main objective here is to test whether adding CSP variables 
to an asset pricing model adds explanatory power, not to identify factors that explain as much 
returns variation as possible. 
The model is estimated the first time including the three factors identified by Fama 
and French ( 1992), and the second time also including the three CSP measures included in an 
extended asset pricing model. The extended model is specified in Equation 4.8. 
ER; = 170 + 17 P (PM,; ) + 178 (size; ) + 1Jv (b I m; ) 
+ 1/ ENV ( CSPENV,; ) + 1/ soc ( CSPsoc,; ) + 1/ oov ( CSPaov,; ) + e;
Equation 4. 8 
where ER ; is the excess return on portfolio i, p M,i  is the market beta of portfolio i, size ; is the 
average market capitalisation of portfolio i, him ; is the average book-to-market value of 
portfolio i, CSP ENV. ; , CSP soc. ; , and CSP aov. ; is the average environmental, social and 
governance performance of portfolio i, the 71s are the slope parameters between the excess 
return and the respective explanatory variables, and e ; is a residual error term included for 
estimation purposes. Excess return is the difference between total shareholder return and the 
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return and on a risk-free asset, which is calculated as part of the Sharpe Ratio (see Section 
4.2.4 for details). 
The null hypothesis tested here is: 
H50: CSP measures do not add explanatory power to a three-factor cross-sectional asset 
pricing model. 
This hypothesis is tested using the same special F-test used to test for the 
significance of fixed industry-group effects in the CSP-F AC model (see Section 4.3.6). A 
significant F-statistic indicates that the extended ( or unrestricted) model is a better 
specification, and that hypothesis H5o is rejected. 
This concludes the discussion of the data included in the empirical analysis, and 
methods employed to address the five research questions. Chapter 5 presents the results from 
the analyses described in Sections 4.3.3 to 4.3.7, and provides a discussion of these results 
and implications of research findings. 
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. 5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Results are 
presented in Section 5. 1 and discussed and interpreted in Section 5.2 together with a summary 
of the limitations of the study. 
5.1 Results 
5.1.1 Correlations Between CSP and F AC 
Correlations between CSP and F AC are calculated within the full sample, within 
four sub-samples constructed on the basis of size and trading history, and within the seven 
industry groups. The results are discussed in turn. 
Correlations Within the Full Sample and the Four Sub-Samples 
Spearman Rank correlations between CSP and F AC within the full sample and the 
four subgroups identified in Section 4.3.3 are provided in the five panels of Table 5. 1. 
Consistent significant and positive correlations between size and CSP are found only 
in the governance category within the full sample. Size-CSP correlations across the different 
subgroups of the sample are not consistent with those of the full sample, and correlations 
differ between the subgroups. The significant positive correlation between size and 
governance performance found in the full sample is not observed in any of the sub-samples, 
though a significant (but small) negative correlation is found among the recently listed 
companies. Correlations between size and environmental performance and between size and 
social performance are different in the small and large company samples, where correlations 
are positive among large companies and negative among small companies. A difference is 
also observed between the full coverage and recently listed companies, where correlations 
between size and environmental performance and between size and social performance are 
significantly positive among full coverage companies (and stronger in the social category) and 
not significant within recently listed companies. 
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Table 5. 1: Spearman Rank Correlations Between CSP and FAC 
This table reports Spearman Rank correlations between Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
and Financial Asset Characteristics (F AC) measures. CSP measures include environmental, 
social and corporate governance performance ratings. These are average monthly ratings 
measured between 1 August 200 1 and 1 July 2003 . FAC variables include size (measured by 
average monthly total market capitalisation), book-to-market value (measured by average 
monthly book-to-market value), total shareholder return (measured as annualised average 
monthly return), Sharpe Ratio (measured as average monthly total excess return divided by 
total risk), benchmark-adjusted performance (measured as annualised average monthly 
abnormal return), Jensen alpha (adjusted for systematic market, size and value risk factors, 
estimated using monthly returns), total risk (measured as standard deviation of monthly 
return), and market beta (measured in a single-factor model). FAC measures are calculated 
over a full six-year period ( l  August 1 997- 1 July 2003), as well as two three-year periods ( l  
August 2000-1 July 2003 and l August 1 997-1 July 2000). Correlations are calculated based 
on ( l )  the entire sample of 237 companies, (2) the largest l 00 companies in the sample (by 
average full-period market capitalisation), (3) the smaller 1 37  companies, (4) the 1 56 
companies with full-period coverage in trading data, and (5) the 8 1  companies with limited 
coverage. Results are provided in panels 1 ,  2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Jensen alphas and 
market betas are only estimated for the two three-year periods, and not for the full period, due 
to poor model fit for longer periods. Alphas and betas are only compared to CSP for the full 
sample (panel 1 ). Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, 
** and ***, respectively.
Panel 1: The (_ull sam]l_/e 
15 1 
Period FAC measure 
Size 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000_2003 
Book-to-market 
value 
Total shareholder 
return 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance 1997-2000 
Jensen alpha 2000-2003 1997-2000 
1997-2003 
Total risk 2000-2003 
1997-2000 
Market beta 2000-2003 1997-2000 
Environmental 
0.0322 
0.0245 
0.1000 
-0.0331
-0.0239
-0.0251
0.0087
0.0004
0.0143
-0.0934
-0.0274
0.0846
0.0340
0.0396
0.0173
0.0443
-0.0565
-0.1444**
-0.1231 *
-0.1861**
-0.2949
-0.2662
Corporate performance 
Governance 
0.1404** 
0.1466** 
Social 
0.0888 
0.0811 
0.2298*** 0.2117*** 
-0.0525 -0.0368
-0.0603 -0.0946
0.0918
0.0790
-0.0559
0.0769
0.1119* 0.2452*** 
-0.0419 -0.1317*
0.0906
0.2688*** 
-0.0147
0.0983
0.0101
0.1475** 
-0.1012
0.0945
0.1110* 0.2094*** 
0.0738 
0.4300** 
-0.0431
0.4575**
-0.2025 -0.2825
-0.1462** -0.3678***
-0.1337** -0.3256***
-0.2072*** -0.3379***
-01062 -0.4774**
-0.4921 ** -0.5018**
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Panel 2: Large comeanies 
FAC measure Period 
Corporate performance 
Environmental Social Governance 
1997-2003 0.2546** 0.3040*** -0.1118
Size 2000-2003 0.2372** 0.2959*** -0.0985
1997-2000 0.3054*** 0.3211 *** -0.1770
1997-2003 -0.2066** -0.1139 -0.0635
Book-to-market 
value 2000-2003 -0.1720* -0.0783
1997-2000 -0.1718 -0.1469
-0.1418
0.1464
1997-2003 -0.0247 0.0944 
Total shareholder 
return 2000-2003 
-0.0497
0.0161 0.2476** 
1997-2000 
-0.0750
0.0327 -0.1342 -0.2232**
1997-2003 -0.0244 0.0634 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 
-0.0115
0.0598 0.2847*** 
1997-2000 
-0.0494
0.0155 -0.0911 -0.2664**
1997-2003 -0.0496 0.0675 0.2041 ** 
2000-2003 -0.1075 0.0031 0.2418** 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance 1997-2000 -0.0305 -0.0157 -0.0701
1997-2003 -0.1460 -0.1668* -0.2620***
Total risk 2000-2003 -0.1012 -0.1738* -0.2514**
1997-2000 -0.2261 * -0.1651 -0.1314
Panel 3: Small com[!_anies 
FAC measure Period 
Corporate performance 
Environmental Social Governance 
1997-2003 -0.1876** -0.1886** -0.0943
Size 2000-2003 -0.1587* -0.1513* -0.0582
1997-2000 -0.2062** -0.0810 -0.0844
1997-2003 0.0281 0.0270 -0.0968
Book-to-market 
value 2000-2003 -0.0597 -0.1445*
1997-2000 
-0.0028
0.0289 0.0810 -0.0130
1997-2003 0.0169 0.0200 
Total shareholder 
return 2000-2003 
-0.0016
0.0551 0.0882 0.1374 
1997-2000 -0.0595 -0.0545 -0.1022
1997-2003 0.0706 0.0976 0.1547* 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 0.0155 0.0697 0.2058** 
1997-2000 0.0744 0.0612 -0.1724
1997-2003 0.0824 0.0868 0.0130 
2000-2003 0.1276 0.1358 0.1025 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance 1997-2000 0.0103 -0.0360 -0.0856
1997-2003 -0.1414 -0.0776 -0.3121 ***
Total risk 2000-2003 -0.1235 -0.0681 -0.2335***
1997-2000 -0.0896 -0.0868 -0.2419**
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Panel 4: Com12.anies with fl'll-e.eriod coverage 
FAC measure Period 
Corporate performance 
Environmental Social Governance 
1997-2003 0.1344* 0.2896*** 0.0664 
Size 2000-2003 0.1284 0.2840*** 0.0630 
1997-2000 0.1401 * 0.2929*** 0.0693 
-0.0315 -0.0996 -0.0792
-0.0750
1997-2003 
Book-to-market value 2000-2003 
1997-2000 0.0311 
-0.1503*
0.0017
-0.1391 *
0.0205
1997-2003 0.0448 -0.0749 -0.1013
Total shareholder 
return 2000-2003 0.0456 0.0473 0.1202 
1997-2000 0.0070 -0.1174 -0.2068**
1997-2003 0.0764 0.1039 0.0869 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 0.0355 0.0415 0.2015** 
1997-2000 0.1035 0.1072 -0.0054
1997-2003 0.0722 -0.0417
2000-2003 0.0909 
-0.0173
0.0269 0.0881 Benchmark-adjusted performance 
1997-2000 0.0163 -0.0573 -0.1449*
1997-2003 -0.0861 -0.2504*** -0.3499***
Total risk 2000-2003 -0.0721 -0.2188*** -0.2660***
1997-2000 -0.0701 -0.2106*** -0.3335***
Panel 5: Comll,anies with limited coverage (recent!}!, /isted2 
FAC measure Period 
Corporate performance 
Environmental Social Governance 
1997-2003 0.0029 -0.1238 -0.2062*
Size 2000-2003 -0.0341 -0.1642
1997-2000 0.5586** 
-0.1256
0.3556 -0.4077*
-0.0574 0.0936 -0.0650
-0.0049 0.0756 -0.1611
1997-2003 
Book-to-market value 2000-2003 
1997-2000 -0.4746** -0.1133 0.1951 
1997-2003 -0.0764 0.1574 0.2715** 
Total shareholder 
return 2000-2003 0.2282** 0.3480*** 
1997-2000 
-0.0652
0.0136 -0.0481 0.1333 
1997-2003 -0.0196 0.0874 0.3356*** 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 0.1527 0.3663*** 
1997-2000 
-0.0933
0.1013 -0.1693 0.0134 
1997-2003 -0.0399 0.2716** 0.2328** 
2000-2003 -0.0643 0.2567** 0.3122*** Benchmark-adjusted performance 
1997-2000 -0.0822 0.0453 0.1482 
1997-2003 -0.1320 0.0216 -0.2773**
Total risk 2000-2003 -0.1119 0.0273 
1997-2000 -0.2723 -0.0429
-0.2842**
0.0280
Correlations .between book-to-market value and CSP are not significant within the 
full sample, but significant coefficients are found sporadically within the sub-samples. The 
correlations between book-to-market value and CSP are consistent across different sections of 
the sample in terms of sign, but not in terms of significance. All significant correlations are 
negative. Significant correlations are found between book-to-market value and (1) 
environmental performance within the large companies sample, (2) social performance within 
the small companies and full coverage samples, and (3) governance performance within the 
small companies and full coverage samples. 
The full sample exhibits strong and significant positive correlations between the four 
financial performance measures and governance performance in the 2000-2003 period. A 
sign-reversal is observed between the two three-year periods, which is only significant for 
total shareholder return (that is, the positive and negative correlations in the two three-year 
periods are both significant). Weaker significant positive correlations are observed between 
financial performance and social performance, where correlations are strongest for Jens en 
alphas and benchmark-adjusted performance, followed by total shareholder return. No 
significant correlations are found between environmental performance and financial 
performance within the full sample. 
Within the four sub-samples, the strongest CSP-financial performance correlations 
are found in the governance category, fewer significant correlations are found in the social 
category, and no significant correlations are observed between environmental performance 
and financial performance, which corresponds to the full-sample correlations. However, the 
four subgroups exhibit notable differences in terms of CSP-financial performance 
correlations. Significant correlations between social performance and financial performance 
are only observed among the recently listed companies, where these are positive. More 
notable differences are observed in the governance category. 
Firstly, correlations are strong, significant and positive for all financial performance 
measures among the recently listed companies, where there is no sign reversal between the 
two three-year periods. In comparison, the companies with full-period coverage only exhibit 
very weak and inconsistent correlations. Secondly, significant reversal effects, where 
correlations are strong, significant and positive for the 2000-2003 period and strong, 
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significant and negative for the 1997-2000 period, are only observed among the large 
companies. In comparison, the small companies do not exhibit such strong reversals, and 
correlations are generally not significant, except for a significant positive correlation between 
governance performance and the Sharpe Ratio. Hence, CSP-financial performance 
correlations differ between full coverage and recently listed companies, and between large 
and small companies. The sign-reversal in CSP-financial performance correlations appears to 
be size-related, whereas the strength of these correlations appears to be more related to 
trading history. 
Within the full sample, strong significant negative correlations are found between 
total risk and CSP, where the strongest correlations are found in the governance category. 
Correlations between market betas and CSP are only provided for the full sample, where 
correlations are strong, significant and negative in the governance category and weaker in the 
social category. No significant correlations are found between total risk and environmental 
performance in any of the samples. Among the four sub-samples, significant negative 
correlations between total risk and social performance are observed only among large and full 
coverage companies, where correlations are strongest for the full coverage companies. 
Significant negative correlations between total risk and governance performance are observed 
in all subgroups, and are strongest among full coverage companies. This suggests a significant 
strong negative relationship between total risk and governance performance, not dependent on 
company size or trading history, and a significant strong negative relationship between total 
risk and social performance predominantly among full coverage companies, and to a lesser 
extent among large companies. 
Correlation Within the Seven Industry-Groups 
Correlations between CSP and F AC within the seven industry groups are presented 
in Table 5.2. Comparing these with the correlations calculated within the whole sample, 
significant correlations between F AC and CSP are specific to certain industry groups. In 
general, the necessity services group exhibits the highest number of significant correlations. 
Similar to the pattern found within the full sample and the four sub-samples, correlations 
within the seven industry groups are strongest in the governance category, followed by social 
and the environmental performance. 
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Table 5.2: Within-Industry Group Spearman Rank Correlations Between CSP and FAC 
Measures 
This table presents Spearman Rank correlations between CSP and F AC measures within seven
industry groups. The seven industry groups include commercial goods and services (COM), energy 
related industries (ENE), habit consumption industries (HAB), situational (lifestyle) consumption
industries (LIF), materials (MAT), necessity services (NEC), and technology industries (TEC).
CSP is measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 2003 . FAC
variables include size (measured by average monthly total market capitalisation), book-to-market
value (measured by average monthly book-to-market value), total shareholder return (measured as
annualised average monthly return), Sharpe Ratio (measured as average monthly total excess
return divided by total risk), benchmark-adjusted performance (measured as annualised average
monthly abnormal return), and total risk (measured as standard deviation of monthly return). All
financial variables are measured over a full six-year period (1 August 1 997-1 July 2003), as well as
two three-year periods (1 August 2000-1 July 2003 and 1 August 1 997-1 July 2000). Correlations
between F AC and environmental, social and governance performance ratings are provided in
panels 1 ,  2 and 3, respectively. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is
indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
Panel 1: Environmental performance 
1 56 
FAC measures Period COM ENE HAB LIF MAT NEC TEC 
0.08 0.34* -0.37 -0.13 0.42** 0.46*** 
Size 0.14 0.34* -0.41 * -0.18 0.40** 0.44*** 
1997-2003 -0.31 ** 
2000-2003 -0.30** 
1997-2000 -0.35** 0.20 0.46*** -0.18 -0.13 0.48** 0.48** 
1997-2003 0.01 -0.28 -0.28 0.43* 0.08 -0.44** 0.07 
Book-to-
market value 2000-2003 0.02 -0.26 -0.23 0.37 0.14 -0.38
** 0.09 
1997- -0.02 -0.38* -0.22 0.78*** -0.05 -0.13 0.27 
Total 1997-2003 0.11 0.31 * -0.48** 0.40** -0.13
shareholder 2000-2003 0.02 0.07 
-0.01
0.06 -0.22
-0.06
0.00 0.15 
return 1997-2000 0.06 0.45** -0.09 -0.43 -0.20 0.18 
-0.33**
0.20
1997-2003 0.09 0.38** 0.00 -0.51 ** -0.08 0.29 -0.03
-0.04 0.18 0.09 -0.32 -0.06 0.05 -0.26Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003
1997-2000 0.10 0.43** -0.03 -0.46* -0.13 0.20 0.36* 
Benchmark- 1997-2003 0.18 0.10 0.06 -0.15 -0.05 0.23 -0.07
adjusted 2000-2003 0.07 0.14 -0.17 0.28* 0.08 
performance 1997- 0.04 
-0.01
0.30 -0.06 -0.16 -0.25 0.37* 
-0.38**
0.26
1997-2003 -0.02 -0.20 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.10
Total risk 2000-2003 -0.23 -0.18 0.07 
-0.03
0.09 -0.23
1997-2000 
-0.07
0.10 -0.15 -0.21 -0.05 -0.22
-0.09
0.04 -0.10
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Panel 2: Social performance 
FAC Period COM ENE HAB LIF MAT NEC TEC 
1997-2003 0.04 0.27 0.21 -0.20 0.43*** 0.35* -0.66***
Size 2000-2003 0.04 0.23 0.21 -0.23 0.41 ** 0.39** -0.68***
1997-2000 0.10 0.64*** 0.22 -0.27 0.43** 0.31 -0.39*
1997-2003 -0.12 -0.08 -0.23 0.02 0.27* -0.30 0.04 
Book-to-
market value 2000-2003 -0.14 -0.08 -0.19 0.05 0.25 0.03 
1997-2000 -0.15 -0.18 -0.28 -0.28 0.12 
-0.35*
0.15 -0.10
Total 1997-2003 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.27 0.02 0.40** 0.13 
shareholder 2000-2003 0.04 -0.04 0.15 0.06 0.50*** 0.30* 
return 1997-2000 0.01 0.06 0.03 
-0.41 *
0.07 -0.03 -0.30 -0.19
1997-2003 0.06 0.12 -0.30 0.09 0.52*** 0.10 
0,03 0.19 0.02 0.48*** 0.26 Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003
1997-2000 
-0.02
0.00
0.04 0.08 0.04 
-0.43*
0.14 0.02 0.04 -0.25
Benchmark- 1997-2003 0.07 0.11 0.18 -0.27 0.07 0.38** 0.17 
adjusted 2000-2003 0.03 -0.02 0.11 -0.29 0.10 0.37** 0.31 * 
performance 1997- 0.00 0.16 0.12 -0.20 -0.07 0.05 -0.05
1997-2003 -0.11 -0.37** 0.28 -0.28* -0.52*** 0.15 
Total risk 2000-2003 
-0.03
0.00 -0.16 -0.33* 0.33 -0.23 -0.57*** 0.21 
1997-2000 -0.05 -0.21 -0.36* -0.13 -0.19 -0.53** -0.04
Panel 3: Governance performance 
FAC Period COM ENE HAB LIF MAT NEC TEC 
1997-2003 0.00 0.20 0.16 -0.22 0.44*** 0.09 -0.16
Size 2000-2003 0.16 0.22 -0.28 0.47*** 0.14 -0.14
1997-2000 
-0.02
0.07 0.39* 0.14 -0.19 0.43** -0.07 0.15 
1997-2003 0.03 0.02 -0.38** 0.20 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14
Book-to-
market value 2000-2003 -0.06 -0.28** 0.16 -0.19 -0.18
1997-2000 
-0.02
0.07 -0.04 -0.47** 0.47* 
-0.22
0.27 0.49** -0.23
Total 1997-2003 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.43** 0.03 
shareholder 2000-2003 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.31 * 0.48*** 0.29*
return 1997-2000 -0.04 -0.18 0.11 -0.46* -0.08 -0.21 -0.41 *
1997-2003 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.27* 0.43** 0.17 
0.17 0.19 0.06 0.27 0.33** 0.55*** 0.21 Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003
1997-2000 -0.06 -0.17 -0.01 -0.38 -0.11 -0.03 -0.08
1997-2003 0.08 -0.12 0.06 0.05 0.20 0.50*** 0.05 
2000-2003 0.15 0.02 0.24 0.35** 0.52*** 0.21 
Benchmark-
adjusted 
performance 1997-2000 0.08 -0.05
-0.05
0.12 -0.34 0.04 0.18 -0.43*
-0.44** -0.28 -0.59*** -0.36** -0.41** -0.41 **
Total risk -0.54*** -0.27 -0.55** -0.31 * -0.42** -0.21
1997-2003 -0.21 
2000-2003 -0.06 
1997-2000 -0.32* -0.22 -0.24 -0.42 -0.21 -0.32 -0.72***
Correlations between size and CSP differ across industry groups. Significant 
positive correlations between environmental performance and size are found in the 
technology, necessity services and habit consumption groups, and significant negative 
correlations are found in the commercial goods and services group. Correlations between 
social performance and size are significantly positive in the materials and necessity services 
groups, and significantly negative in the technology group. 
Correlations between governance performance and size are significantly positive in 
the materials group. This indicates that environmental and social performance is more often 
related to size than governance performance, but the nature of this relationship differs across 
industry groups (though significant positive correlations are observed more frequently than 
significant negative correlations). 
Correlations between book-to-market value and CSP appear only sporadically within 
the industry groups. Significant negative correlations between environmental performance 
and book-to-market value are found in the necessity services group, and some significant 
positive correlations are found in the lifestyle consumption group. No strongly significant 
correlations are found between social performance and book-to-market value, but significant 
negative correlations are found between governance performance and book-to-market value in 
the habit consumption group. 
Correlations between CSP and financial performance differ across the industry 
groups. The general tendency of governance performance being most strongly correlated with 
financial performance, followed by social performance, is also evident within the industry 
groups. The strongest financial performance-CSP correlations are found within the necessity 
services group, which stands out among the other groups in terms of CSP-financial 
performance correlations. More specifically, significant positive correlations between 
environmental performance and financial performance are found in the energy-related group, 
and significant negative corresponding correlations are found in the lifestyle consumption 
group. Significant positive correlations are found between social performance and financial 
performance in the necessity services group, which also exhibits significant positive 
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correlations in the governance category. Some significant positive correlations between 
governance performance and financial performance are also found in the materials group. 
Correlations between CSP and risk are generally strongly significant and negative 
across industry groups in the social and governance categories, and are strongest in the 
governance category. No significant correlations are found in the environment category, 
significant negative correlations between social performance and risk are found within the 
necessity services and habit consumption groups, and significant negative correlations 
between governance performance and risk is found within all groups except habit 
consumption and commercial goods and services. 
The results presented here imply rejection of both hypotheses HI. Io and Hl.2o. 
There are significant cross-sectional correlations between ranks of CSP and F AC measures, 
and these typically differ based on company size, trading history and industry classification. 
Within the full sample, governance performance is strongly and positively related to financial 
performance and strongly and negatively related to risk, social performance is somewhat 
positively related to financial performance and strongly negatively related to risk, and 
environmental performance is strongly negatively related to risk. 
Correlations between CSP and size are contingent on size, trading history and 
industry group, correlations between social performance and financial performance and 
between governance performance and financial performance are contingent on trading history 
and industry group (and weakly contingent on size), and correlations between CSP and risk 
relationships are in general not so much contingent on size, trading history and industry 
group, but are universally strong across different types of companies in the governance 
category and to a certain extent in the social category. Positive correlations between social 
performance and financial performance, and between governance performance and financial 
performance, are highly concentrated within recently listed companies and within the 
necessity services group. 
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5.1.2 Comparing the FAC of Firms with Different Levels o/CSP 
This part of the analysis compares the F AC of portfolios containing companies with 
high, moderate and low CSP. The results of these comparisons, provided in Table 5.3, suggest 
that companies with high social and governance performance are larger than companies with 
moderate and low performance. In both cases, the high CSP portfolios exhibit significantly 
larger average company size compared to the moderate CSP portfolios, whereas differences 
between moderate and low CSP portfolios are not significant. The high, moderate and low 
environmental performance portfolios are not statistically different in terms of company size. 
There is some evidence that companies with high environmental performance 
underperform financially compared to companies with moderate and low environmental 
performance. The low and moderate environmental performance portfolios exhibit 
significantly higher financial performance compared to the high environmental performance 
portfolio during the 1997-2000 period. A weak reversal effect is observed for the Jensen 
alpha, which is significantly higher for the high environmental performance portfolio 
compared to the moderate environmental performance portfolio, which again is significantly 
higher for the moderate environmental performance portfolio compared to the low 
environmental performance portfolio. 
There is weak evidence that companies with high social performance financially 
outperform companies with moderate (and low) social performance in the 2000-2003 period. 
There are few significant differences between the high, moderate and low social performance 
portfolios. The high social performance portfolio exhibits significantly higher total 
shareholder return and benchmark-adjusted performance compared to the moderate social 
performance portfolio in 2000-2003. The Jensen alphas follow a significant reversal pattern 
similar to that observed between the environmental performance portfolios. 
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Table 5.3: Comparing FAC of High, Moderate and Low CSP Companies 
This table reports average Financial Asset Characteristics (F AC) measures of high (H), moderate
(M) and low (L) CSP company portfolios. Comparisons are made based on portfolios formed from
the full sample with the four companies with the largest monthly return outliers omitted, hence the
sample base consists of 233 companies. Portfolios are formed by first ranking companies by CSP
ratings, then dividing the sample into three portfolios of approximately equal size (by number of
companies). The procedure is repeated for environmental, social and governance performance 
ratings. CSP is measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 2003. 
F AC measures include size (measured by average monthly total market capitalisation), book-to­
market value (measured by average monthly book-to-market value), total shareholder return
(measured as annualised average monthly return), Sharpe Ratio (measured as average monthly
total excess return divided by total risk), benchmark-adjusted performance (measured as
annualised average monthly abnormal return), Jensen alpha (adjusted for systematic market, size
and value risk factors, estimated using monthly portfolio returns), total risk (measured as standard
deviation of monthly return), and market beta (measured in a single-factor model, estimated using 
monthly portfolio returns). FAC measures are calculated over a full six-year period ( 1  August 
1 997- 1 July 2003), as well as two three-year periods ( 1  August 2000-1 July 2003 and 1 August
1 997- 1 July 2000). Jensen alphas and market betas are only estimated for the two three-year
periods, and not for the full period, due to poor model fit for longer periods. Differences between
high and low (H-L), high and moderate (H-M) and moderate and low (M-L) environmental
performance portfolios are reported in the last three columns. Results for portfolios constructed
based on environmental, social and governance performance are presented in panels 1 ,  2, and 3,
respectively. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, ** and
***, respectively. 
Panel 1: Environmental eer(prmance 
Average portfolio values
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Portfolio differences 
FAC measure Period H M L H-L H-M M-L
Size 
1997-2003 8.6899 8.6972 8.5646 0.1253 -0.0073 0.1326 
2000-2003 8.7081 8.7280 8.5993 0.1088 0.1286 
1997-2000 8.7551 8.7091 8.4723 0.2827 
-0.0198
0.0460 0.2368* 
1997-2003 0.6286 0.7371 0.6946 -0.0660 -0.1085 0.0425 
Book-to-
market value 2000-2003 0.6552 0.7713 0.7343 -0.0791 -0.1161 0.0370 
1997-2000 0.5527 0.5732 0.6264 -0.0737 -0.0205 -0.0532
Total 1997-2003 0.0950 0.1256 0.0925 0.0025 0.0331 
shareholder 2000-2003 0.0685 0.0104 0.0211 0.0475 
-0.0307
0.0582
return 1997-2000 0.1416 0.3287 0.2265 -0.0850 -0.1872***
-0.0107
0.1022
0.0521 0.0590 0.0241 0.0280 0.0349 
0.0563 0.0222 0.0445 0.0118 
-0.0069
0.0341 -0.0223
1997-2003 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003
1997-2000 0.0477 0.1212 0.0190 0.0287 -0.0735* 0.1022*** 
Benchmark- 1997-2003 0.1029 0.0917 0.0616 0.0414 0.0113 0.0301 
adjusted 2000-2003 0.0111 0.0749 0.0862 
performance 1997-2000 0.2560 
-0.0751
0.4079
-0.0638
0.2828 -0.0268 -0.1519**
-0.0114
0.1251
Jensen alpha 2000-2003 0.0053 0.0020 0.0000 0.0053*** 0.0033*** 0.0020* 
1997-2000 0.0068 0.0281 0.0133 -0.0064*** -0.0213*** 0.0148***
1997-2003 0.1142 0.1387 0.1472 -0.0329*** -0.0245** -0.0085
Total risk 2000-2003 0.1101 0.1267 0.1350 -0.0249** -0.0166 -0.0083
1997-2000 0.1114 0.1329 0.1483 -0.0369** -0.0215 -0.0154
Market beta 2000-2003 0.8724 1.3726 1.3321 -0.4596*** -0.5002*** 0.0406 
1997-2000 0.8605 1.1674 1.0477 -0.1872*** -0.3068*** 0.1196***
Panel 2: Social eer(grmance 
Average portfolio values 
FAC measure Period H M L 
Size 
1997-2003 8.8233 8.5560 8.5704 
2000-2003 8.8537 8.5741 8.6064 
1997-2000 9.0190 8.4811 8.4321 
Book-to-
1997-2003 0.6241 0.7463 0.6930 
market value 2000-2003 0.6030 0.7763 0.7808 
1997-2000 0.5671 0.5843 0.6050 
Total 1997-2003 0.1127 0.0947 0.1053 
shareholder 2000-2003 0.0907 -0.0009 0.0094 
return 1997-2000 0.1671 0.2398 0.2809 
0.0488 0.0495 0.0353 1997-2003 
Sharpe Ratio 2000-2003 0.0682 0.0197 0.0352 
1997-2000 0.0482 0.0823 0.0509 
Benchmark- 1997-2003 0.1152 0.0809 0.0592 
adjusted 2000-2003 0.0114 -0.0715
performance 1997-2000 0.2898 
-0.0702
0.3301 0.3190 
Jensen alpha 2000-2003 0.0075 0.0004 
1997-2000 0.0103 0.0159 
-0.0016
0.0204
1997-2003 0.1232 0.1232 0.1544 
Total risk 2000-2003 0.1140 0.1159 0.1422 
1997-2000 0.1138 0.1266 0.1524 
Market beta 2000-2003 1.1243 1.1477 1.3258 
1997-2000 0.7424 1.0459 1.2680 
Panel 3: Governance eer(grmance 
F AC measure Period 
Size 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
Book-to-
market value2000-2003
1997-2000 
Total 1997-2003 
shareholder 2000-2003 
return 1997-2000 
1997-2003 
Sharpe Ratio2000-2003 
1997-2000 
Benchmark- 1997-2003
adjusted 2000-2003 
performance 1997_2000 
Jensen alpha 2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
Total risk 2000-2003 
1997-2000 
2000-2003 
Market beta 
1997_2000 
Average portfolio values 
H M L 
8.9035 8.4955 8.5676 
8.9327 8.5286 8.5900 
8.9503 8.4942 8.4448 
0.6385 0.6627 0.7629 
0.6329 0.6469 0.8877 
0.6557 0.5287 0.5726 
0.1252 0.1044 0.0842 
0.1138 0.0326 -0.0455
0.1509 0.2558 0.2949 
0.0705 0.0506 0.0126 
0.1010 0.0362 
0.0304 0.0876 
-0.0114
0.0635
0.1195 0.0827 0.0527 
0.0193 -0.0495 -0.0993
0.2808 0.3199 0.3439 
0.0083 -0.0016
0.0077 
-0.0002
0.0175 0.0226 
0.1044 0.1329 0.1638 
0.0968 0.1285 0.1467 
0.1082 0.1234 0.1679 
0.9524 1.1021 1.5496 
0.7993 0.9473 1.3607 
Portfolio differences 
H-L H-M M-L
0.2529** 0.2673* -0.0144
0.2473* 0.2796* -0.0323
0.5868*** 0.5379*** 0.0490 
-0.0690 -0.1223 0.0533 
-0.1778* -0.1733 -0.0045
-0.0379 -0.0172 -0.0207
0.0075 0.0181 -0.0106
0.0813 0.0916* -0.0102
-0.1138 -0.0728 -0.0411
0.0135 -0.0007 0.0143 
0.0330 0.0485 -0.0156
-0.0027 -0.0342 0.0315 
0.0560 0.0342 0.0218 
0.0829 0.0817* 0.0012 
-0.0292 -0.0403 0.0111 
0.0091*** 0.0071*** 0.0020* 
-0.0101*** -0.0056*** -0.0045***
-0.0311 ** 0.0000 -0.0312**
-0.0282** -0.0019 -0.0263**
-0.0386** -0.0128 -0.0258
-0.2014*** -0.0234 -0.1781 ***
-0.5256*** -0.3035*** -0.2221***
Portfolio differences 
H-L H-M M-L
0.3359** 0.4080*** -0.0721
0.3427** 0.4041*** -0.0614
0.5055*** 0.4560*** 0.0495 
-0.1243 -0.0242 -0.1002
-0.0140 -0.2407**-0.2547***
0.0830 0.1270 -0.0440
0.0410 0.0208 0.0202 
0.1594*** 0.0813* 0.0781 
-0.1439* -0.1049* -0.0390
0.0579** 0.0200 0.0379* 
0.1123*** 0.0648** 0.0475 
-0.0331 -0.0572 0.0241 
0.0668 0.0368 0.0300 
0.1186** 0.0688 0.0498 
-0.0631 -0.0392 -0.0239
0.0098*** 0.0085*** 0.0013 
-0.0149*** -0.0098*** -0.0051 ***
-0.0594*** -0.0285** -0.0309**
-0.0499*** -0.0317*** -0.0182
-0.0597*** -0.0152 -0.0445**
-0.5971 ***
-0.5613***
-0.1497*** -0.4474***
-0.1480*** -0.4134***
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The most significant differences between portfolios' financial performance are 
observed in the governance performance category. There is strong evidence that companies 
with high governance performance financially outperform companies with moderate and low 
governance performance during 2000-2003, although some reversal is observed in total 
shareholder return and Jensen alphas. The high governance performance portfolio exhibits 
significantly greater financial performance compared to the moderate and low governance 
performance portfolios. Significant reversals between the two three-year periods are observed 
in total shareholder return and again in the Jensen alphas. 
There is strong evidence that companies with high CSP exhibit lower risk than 
companies with lower CSP, and differences are most significant in the governance category. 
The high environmental performance portfolio exhibits significantly lower risk compared to 
the moderate and low environmental performance portfolios. The high and moderate social 
performance portfolios exhibit significantly lower risk compared to the low social 
performance portfolios. Finally, the high governance performance portfolio exhibits 
significantly lower risk than the moderate and low performance portfolios, and the moderate 
performance portfolio exhibits significantly lower risk compared to the low performance 
portfolio. 
Results imply that hypothesis H20 is rejected. Portfolios with high, moderate and 
low CSP exhibit different F AC. No evidence is found to suggest inverted U-shaped CSP­
financial performance relationships where moderate-CSP companies financially outperform 
high and low-CSP companies. Companies with high social and governance performance are 
larger and exhibit lower book-to-market values and higher financial performance than 
companies with low performance. There is some evidence that companies with high 
environmental performance underperform financially compared with companies with 
moderate and low environmental performance. Companies with high CSP exhibit lower risk 
than companies with low CSP. 
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5.1.3 The Ability of CSP to Explain Cross-sectional Variation in FAC 
In this part of the analysis, individual F AC variables are regressed on a combination 
of environmental, social and governance performance. These F AC-CSP models are estimated 
once within the full sample, based on the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios, and then within each of 
the seven industry groups, based on individual company observations. The results are 
discussed in tum. 
Model Estimation Within the Full Sample 
Results from F AC-CSP regressions within the full sample are provided in Table 5.4. 
In terms of model fit, 10 of the 22 estimated models exhibit significant F-statistics. The 
highest adjusted R-squared value is 0.38, with five models exhibiting adjusted R-squared 
values of more than 0.20. Model fit is generally better for the 2000-2003 period when 
financial performance measures are used as dependent variables, and is very low for the 1997-
2000 period (though the opposite pattern is observed for beta and size). This suggests 
variation in CSP explains a significant portion of variation in F AC during 2000-2003. 
Secondly, the governance performance variables have the largest proportion of significant 
coefficients (10 of the 22 governance performance coefficients are significant). Only two of 
the social performance coefficients are significant and none of the environmental performance 
coefficients are significant. Hence, when all three CSP measures are considered in 
combination governance performance is most dominant in explaining F AC. 
The ability of CSP to explain F AC is strongest for total risk and the Sharpe Ratio. 
The coefficients also suggest strong positive linear relationships between governance 
performance and total shareholder return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen alpha in the 2000-2003 
period. Results also suggest strong negative relationships between governance performance 
and book-to-market value, total risk and the market beta. CSP does not explain much of the 
variation in size and market beta. 
In sum, CSP explains a significant portion of variation in risk and financial 
performance, dominated by governance performance, which is significantly positively related 
to financial performance and significantly negatively related to book-to-market value and risk. 
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Table 5.4: Regressing FAC Measures on CSP Measures 
This table reports estimated parameters for the model 
FAC; = Yo + YENv (CSPENv) + Ysoc(CSPsoc) + Yoov(CSPaov) + e; 
which is estimated using 27 portfolios with similar CSP attributes. The intercept term is not 
reported here. CSP and F AC measures are average values for the constituent companies within 
each portfolio. CSP is measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 
2003 . FAC measures include size (measured by portfolio average monthly total market 
capitalisation), book-to-market value (measured by portfolio average monthly book-to-market 
value), total shareholder return (measured by portfolio annualised average monthly return), 
Sharpe Ratio (measured by the average Sharpe Ratio of each company in the portfolio, 
calculated as average monthly total excess return divided by company total risk), benchmark­
adjusted performance (measured as annualised average monthly abnormal return), Jensen alpha 
(adjusted for systematic market, size and value risk factors, estimated using monthly portfolio 
returns), total risk (measured as standard deviation of monthly return), and market beta 
(estimated in a single-factor model using monthly portfolio returns). FAC measures are 
calculated over a full six-year period ( 1  August 1 997-1 July 2003), as well as two three-year 
periods ( 1  August 2000- 1 July 2003 and 1 August 1997-1 July 2000). Jensen alphas and market 
betas are only estimated for the two three-year periods, and not for the full period, due to poor 
model fit for longer periods. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated 
by *, **  and *** ,  respectively. 
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Dependent 
variable 
Size 
Book-to­
market value 
Total 
shareholder 
return 
Sharpe Ratio 
Benchmark­
adjusted 
performance 
Jensen alpha 
Total risk 
Market beta 
Period 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
YENV 'Ysoc 
-0.0480 0.0513 
-0.0552 0.0510 
-0.0386 0.2315** 
-0.0329 0.0246 
-0.0277 -0.0035
-0.0177
-0.0052
-0.1040
0.0061
0.0313
-0.0304
-0.0098
0.0013
0.0022
-0.0157
0.0047
0.0105
0.0057
0.0280
0.0422*
0.0202
0.0020
0.0021
0.0107 -0.0407
0.0027-0.0006
0.0009 -0.0028
-0.0042 -0.0023
-0.0031 -0.0031
-0.0056 -0.0064
0.0077-0.1082
0.0037 -0.1690*
YGOV 
0.1321 
0.1399 
0.1073 
-0.0871 *
-0.1350**
0.0875
0.0212
0.0699***
-0.0376
0.0252**
0.0543***
-0.0214
0.0220 
0.0422 
0.0214 
0.0039** 
-0.0050
-0.0285***
-0.0227***
-0.0197
-0.2578*
-0.2108**
Adj. R2 
0.0267 
0.0510 
0.1529 
0.0432 
0.1564 
-0.0180
-0.0417
0.3104
-0.0569
0.2199
0.3149
-0.0317
0.0815
0.1819
-0.0801
0.2415
-0.0353
0.3471
0.3820
0.0862
0.0858
0.3029
F-statistic
1.24
1.47
2.56*
1.39
2.61 *
0.85
0.65
4.90***
0.53
3.44**
4.98***
0.73
1.77
2.93*
0.36
3.76**
0.70
5.61 ***
6.36***
1.82
1.81
4.77***
Model Estimation Within the Seven Industry Groups 
F AC-CSP model estimations within the seven industry groups are provided in Table 
5.5. These are discussed as alternative model estimates to the models estimated within the full 
sample. Note however that models estimated within industry groups are estimated based on 
individual company observations, rather than the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios. This means the 
Jensen alpha and market beta are not included as F AC variables. Because of the high 
probability of multicollinearity, coefficients are not discussed significantly. 
Model fit is not very different within the industry groups compared to the full 
sample. Model fit does however vary much between the industries. Some models exhibit 
exceptionally good fit, such as the size-CSP model estimated within the technology group, 
where the adjusted R-squared value is as high as 0.52. Models with size and total risk as 
dependent variables exhibit the highest numbers of significant F-statistics. However, the most 
notable observation is that most significant F-statistics are found within the necessity services 
group, which is also the only group where financial performance-CSP models exhibit 
significant F-statistics and coefficients. 
The models regressing size on CSP exhibit low fit and coefficients that are not 
significant within the full sample. Significant F-statistics and coefficients are however 
revealed within some industry groups. As mentioned, model fit is very good within the 
technology group, and good model fit is also observed in the materials and commercial goods 
and services groups. Although individual slope coefficients are not attributed much 
interpretational value, it is worth noting that many slope coefficients within these models are 
significant, and that these often have opposite signs within the same model. 
The models regressing book-to-market value on CSP exhibit significant model fit 
only in one period. Within the industry groups, F-statistics are significant for the lifestyle 
consumption group, and for the necessity services and habit consumption groups (both 
exhibiting significant F-statistics only in one period). Significant CSP slope coefficients are of 
both signs. 
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Table 5.5: Regressing FAC on CSP Within Industry Groups 
This table reports estimated parameters for the model 
FA ci,j = Yo + r ENV( CSPENV,i )  + r soc ( CSPSOC,i )  + r GOV ( CSPGOV,i) + e;
which is estimated within each industry group based on individual company observations. The
seven industry groups include commercial goods and services (COM), energy related industries
(ENE), habit consumption industries (HAB), situational (lifestyle) consumption industries (LIF),
materials (MAT), necessity services (NEC), and technology industries (TEC). The intercept
term is not reported here. CSP is measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 
and 1 July 2003. FAC variables include size (measured by average monthly total market
capitalisation), book-to-market value (measured by average monthly book-to-market value),
total shareholder return (measured as annualised average monthly return), Sharpe Ratio
(measured as average monthly total excess return divided by total risk), benchmark-adjusted
performance (measured as annualised average monthly abnormal return), and total risk
(measured as standard deviation of monthly return). F AC variables are calculated over a full six­
year period ( 1  August 1997-1 July 2003), as well as two three-year periods ( 1  August 2000-1
July 2003 and 1 August 1997-1 July 2000). Estimation results are provided for model with each
F AC variable in tum, in panels 1 to 6. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level
is indicated by *, * *  and * * *, respectively. 
Panel 1: Size 
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Dependent 
variable 
Size 
Book-to­
market value 
Total 
shareholder 
return 
Sharpe Ratio 
Benchmark­
adjusted 
performance 
Jensen alpha 
Total risk 
Market beta 
Period 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
2000-2003 
1997-2000 
YENV 'Ysoc 
-0.0480 0.0513 
-0.0552 0.0510 
-0.0386 0.2315** 
-0.0329 0.0246 
-0.0277 -0.0035
-0.0177
-0.0052
-0.1040
0.0061
0.0313
-0.0304
-0.0098
0.0013
0.0022
-0.0157
0.0047
0.0105
0.0057
0.0280
0.0422*
0.0202
0.0020
0.0021
0.0107 -0.0407
0.0027-0.0006
0.0009 -0.0028
-0.0042 -0.0023
-0.0031 -0.0031
-0.0056 -0.0064
0.0077-0.1082
0.0037 -0.1690*
YGOV 
0.1321 
0.1399 
0.1073 
-0.0871 *
-0.1350**
0.0875
0.0212
0.0699***
-0.0376
0.0252**
0.0543***
-0.0214
0.0220 
0.0422 
0.0214 
0.0039** 
-0.0050
-0.0285***
-0.0227***
-0.0197
-0.2578*
-0.2108**
Adj. R2 
0.0267 
0.0510 
0.1529 
0.0432 
0.1564 
-0.0180
-0.0417
0.3104
-0.0569
0.2199
0.3149
-0.0317
0.0815
0.1819
-0.0801
0.2415
-0.0353
0.3471
0.3820
0.0862
0.0858
0.3029
F-statistic
1.24
1.47
2.56*
1.39
2.61 *
0.85
0.65
4.90***
0.53
3.44**
4.98***
0.73
1.77
2.93*
0.36
3.76**
0.70
5.61 ***
6.36***
1.82
1.81
4.77***
Panel 2: Book-to-market value 
Industry 
Group Period 'l._ENV �QC 
1997-2003 0.0383 -0.0729
COM 2000-2003 0.0107 -0.0709
1997-2000 0.0523 -0.1465
1997-2003 -0.1160* 0.0583 
ENE 2000-2003 -0.1352* 0.0763 
1997-2000 -0.1527 0.0435 
1997-2003 0.0387 -0.0303
HAD 2000-2003 0.0298 -0.0381
1997-2000 0.0778 -0.0480
1997-2003 0.2709** -0.0179
LIF 2000-2003 0.2186 -0.0127
1997-2000 0.3459** -0.0487
1997-2003 0.0605 0.1483 
MAT 2000-2003 0.0981 0.1355 
1997-2000 -0.0217 0.0471 
1997-2003 -0.3277 -0.0438
NEC 2000-2003 -0.3034 -0.1410
1997-2000 -0.1545 0.0470 
1997-2003 0.0201 0.0475 
TEC 2000-2003 0.0758 0.0089 
1997-2000 0.0804 -0.0319
Panel 3: Total shareholder return 
Industry 
Group Period 'l..ENV 'l..soc 
1997-2003 0.0127 -0.0244
COM 2000-2003 0.0362 -0.0506
1997-2000 -0.0486 0.0398 
1997-2003 0.0476 -0.0433
ENE 2000-2003 0.0145 -0.0413
1997-2000 0.0996 
1997-2003 
HAD 2000-2003 
-0.0143
0.0314
1997-2000 -0.0419
-0.0617*
0.0225
0.0271
0.0123
1997-2003 -0.1064 -0.0314
LIF 2000-2003 -0.1319 -0.0190
1997-2000 -0.0968 -0.0186
1997-2003 -0.0069 -0.0034
MAT 2000-2003 0.0090 -0.0057
1997-2000 -0.0029 -0.0205
1997-2003 0.0452 0.0518 
NEC 2000-2003 0.0289 0.1427** 
1997-2000 0.0124 -0.1444*
1997-2003 -0.0183
TEC 2000-2003 -0.1259
-0.0002
0.0771
1997-2000 0.1175 -0.1234
l<i.OV 
-0.0201
-0.0508
0.0330 
-0.0280
0.0012 
-0.0476
-0.2153**
-0.2204
-0.2390**
-0.0448
-0.1822
-0.1054
-0.1354
-0.2082
0.0924 
-0.1752
-0.3331
0.5427 
-0.1071
-0.1272
0.0074 
'l._GOV 
0.0367 
0.0755 
0.0551 
-0.0396
0.0048 
-0.1087
0.0232 
-0.0261
0.0407 
0.0625 
0.1118 
-0.0694
0.0067
0.0721 *
-0.0772
0.0933* 
0.1575** 
-0.0962
-0.0147
0.0038 
-0.1460
Adj. R2 
-0.0391
-0.0257
-0.0688
0.0079 
0.0302 
-0.0012
0.0884 
0.0295 
0.1880 
0.2058 
0.1059 
0.3712 
-0.0521
-0.0220
-0.0403
0.0408 
0.1221 
0.0280 
-0.0388
-0.0291
-0.1377
Adj. R2 
-0.0621
-0.0391
-0.0605
0.0335 
-0.0859
0.2193 
-0.0497
-0.0818
-0.0718
0.0675
0.0256
-0.0468
-0.0854
0.0207
-0.0283
0.2022 
0.3334 
0.1194 
-0.0883
0.0019
0.0242
F-statistic N 
0.45 45 
0.63 45 
0.31 33 
1.08 31 
1.31 31 
0.99 23 
1.97 31 
1.30 31 
3.01* 27 
2.64* 20 
1.75 20 
3.56* 14 
0.39 38 
0.73 38 
0.65 28 
1.42 31 
2.39* 31 
1.21 23 
0.55 37 
0.66 37 
0.23 20 
N 
45 
45 
34 
31 
31 
23 
31 
31 
27 
20 
20 
14 
38 
38 
29 
31 
F-statistic
0.14
0.45
0.37
1.35
0.21
3.06*
0.53
0.24
0.42
1.46
1.17
0.81
0.03
1.26
0.74
3.53**
6.00*** 31 
2.04 24 
0.03 37 
1.02 37 
1.17 22 
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Panel 4: Sharpe Ratio 
Industry 
Group Period YENV rsoc 
1997-2003 0.0131 -0.0227
COM 2000-2003 0.0037 
1997-2000 0.0098 
-0.0261
0.0078
1997-2003 0.0440** -0.0272
ENE 2000-2003 0.0227 -0.0308
1997-2000 0.0591 ** -0.0077
1997-2003 -0.0141 0.0228 
HAB 2000-2003 -0.0006 0.0363 
1997-2000 -0.0105 0.0103 
1997-2003 -0.0859 -0.0198
LIF 2000-2003 -0.0980 -0.0378
1997-2000 -0.0872 -0.0084
1997-2003 -0.0094 0.0039 
MAT 2000-2003 
1997-2000 
1997-2003 
-0.0174
0.0093
0.0346
-0.0211
0.0244
0.0449
NEC 2000-2003 0.1061 *** 
1997-2000 -0.0167
1997-2003 
-0.0291
0.0556
0.0136 -0.0080
TEC 2000-2003 0.0229 
1997-2000 
-0.0424
0.0917 -0.0561
Panel 5: Benchmark-adiusted performance 
Industry 
Group Period YENV rsoc 
1997-2003 0.0437 -0.0113
COM 2000-2003 0.0662 -0.0574
1997-2000 0.0492 
1997-2003 -0.0070
ENE 2000-2003 -0.0189
1997-2000 
-0.0329
0.0198
0.0006
0.0410
1997-2003 -0.0048
HAB 2000-2003 0.0606 
1997-2000 -0.0105
-0.0140
0.0367
0.0224
0.0117
1997-2003 -0.0110 -0.0535
LIF 2000-2003 -0.0004
1997-2000 
-0.0940
0.0659 -0.0848
1997-2003 0.0384 
MAT 2000-2003 
-0.0002
0.0522 0.0265 
1997-2000 -0.0593 0.0166 
1997-2003 0.0513 0.0715 
NEC 2000-2003 0.0169 0.1021 
1997-2000 0.1245 
1997-2003 -0.0077
TEC 2000-2003 
-0.0779
0.0216
0.1087
1997-2000 
-0.1690
0.3842 -0.0454
YGOV 
O.ol 78
0.0492 
-0.0075
0.0033 
0.0343 
-0.0815
0.0207 
0.0056 
0.0133 
0.0436 
0.0798 
-0.0474
0.0276
0.0702** 
-0.0379
0.0905** 
0.1159*** 
0.0320 
0.0046 
-0.0093
0.0008
YGOV 
0.0160 
0.0572 
0.0405 
-0.0686
-0.0196
-0.0798
0.0182
-0.0428
0.0214
-0.0036
0.0874 
-0.2047
0.0198 
0.0533 
-0.0075
0.1653*** 
0.1421 ** 
0.1203 
-0.0203
-0.0575
-0.1262
Adj. R2 
-0.0531
-0.0380
-0.0950
0.0645
-0.0645
0.1787 
0.0007 
-0.0436
-0.1191
0.1880 
0.1090 
0.0412 
-0.0396
0.0854 
-0.0749
0.3016
0.4022
-0.0561
-0.0829
-0.0390
0.0211
Adj. R2 
-0.0465
-0.0239
-0.0728
-0.0347
-0.0947
-0.0584
-0.0450
-0.0607
-0.1107
-0.1443
-0.0857
-0.0966
-0.0331
0.0988
-0.0554
0.2806
0.2091
0.0173
-0.0870
0.0527
-0.0074
N 
45 
45 
34 
31 
31 
23 
31 
31 
27 
20 
20 
14 
38 
38 
29 
31 
F-statistic
0.26
0.46
0.05
1.69
0.39
2.6*
1.01
0.58
0.08
2.47*
1.77
1.19
0.53
2.15
0.35
5.32***
7.73*** 31 
0.61 23 
0.08 37 
0.55 37 
1.15 22 
F -statistic N 
0.35 45 
0.66 45 
0.28 33 
0.66 31 
0.14 31 
0.60 23 
0.57 31 
0.43 31 
0.14 27 
0.20 20 
0.50 20 
0.62 14 
0.61 38 
2.35* 38 
0.51 29 
4.90*** 31 
3.64** 31 
1.13 23 
0.04 37 
1.67 37 
0.95 20 
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As discussed, the necessity services group stands out in terms of model fit and 
significant coefficients in the models regressing financial performance on CSP. Few other 
industry groups exhibit significant F-statistics for these models. The lifestyle consumption 
group exhibit good model fit for the full period when financial performance is measured by 
the Sharpe Ratio, and the materials group exhibits good model fit for the 2000-2003 period 
when financial performance is measured by benchmark-adjusted performance. The full-period 
model regressing total risk on CSP exhibits good fit, though model fit differs among the 
industry groups. Significant F-statistics are observed in the necessity services, technology and 
energy-related groups. Most significant slope coefficients are negative. 
Results imply that both hypotheses HJ. Io and H3.2o are rejected. CSP does explain 
significant cross-sectional variation in F AC and this ability does differ across industry groups. 
Size is well explained by CSP within the technology, necessity services, materials and 
commercial goods and services groups, but not in the energy-related, habit consumption and 
lifestyle consumption groups. Book-to-market value is somewhat explained by CSP in the 
lifestyle consumption and necessity services groups, but not within other groups. Financial 
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Panel 6: Total risk 
Industry 
Group Period YENV Ysoc 
1997-2003 -0.0012 -0.0062
COM 2000-2003 
1997-2000 
-0.0103
0.0109
-0.0100
0.0047
1997-2003 -0.0049 0.0216* 
ENE 2000-2003 -0.0060 0.0236* 
1997-2000 -0.0028 -0.0023
1997-2003 -0.0020 -0.0163*
HAB 2000-2003 -0.0027 -0.0173
1997-2000 -0.0023 -0.0109
1997-2003 0.0093 
LIF 2000-2003 0.0131 
1997-2000 0.0162 
-0.0031
0.0019
0.0084
1997-2003 0.0009 -0.0130
MAT 2000-2003 0.0088 -0.0163
1997-2000 -0.0021
1997-2003 -0.0599***
NEC 2000-2003 -0.0423***
1997-2000 
-0.0085
0.0124
0.0009
0.0193 -0.0751 ***
1997-2003 -0.0085 0.0198 
TEC 2000-2003 -0.0088 0.0158 
1997-2000 -0.0105 0.0009 
YGOV 
0.0000 
-0.0037
0.0009
-0.0521 ***
-0.0625***
-0.0161
-0.0134
-0.0042
-0.0177*
-0.0390**
-0.0277*
-0.0576
-0.0175*
-0.0130
-0.0171
-0.0215
-0.0302**
-0.0244
-0.0526***
-0.0301 **
-0.0688***
Adj. R2 
-0.0671
-0.0402
-0.0809
0.2854 
0.3311 
0.0419 
0.1649 
0.0264 
0.1885 
0.1205 
0.1213 
-0.0334
0.0758
0.0199
0.0198
0.4205
0.4003
0.3615
0.2081
0.0388
0.2883
F-statistic N 
0.08 45 
0.43 45 
0.18 34 
4.99*** 31 
5.95*** 31 
1.32 23 
2.97** 31 
1.27 31 
3.01 * 27 
1.87 20 
1.87 20 
0.86 14 
2.01 38 
1.25 38 
1.19 29 
8.26*** 31 
7.67*** 31 
5.34*** 24 
4.15** 37 
1.48 37 
3.84** 22 
performance is well explained by CSP only within the necessity services group. Risk is well 
explained by CSP in the energy-related, habit consumption, necessity services and technology 
groups. 
5.1.4 The Ability of FAC to Explain Cross-Sectional Variation in CSP 
The ability of F AC to explain cross-sectional variation in CSP is investigated by 
regressing individual CSP measures on a combination of F AC variables, covering size, book­
to-market value, financial performance and risk. These CSP-F AC models are estimated based 
the 27 CSP-sorted portfolios of the full sample, and also within each of the seven industry 
groups, similarly to the F AC-CSP models. A third approach is also taken, where the model is 
estimated once on the full sample using individual company observations and once on the 
same sample but including industry group dummies to test for fixed industry group effects. 
Results are discussed in turn. 
Models Estimated Within the Full Sample 
The results from regressing CSP-FAC models using portfolio observations within the full 
sample are provided in 
Table 5.6. Results indicate that models estimated with environmental performance 
as the dependent variable exhibit poor fit. Models estimated with social performance as the 
dependent variable exhibit better fit, but mainly for the 1997-2000 models. Models estimated 
with governance performance as the dependent variable exhibit best fit, and F-statistics are 
significant for both periods. 
The environmental performance-F AC models exhibit some significant negative 
financial performance coefficients for the 2000-2003 period, suggesting that environmental 
performance is most strongly related to financial performance of the F AC variables, and that 
this relationship is negative. For the 1997-2000 period, the size coefficients and, to some 
extent, the risk coefficients are significant, and both are negative. This suggests that, although 
F AC does not significantly explain variation in environmental performance, there is some 
weak evidence that environmental performance is negatively related to financial performance, 
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size and risk. Nonetheless, these results indicate that environmental performance is not well 
explained by a combination ofFAC variables. 
Table 5. 6: Regressing CSP on FAC Within the Full Sample 
This table displays estimated parameters for the general model 
CSP;,1 = 00 + B8 (size; ) + Bv(b l m;) + BR (risk;,m )  + BFP (FP;., ) + e;
which is estimated based on average portfolio values for 27 portfolios with similar CSP 
attributes .  CSP is measured by environmental, social and corporate governance performance. 
Size and book-to-market value (b/m) are average monthly values (log value for size), risk is 
measured in turn by the market beta and total risk, and financial performance (FP) is measured in 
turn by total shareholder return (TSR), Sharpe Ratio, benchmark-adjusted performance (BAP) 
and Jensen alpha. Because multiple measures are available for risk and FP, models are first 
estimated using the two alternative risk measures in turn. The risk measure yielding the best 
model fit is then kept and expanded by each of the FP measures in turn. Hence, the columns 
labelled 'risk measures' display estimation results for the model estimated with size, book-to­
market value, and total risk or market beta. The four columns labelled 'financial performance 
measures '  display the estimation results for the models estimated with size, book-to-market 
value, the risk measure with best fit in the previous model, and either total shareholder return, 
Sharpe Ratio, benchmark-adjusted return or Jensen alpha. Models are estimated using financial 
variables measured over the 1 August 2000-1 July 2003 and 1 August 1 997-1 July 2000 periods, 
respectively. CSP the average monthly rating measured between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 
2003 . Results from model estimation with environmental, social and governance performance as 
the dependent variable is provided in panels 1 ,  2 and 3, respectively. The symbols *, ** and ***  
indicate statistical significance at a 90, 95  and 99 percent level, respectively. 
Panel 1: Environmental performance 
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Risk measures Financial performance measures 
Coeff. Beta Total Risk TSR Shar[!_e BAP Al[!_ha 
Size -0.1858 -0.1986 -0.1954
I") 
Value 
-0.2056
0.1491 -0.1132
-0.2818
0.0841
-0.2384
0.0074 -0.0743
g Beta 
-0.0357
0.1399
M Total risk 0.2815 -0.1937 -2.0822 0.1450 0.4004 
0 FP -1.2450* -1.7321 * -0.9315 -14.86170 
M Adj. R2 -0.0210 0.0263 0.0458 -0.0150
F-stat 0.82 1.23 
-0.0126
0.92 1.31 0.90 
-0.0159
0.90
Size 
0 Value 
-0.3044** -0.5771 *** -0.5601 *** -0.6554*** -0.5134*** -0.5779***
0.1022 -0.0543 -0.0493 -0.0725 0.0423 -0.0571
0 Beta 0.1544 0 
M Total risk -2.6010* -1.7103 -1.5756 -1.6493
O'I FP -0.2948
-3.7712**
0.9630 -0.4147 -3.9003O'I .... Adj. R2 -0.0409 0.0762 -0.0372
F-stat
-0.0859
0.31 0.66 
-0.0635
0.61 1.54 0.77 
-0.0410
0.43
The 1997-2000 social performance-FAC models exhibit significant negative market 
beta coefficients, suggesting that when F AC variables are investigated in combination, social 
performance is most strongly related to risk. Hence, a significant portion of the variation in 
social performance is explained by the combination of F AC variables, but only for the 1997-
2000 period, suggesting this evidence is weak. 
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Panel 2: Social performance 
Risk measures Financial performance measures 
Coe/f. Beta Total Risk TSR Sharee BAP Ale.ha 
Size 0.0119 -0.0027 0.0322 0.2452 0.1122 
""> Value 0.3350 -0.0257 0.4039 
-0.0377
0.2389 0.3110 0.4484 
8 Beta -0.0653
M Total risk -9.5847 -1.6383 -7.18190 = FP -6.68892.7839 -0.7298 -5.83963.2288* 44.8056* = 
M Adj. R2 -0.0602 0.0411 0.1064 0.0827 
F-stat 0.51 
-0.0103
0.91 1.28 
-0.0403
0.75 1.77 1.59 
Size 0.5351 0.6065* 0.6727 0.5546 0.5702 0.6535 
= Value -0.1953 -0.1180 -0.1022 0.0016 -0.2572 -0.1389
8 Beta -0.7433* -0.9043* -0.9102** -0.7992* -0.8864*
M Total risk 6.4517** 
O'I FP 0.8494 2.4269 0.4122 7.8833 O'I .... Adj. R2 0.2319 0.1289 0.2191 0.2479 0.2036 0.2168 
F-stat 3.62** 2.28 2.82** 3.14** 2.66* 2.8* 
Panel 3: Governance performance 
Risk measures Financial performance measures 
Coe.ff. Beta Total Risk TSR Sharee BAP Ale.ha 
Size 0.5507 -0.1263 -0.0949 -0.0147 -0.0056 -0.0458
""> Value -1.3270 -0.4558 -0.0692 -0.4854 -0.2918 -0.1237
8 Beta -0.0682
M Total risk -16.1149** -13.5094** -10.7682 -14.2912** -14.4316**0 = FP 2.5048* 3.9874** 1.5723 31.3887* = 
M Adj. R2 0.1962 0.3710 0.4406 0.4670 0.3905 0.4274 
F-stat 3.12** 6.11 *** 6.12*** 6.69*** 5.16*** 5.85*** 
Size 0.3151 0.2849 0.4974 0.3234 0.3819 0.4156 
= Value 0.6707 0.5141 0.8059 0.7549 0.5455 0.6974 
8 Beta -0.9230** -1.1622*** -0.9944** -1.1485*** -1.0534**
M Total risk -5.0160
O'I FP 1.1805 1.0373 1.5296 6.3697 O'I .... Adj. R2 0.2526 0.0873 0.2784 0.2302 0.3192 0.2436 
F-stat 3.93** 1.83 3.51 ** 2.94** 4.05** 3.09** 
As previously, the strongest evidence for CSP-F AC relationships are found in the 
governance category. Risk coefficients are significant and negative in both periods, and 
financial performance coefficients are significant and positive in the 2000-2003 period. 
Hence, a significant portion of the variation in governance performance is explained by the 
combination of F AC variables, of which risk and financial performance are most important as 
explanatory variables. 
Estimating CSP-FAC Models Within Industry Groups 
Results from CSP-F AC model estimations within industry groups are presented in 
Table 5.7, and show that model estimates differ across industry groups. Whereas 
environmental performance-F AC models are estimated with poor fit within the full sample, 
the models estimated within industry groups exhibit significant F-statistics in the necessity 
services, lifestyle consumption and commercial goods and services groups. The necessity 
services group exhibits significant positive size coefficients (and a significant positive 
financial performance coefficient in the 1997-2000 period). The lifestyle consumption group 
exhibits significant negative financial performance coefficients, and the commercial goods 
and services group exhibits significant negative size and risk coefficients. Hence, a significant 
portion of variation in environmental performance is explained by F AC within about half the 
industry groups, where size appears to be most important when considered in combination 
with other F AC variables. 
When regressing social performance on FAC, significant model fit is only observed 
within the necessity services and technology groups. The necessity services group exhibits 
significant negative risk coefficients, and a significant positive financial performance 
coefficient for the 2000-2003 model. The technology group exhibits negative size 
coefficients. Hence, social performance is significantly explained by F AC variables within the 
necessity services group, where risk is most important in explaining social performance, and 
the technology group, where size is most important in explaining social performance. 
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Table 5. 7: Regressing CSP on FAC Within Industry Groups 
This table reports estimates for the model 
CSP;,J = B0 + B8 (size ; ) + Bv (b I m ; ) +  BR (risk ;,m ) + BFP (FP;,1 ) + e .
which is estimated based on individual company CSP and F AC measures within each industry 
group. The seven industry groups include commercial goods and services (COM), energy related 
industries (ENE), habit consumption industries (HAB), situational (lifestyle) consumption 
industries (LIF), materials (MAT), necessity services (NEC), and technology industries (TEC). 
CSP is measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 2003 . Size is 
measured by average monthly total market capitalisation (log), value is measured by average 
monthly book-to-market value, and risk is measured by standard deviation of monthly returns. The 
model is estimated using three different financial performance (FP) measures. Total shareholder 
return (TSR) is measured by annualised average monthly returns, Sharpe Ratio (SH) is measured 
by average monthly total excess return divided by standard deviation of monthly returns, and 
benchmark-adjusted performance (BAP) is measured by annualised average monthly abnormal 
return. This table reports estimated parameters only for the models with best fit, specifying which 
FP measure gives best fit in each model. Intercepts are not reported. All independent variables are 
measured over a full six-year period ( 1  August 1 997-1 July 2003), as well as two three-year 
periods ( 1  August 2000-1 July 2003 and 1 August 1 997-1 July 2000). Estimation results from 
models with environmental, social and governance performance as the dependent variable are 
reported in panels 1 ,  2 and 3, respectively. Statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent 
level is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
Panel 1: Environmental eer(prmance 
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BFP 
Ind. Period Bs Bv BR TSR SH BAP Adj. R2 F-stat 
97-03 -0.821 *** 0.819 0.170 3.26** 
COM 00-03 -0.710***
-0.437 -4.512**
-0.303 -5.066** 0.332 0.154 3.01 ** 
97-00 -0.627** -0.523 0.709 -0.609 0.089 1.79 
97-03 -0.456 -0.703 2.866 0.076 1.62 
ENE 00-03 0.857*** -0.479
-3.225
3.344 0.059 1.47 
97-00 0.409 -0.087 -2.536
-0.459
1.418 0.223 2.58* 
97-03 0.082 -0.107 -5.967 -1.340 -0.044 0.69 
HAB 00-03 0.088 -0.197 -0.235 0.582 0.39 
97-00 0.380 -0.145 -6.610 -1.408
-0.089
0.051 1.35 
97-03 -0.530 0.538 -5.071 -2.603* 0.365 3.73** 
LIF 00-03 -0.601 0.608 -5.955 -1.731* 0.289 2.93* 
97-00 -0.323 1.182 -2.879 -0.794 0.317 2.51 
97-03 -0.759** -0.459 0.042 1.41 
MAT 00-03 -0.454**
-0.047
0.105
-6.484
3.212 1.380** 0.125 2.32* 
97-00 -0.523 -0.066 -4.770 -0.494 0.000 1.00 
97-03 0.555** -0.135 2.468 1.118 0.210 2.99** 
NEC 00-03 0.570*** -0.281 4.785 0.458 0.217 3.08** 
97-00 0.727*** -0.259 -0.472 1.548** 0.474 5.96*** 
97-03 0.444** 0.100 0.706 0.190 0.066 1.64 
TEC 00-03 0.324* 0.118 0.661 -0.292 0.081 1.80 
97-00 0.402 0.597 0.300 0.636 0.088 1.46 
Panel 2: Social p_erfgrmance 
8FP 
Ind. Period 8s 8v BR TSR SH BAP Adj. R2 F 
97-03 -0.018 -0.370 -0.560 0.273 -0.066 0.32 
COM 00-03 -0.076 -0.400 -2.466 -0.299 -0.028 0.70 
97-00 0.330 -0.267 3.504 -0.281 -0.005 0.96 
97-03 0.283 -0.250 2.718 -1.032 -0.082 0.43 
ENE 00-03 0.103 -0.150 0.195 -0.719 -0.120 0.19 
97-00 1.301 *** -0.272 2.365 0.320 0.424 5.04*** 
97-03 0.072 -0.113 -10.635** -1.116 0.079 1.64 
HAB 00-03 0.002 -0.097 -4.874 0.870 0.000 1.00 
97-00 0.304 -0.339 -8.711 -0.640 0.037 1.25 
97-03 -0.440 -0.298 -1.569 -2.151 -0.072 0.68 
LIF 00-03 -0.430 -0.011 -0.830 -1.303 -0.038 0.83 
97-00 -0.536 -1.114 -3.248 -0.803 -0.081 0.76 
97-03 0.257* 0.110 0.033 0.364 0.055 1.54 
MAT 00-03 0.240* 0.081 0.512 0.260 0.014 1.13 
97-00 0.411 ** 0.409 -0.711 0.843 0.127 1.98 
97-03 0,038 -0.050 -6.167*** 1.642 0.407 6.15*** 
NEC 00-03 0.215 0.011 -4.472 1.469* 0.355 5.13*** 
97-00 0.021 -0.227 -6.342* ** 0.843 0.269 3.02** 
97-03 -0.313** 0.026 -0.203 0.229 0.293 4.72*** 
TEC 00-03 -0.263* 0.017 0.396 0.032 0.280 4.50*** 
97-00 -0.237 -0.441 -3.347 -0.976 0.067 1.34 
Panel 3: Qovernance u.erfprmance 
8FP 
Ind. Period 8s 8v 8R TSR SH BAP Adj. R2 F 
97-03 -0.002 0.036 -1.544 -0.005 -0.077 0.22 
COM 00-03 -0.110 -0.329 -1.029 0.536 -0.037 0.60 
97-00 0.187 0.077 0.352 0.391 -0.085 0.38 
97-03 -0.180 0.211 -8.472*** -0.565 0.199 2.87** 
ENE 00-03 -0.222 0.095 -7.886*** -0.523 0.260 3.63** 
97-00 0.522* -0.195 -2.394 -0.829 0.143 1.92 
97-03 0.060 -0.362 -4.945* -0.009 0.159 2.42* 
HAB 00-03 O.oI 1 -0.108 -4.596* -1.339* -0.001 0.99 
97-00 0.193 -0.972** -6.466* -0.637 0.246 3.12** 
97-03 -0.918** -0.446 -10.457*** -0.679 0.386 3.99** 
LIF 00-03 -0.822** -0.061 -14.454*** -0.752 0.345 3.50** 
97-00 -0.908** -0.581 -8.984*** -2.085** 0.570 5.31 ** 
97-03 -0.076 -0.018 -1.919 -0.482 0.133 2.42* 
MAT 00-03 -0.036 0.006 -1.182 -0.046 0.147 2.59* 
97-00 0.099 0.241 -0.825 -0.303 0.085 1.63 
97-03 -0.198 0.041 -3.051 1.801 * 0.144 2.26* 
NEC 00-03 -0.157 0.049 -3.592 1.478** 0.208 2.97** 
97-00 -0.203 0.193 -0.165 -0.589 0.068 1.40 
97-03 0.533*** 0.045 -2.364** 0.068 0.158 2.69** 
TEC 00-03 0.530*** 0.063 -1.842* -0.038 0.026 1.24 
97-00 0.299 0.268 -5.208** -0.225 0.223 2.37* 
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When regressing governance performance on F AC significant model fit is observed 
within all groups except commercial goods and services. Risk coefficients are significant and 
negative within the energy-related, habit consumption, lifestyle consumption and technology 
groups. The size coefficients are significant and negative in the lifestyle consumption group, 
and significant and positive in the technology group. Only the financial performance 
coefficients are significant, and positive, within the necessity services group. Hence, 
significant portions of the variation in governance performance are explained by F AC 
variables within most industry groups. Risk is most important in explaining governance 
performance when evaluated in combination with other F AC variables, followed by size in 
the lifestyle and technology groups and financial performance in the necessity services group. 
Estimating CSP-FAC Models With and Without Fixed Industry Effects 
Results from estimating CSP-F AC models using individual company observations, 
with and without industry dummy variables, are presented in Table 5.8. Results indicate that 
both the environmental performance-F AC and social performance-F AC models are 
significantly improved by including fixed industry effects, but that the governance 
performance-F AC models are not improved. This suggests that industry classification does 
matter in terms of companies' environmental and social performance levels, but not in terms 
of companies' governance performance levels, which is more pervasive. 
In the environmental performance-F AC models, the materials and technology 
groups exhibit significantly lower environmental performance compared to the reference 
group (the commercial goods and services group). In the social performance-F AC models, the 
lifestyle consumption, habit consumption and materials groups exhibit significantly lower 
social performance compared to the reference group. There are no fixed industry group effects 
in the governance performance-F AC models, and the model is not improved by including 
industry group dummies. 
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Table 5. 8: Estimating an Extended CSP-FAC Model With and Without Industry Group Fixed 
Effects 
This table displays parameters estimated in the model 
CSP;,1 = 'Po +  'PENE (ENE;) + 'PHAB(HAB;) + 'PLJF (LIF;) + 'PcMAr(MA T;) +
'PNEc (NEC;) + 'PrEc (TEC;) + (/J8 (size; ) + <A, (b /  m; ) + 'PR (risk; m) + 'PFP(FP; 1) + e; , , 
which is estimated based on individual company CSP and F AC, as well as industry group 
classification. CSP is measured by average monthly ratings between 1 August 2001 and 1 July 2003. 
All financial variables are measured over a full six-year period (1 August 1 997-1 July 2003), as well 
as two three-year periods (1 August 2000- 1 July 2003 and 1 August 1 997-1 July 2000). Industry 
variables are (0, 1 )  dummy variables indicating industry group classification. Industry groups include 
commercial goods and services (reference group for which ¢0 is the intercept), energy related 
industries (ENE), habit consumption industries (HAB), situational (lifestyle) consumption industries 
(LIF), materials (MAT), necessity services (NEC), and technology industries (TEC). The 
commercial goods and services industry group is the references group. Size is measured by average 
monthly total market capitalisation (log), book-to-market value (b/m) is measured by average 
monthly value, and risk is measured by standard deviation of monthly returns. The model is 
estimated using three different financial performance (FP) measures. Total shareholder return (TSR) 
is measured by annualised average monthly returns, Sharpe Ratio (SH) is measured by average 
monthly total excess return divided by standard deviation of monthly returns, and benchmark­
adjusted performance (BAP) is measured by annualised average monthly abnormal return. This table 
reports estimated parameters only for the models with best fit, specifying which FP measure gives 
best fit in each model. Models are estimated both with and without fixed effects ( or dummy 
variables). Estimation results for models with environmental, social and governance performance as 
the dependent variable are provided in panels 1 ,  2 and 3, respectively. Models are estimated both 
with and without fixed industry group effects (dummy variables), and fixed effects (model 
improvement) is tested for by using an F-test which is also provided. Statistical significance at the 
90, 95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, * * and * * *, respectively. 
Panel 1 :  Environmental performance 
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Coefficients 1997-2003 2000-2003 1997-2000 
'Po 4.771 *** 5.398*** 4.721 *** 5.300*** 3.561 *** 4.036*** 
'PENE -0.688**
'PHAB 
-0.388
0.258
-0.319
0.273 0.064 
'PLIF -0.213 -0.21 -0.381
'PMAT -0.688*** -0.611 ** -0.953***
'PNEC 0.086 0.063 -0.143
�TEC -0.435* -0.510** -0.701 **
'Ps -0.177 -0.230** -0.165 -0.218** -0.058 -0.073
¢,v -0.113 -0.106 -0.114 -0.108 -0.092 -0.142
'PR -2.805** -2.632** -3.091 ** -2.605** -1.968* -1.367
TSH 
'PFP SH -0.476 -0.299 0.7476 0.558 
BAP 0.176 0.317 
0.016 0.07 0.015 0.062 0.008 0.084 
1.94 2.75*** 1.88 2.54*** 1.34 2.53*** 
Adj. R2 
F-stat
F-test of fixed effects 3.21 *** 2.92*** 3.25*** 
Panel 2: Social 12.er(prmance 
Coefficients 1997-2003 2000-2003 1997-2000 
</Jo 3.833*** 2.989*** 3.594*** 2.921 *** 1.359 0.409 
<PENE -0.248 -0.226 -0.484*
<PHAB -0.469** -0.423* -0.549**
<PLIF -0.965*** -0.949*** -1.247***
<PMAT -0.608**
<PNEC 
-0.407*
0.276
-0.403*
0.297 0.214 
fP._TEC -0.145 -0.124 -0.402
</Js -0.038 0.019 -0.016 0.027 0.240** 0.297***
</Jv -0.070 -0.048 -0.099 -0.086 -0.087 -0.045
<PR -2.728*** -2.275** -1.659 -1.122 -0.770
<PFP TSH 0.099 
-1.869*
0.049
SH -0.070 0.055 
BAP 0.295 0.225 
0.093 0.009 0.100 0.017 0.187 0.062 
3.38*** 1.55 3.58*** 2.01 * 4.82*** 3.73***
Adj.R 
F-stat
F-test of fixed effects 4.49*** 4.50*** 5.16***
Panel 3: Governance f2er(prmance 
Coefficients 1997-2003 2000-2003 1997-2000 
</Jo 4.266*** 4.193*** 3.703*** 3.615*** 2.231*** 2.357*** 
<PENE -0.313 -0.270 -0.345
<PHAB -0.118 -0.047
<PLIF 
<PMAT 
-0.003
0.037
-0.004
0.054
<PNEC -0.087 -0.080
fP._TEC -0.109 -0.135
</Js -0.093 -0.095 -0.051 -0.049 0.079 
</Jv -0.137 -0.132 -0.148* -0.140*
-0.078
0.310
0.034
0.068
0.170
0.097
0.094 0.079 
<PR -4.212*** -4.152*** -2.955*** -2.962*** -2.222** -2.026**
(pFP TSH 
SH 0.603* 0.640** -0.332 -0.197
BAP 0.291 0.291 
0.100 0.109 0.087 0.099 0.043 0.044 
3.58*** 8.08*** 3.22*** 7.34*** 1.75* 2.91 **
Adj.R 
F-stat
F-test of fixed effects 0.62 0.52 0.45 
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Results imply that hypotheses H4. 10 and H4.20 are rejected, and that hypothesis 
H4.3o is rejected for environmental and social performance, but not for governance 
performance. While a combination of size, book-to-market value, financial performance and 
risk explains significant cross-sectional variation in CSP, this ability does differ across 
industry groups, and fixed industry effects are present in the environmental and social 
performance categories. Within the full sample, F AC are best explained by governance 
performance, to a lesser extent by social performance, but are not well explained by 
environmental performance. Some evidence is found of a negative relationship between 
environmental performance and size, risk and financial performance and some evidence is 
found of a negative relationship between social performance and risk. Strong evidence is 
found of a negative relationship between governance performance and risk and a positive 
relationship between governance performance and financial performance. Within the industry 
groups, environmental performance is most importantly explained by size where model fit is 
good, social performance is only well explained by F AC within the necessity services and 
technology services, and governance performance is well explained by F AC in most industry 
groups. 
5.1.5 The Ability of CSP to Add Explanatory Power to a Conventional Asset
Pricing Model 
The ability of CSP to add explanatory power to a Fama and French ( 1992) type asset 
pricing model is investigated by estimating the a model with and without including CSP 
variables among the explanatory variables. Pairs of models are tested for statistical 
improvement using the F-test (similarly to the CSP-FAC models with fixed effects). Results 
are reported in Table 5.9. 
The basic three-factor asset pricing model is estimated with moderate model fit for 
the two three-year periods, where model fit is best over the 1997-2000 period. The basic 
model exhibits an adjusted R-squared value of 0.2 1  over the 2000-2003 period, which is 
improved to 0.34 when the three CSP variables are included. The F-test suggests that the 
extended model is statistically better than the basic model. This means CSP does add 
explanatory power to the basic three-factor asset pricing model, though only for the 2000-
2003 period. The basic model estimated over the 1997-2000 period is not improved by 
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including the CSP variables. In fact the adjusted R-squared value deteriorates once these are 
included, and the F-statistic for model improvement is not significant. 
Table 5.9: Estimating Three-Factor Asset Pricing Models With and Without CSP 
This table reports the results from estimating a three-factor asset pricing model, including
market beta, size and value, and an extended model which also includes CSP measures for
environment, social and governance performance. The extended model is specified 
ER; = 1]0 + 17p(/JM,;) + 1Js(size) + 1Jv(value) + 1JENV(CSl1,NV, ;) + 1Jsoc(CS1'soc,; ) + 1JGOv(CSPGOv,; )  + e; 
where ER is excess return and the explanatory variables include market beta (measured in a
three-factor Jensen alpha model), size (measured by log of total market capitalisation), book­
to-market value (measured by book-to-market value), environmental performance, social
performance and corporate governance performance, respectively. Estimation is based on a
set of 27 CSP-sorted portfolios. The model is estimates using CSP variables measured over
the 1 August 200 1 - 1  July 2003 period, and the other variables are measured in turn over the 1 
August 2000- 1 July 2003 and 1 August 1 997-1 July 2000 periods. Extended models are tested
for significant specification improvement using the F-test. Statistical significance at the 90,
95 and 99 percent level is indicated by *, **  and ***, respectively. 
2000-2003 1997-2000 
Basic Extended Basic Extended 
Coefficients model model model model 
Adj. R2 0.21 1 0  0.3439 0.3532 0.2867 
F-statistic 3.32**  3.27**  5.73 ***  2.74**  
1/0 0.0926 0.3639 1 .0395 1 .0354 
,, /3 -0.0489 -0.0703* 0.2063**  0.2473**
1/S 0.0064 -0.0490 -0. 1 1 59 -0. 1 37 1  *
1/v -0. 1 527 -0.0620 -0. 1449 -0. 1 509
1/ENV -0.0195 0.0048 
1/SOC 0.0339 0.0286 
1/GOV 0.0454* 0.0 1 92 
F-test for model 
2.55* 0.29 improvement 
The estimated coefficients convey some useful information. None of the coefficients 
are significant for the basic model estimated over the 2000-2003 period, but the beta 
coefficient becomes significant in the extended model (though it is small). Interestingly, the 
coefficient has a negative sign. This would be expected, or at least not surprising, during 
certain periods when high-beta companies are going through a period of low returns. The 
governance performance coefficient is significant and positive, indicating that governance 
performance explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in excess return. 
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The basic model estimated over the 1997-2000 period exhibits a significant positive beta 
coefficient, which means that high-beta companies are experiencing high returns during this 
period. The size coefficient becomes significant once the model is extended by the CSP 
variables, and is negative as expected. None of the CSP variables exhibit significant slope 
coefficient in this model. Results imply that hypothesis H5o is rejected, but only when using 
2000-2003 data. CSP does add explanatory power to the cross-sectional three-factor asset 
pricing model over the 2000-2003 period, but not over the 1997-2000 period. 
5.2 Discussion 
5.2.1 Summary of Tested Hypotheses 
All hypotheses are rejected in their general forms. There are significant cross­
sectional correlations between ranks of CSP and F AC measures, and these differ between 
samples based on company size, trading history and industry classification. Portfolios with 
high, moderate and low CSP exhibit different F AC. CSP explains significant cross-sectional 
variation in F AC and this ability differs across industry groups. A combination of size, book­
to-market value, financial performance and risk explains significant cross-sectional variation 
in CSP, and again this ability differs across industry groups. Fixed industry effects are present 
in full-sample models in the environmental and social performance categories. Finally, CSP 
adds explanatory power to the cross-sectional three-factor asset pricing model over the 2000-
2003 period. 
Among the CSP measures, more significant relationships are found between 
governance performance and FAC, fewer significant relationships are found between social 
performance and F AC, and very few significant relationships are found between 
environmental performance and F AC. Strong and consistent evidence exists of a negative 
relationship between CSP and risk, which is strongest in the governance category, followed 
by the social category. Governance performance is strongly and positively related to financial 
performance. This evidence is robust across full-sample analyses, and is strongest among 
recently-listed companies and companies in the necessity services industry group. Weaker 
similar evidence is found for the social category. 
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The relationship between size and environmental and social performance is specific 
to type of company, in terms of size, trading history and industry group, whereas the 
relationship between size and governance performance is evident only across a fuller 
spectrum of companies and is not specific to company size, trading history and industry 
group. Weak evidence of a negative relationship is found between governance performance 
and book-to-market value within the full sample analyses. Evidence of fixed industry group 
effects when environmental and social performance is regressed on CSP, but not when 
governance performance is regressed on CSP, further strengthens the evidence that 
environmental and social performance is contingent on industry-specific factors, whereas 
governance performance is contingent on other factors that are not specific to industry 
classification. 
5.2.2 Discussion of Findings 
The evidence presented here provides important insights into the relationship 
between CSP and F AC. Significant patterns are found in terms of investment style and in 
terms of financial performance and risk. 
CSP and Style Characteristics 
The evidence presented here indicates that there is an overall positive association 
between size and governance performance, and that industry-specific characteristics are not 
important in explaining governance performance. This could be interpreted as supporting the 
'slack resources hypothesis' or 'available funds hypothesis' suggested by Preston and 
O'Bannon ( 1997) and Waddock and Graves ( 1997a), respectively. However, as discussed in 
Section 2.4.3, it makes better intuitive sense that this relationship is caused by a positive 
relationship between organisational complexity and governance performance. Hence, size 
itself is likely to be the important factor in determining governance performance, rather than 
the ability to spend on particular activities. The fact that this relationship appears to be 
independent of industry group classification also makes intuitive sense. While it is likely that 
particular industries are prone to particular controversies driving demand and supply of 
183 
environmental and social performance, expectations of governance performance are perhaps 
less likely to be dependent on industry. 
Contrary to governance performance, environmental and social performance is 
contingent on industry as well as size, although possibly for different reasons from 
governance performance. The evidence of significant industry fixed effects in cross-sectional 
CSP-F AC regression models confirms the importance of industry in explaining environmental 
and social performance. The link between size and environmental and social performance is 
also dependent on industry, indicating that large companies achieve higher environmental and 
social performance in some industries, but that small companies achieve higher performance 
in others. This is further supported by the fact that very large and very small companies tend 
to perform better on social and environmental criteria than moderately sized companies. 
When very large companies outperform moderately sized companies this may well be 
evidence of the 'slack resources' and 'available funds' hypotheses. When very small 
companies outperform moderately sized companies this is more likely to be explained by the 
fact that very small companies are likely to operate within particular niches which gives these 
companies a comparative advantage in achieving CSP. This appears to be the case within the 
commercial goods and services industries, where there is a negative relationship between size 
and environmental performance, and within the technology industries, where there is a 
negative relationship between size and social performance. 
This has implications for the investment style of SRI funds. If the constituency of 
SRI funds reflects CSP (which may or may not be the case, although there should be a very 
strong link), investment style will depend on the specific criteria on which the constituent 
firms are selected. Emphasis on governance issues will likely result in a portfolio dominated 
by large companies. Emphasis on environmental and social issues is however more likely to 
result in a portfolio of both very large companies, which possibly achieve high CSP because 
they can afford to be philanthropic, and very small companies that operate within particular 
niches. Furthermore, emphasis on environmental and social issues is likely to result in 
portfolios that are over-exposed to certain industries and under-exposed to others.45
45 This could be counteracted by the popular 'best-of-sector' approach, which selects the best performing 
companies of each sector to maintain appropriate diversification (The Allen Consulting Group, 2000). 
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Some evidence is found of a negative relationship between governance performance 
and book-to-market value within the full sample analyses (but book-to-market value appears 
to be unrelated to environmental and social performance). This is consistent with evidence 
provided by Cochran and Wood ( 1984) and Pava and Krausz ( 1996), although they use a 
composite CSP measure rather than a specific measure of governance performance. This 
evidence supports the arguments provided by Ruf et al. (2001), who suggest CSP is linked to 
valuable implicit contracts. Governance performance may be linked to valuable assets that are 
not accounted for on the balance sheet, hence this could link to valuable reputation, 
organisational capital or other intangibles. 
This in turn suggests that SRI portfolios that are selected based on governance 
performance may exhibit value rather than growth characteristics. Such portfolios are, 
however, not likely to exhibit particular value or growth characteristics if selected based on 
environmental or social performance. 
Financial Performance and Risk 
The present study provides evidence that governance performance is strongly and 
positively related to financial performance. This evidence is robust across full-sample 
analyses, and is concentrated among recently-listed companies, large companies and 
companies in the necessity services industry group. Similar but weaker evidence is found for 
social performance. This is interpreted as being particularly supportive of the 'good 
management theory' proposed by Waddock and Graves ( 1997a), suggesting that CSP is an 
indicator of quality of management. This is because quality of management is likely to be 
particularly well reflected in governance performance (more so than in environmental and 
social performance as such). If so, the 'good management theory' appears to hold particularly 
strongly among recently listed companies, large companies and the group of companies that 
include banks, diversified financials, insurance and telecommunications companies, and 
among recently listed companies. 
Corporate governance may be particularly important to recently listed companies 
because these cannot depend on long track-records of good management and financial 
performance. Recently listed companies therefore need to convince their investors, suppliers 
and customers that they can be relied upon ( or that the implicit contracts they hold with 
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stakeholders are valuable), and must pursue the strategies available to them in order to lower 
the perceived risk of buying from, supplying to or investing in these companies. Governance 
may be particularly important to the success of large companies because they face higher 
expectations of governance than small companies.46 Lastly, governance may be particularly
important to banks, diversified financials, insurance and telecommunications companies 
because these companies produce high-credence services. Stakeholders are likely to rely 
heavily on reputation and other factors that can lower perceived risk. High governance 
performance may therefore be important to gain competitive advantage within these markets. 
It is worth noting, in this respect, that the companies within this industry group are very large 
compared to the constituents of other industry groups. This may indicate a link between the 
fact that size and industry matters in determining the strength of a governance performance­
financial performance relationship. 
Further strength to the good management theory is provided by the very strong and 
consistent evidence of a negative relationship between CSP and risk, which is also stronger in 
the governance category compared to the other categories. This evidence is robust across 
various samples, and is not contingent on size, trading history or industry. Note that this 
relationship is strong for all CSP measures, including environmental and social performance, 
although it is strongest for governance performance. 
This evidence is useful to managers, investors, SRI fund managers and regulators. 
To corporate managers, this evidence suggests that the pursuit of corporate governance and 
excellence in management may be justified as a strategy for furthering the objective of wealth 
maximisation. The pursuit of social performance may be justified similarly, but there is little 
evidence that the pursuit of environmental performance is positively related to financial 
performance (although there is a negative relationship between environmental performance 
and risk). Investors may consider CSP to contain useful information, and would in particular 
be justified in selecting companies with high governance and social performance, even for 
pure financial wealth-maximising reasons. To SRI fund managers, this provides good reason 
to continue to offer such products to investors, since they add value to investors financially 
(as well as morally). Finally, regulators may use this evidence as an indication that good 
46 Note that the relationship between governance performance and financial performance is also significant 
among large companies when financial performance is adjusted by size. 
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governance 1s a market-driven virtue and that the need for intervention is limited. 
Environmental and social issues are not so clearly market-driven virtues, and that negative 
externalities of production may need to be managed by regulators in certain markets where 
the costs of environmental and social performance outweigh the benefits. 
In sum, relationships between governance performance and financial characteristics 
are much more easily detected than relationships between social and environmental 
performance and financial characteristics. These latter relationships appear to be rather 
elusive, and are not explained well by the existing theories provided in the literature. They 
appear to be very prone to contingencies, which are likely to be very specific to industry-type 
characteristics. 
Comparing New and Existing Evidence 
The evidence provided in the present study is consistent with the existing literature 
in a general sense. Governance performance is most strongly related to financial performance 
and other financial characteristics. The most consistent results in the empirical literature are 
also found between governance performance and financial characteristics (although most of 
these studies concern particular events associated with governance). The strong evidence of a 
negative relationship between CSP and risk is also consistent with existing empirical 
evidence. This suggests that an important source of the inconsistencies in reported CSP-size 
and CSP-financial performance relationships is identifiable contingency factors, related to 
firm size, trading history and industry factors. These contingency factors are particularly 
important when investigating relationships between environmental performance and social 
performance. This evidence therefore supports the suggestions made by Chen and Metcalf 
(1980), Herremans, Akathaporn and Mcinnes (1993), Marcus and Goodman (1986), Rowley 
and Berman (2000) and Ullman (1985), in terms of the importance of CSP-F AC contingency 
factors, and is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Herremans, Akathaporn and 
Mclnnes (1993) and Spencer and Taylor (1987). The evidence provided in the present study is 
however unique in testing and demonstrating that CSP-F AC relationships are also contingent 
on company size and trading history. 
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5.2.3 Limitations of the Study and Areas of Future Research 
The present study is subject to some limitations. These have been mentioned 
throughout Chapter 4 where relevant, and are summarised here. 
The included sample is representative of the companies covered in the 
S&P/ASX300 Index (which consists of the constituents of the S&P/ASX200 and S&P/ASX 
Small Ordinaries indices). The portion of these companies covered in the S&P/ASX200 Index 
are best represented in this sample, since only some companies included in the S&P/ ASX 
Small Ordinaries are covered in the Corporate Monitor CSP dataset. The representativeness of 
the included sample is limited by ( 1) the fact that only those companies with adequate 
coverage are included and (2) that the smaller subset of the CSP dataset is subjectively 
selected for inclusion by Corporate Monitor. The included sample is however representative 
of the largest and most frequently traded companies in the Australian market. 
The usefulness and validity of the CSP data used in the analysis are subject to some 
limitations. Quantitative measurement of CSP is inherently subjective and will vary across 
data providers. A comparison between the CSP data from Corporate Monitor and alternative 
CSP data from Reputation Management indicates that, although ratings are somewhat 
different, especially in terms of rating methodology, format and distribution, there is some 
level of agreement between these rating agencies. The CSP data used here are therefore 
accepted as being Corporate Monitor's interpretation of Australian companies' CSP. Research 
findings therefore relate specifically to the rating criteria used by Corporate Monitor. Lastly, 
many companies have incomplete CSP rating series. While this is a limitation, possible 
consequences are attempted minimised by augmenting data series where appropriate and by 
setting criteria for how much missing data are acceptable. 
The financial data used in the analysis are also subject to some limitations. Firstly, 
the time period over which companies' F AC can be measured is limited. Even within the six­
year sample period, which is a relatively short investment horizon, many companies are not 
provided with FAC measures for the first part of the period. This means research findings 
based on 1997-2000 financial data are not as reliable as research findings based on 2000-2003 
data. Secondly, four companies with outlier return observations are omitted from some parts 
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of the analysis. This is a limitation because some data are lost in those parts of the analysis. 
However, such omission is necessary for producing useful and reliable results. Thirdly, there 
are several approaches to measuring F AC. Although the F AC variables included in the 
present study are selected because they are consistent with contemporary conventions in the 
evaluation of financial assets, it is possible that other variables would convey information that 
is not conveyed by the included F AC measures. Moreover, there are several approaches to the 
actual measurement of the included variables. 
Jensen alphas and market betas are only included in the analysis where CSP-sorted 
portfolio observations are used, hence parts of the analysis do not include these measures. 
Although other financial performance and risk measures are included, the fact that a good 
measure of systematic market risk is omitted from parts of the analysis is a limitation. This is 
however a consequence of the sample size. The benchmark-adjusted performance measures 
are subject to some limitations because they are calculated using benchmark portfolios that 
are smaller that what might be desired. Again, this is a consequence of sample size and, given 
the limited size of the Australian market, little can be done to remedy this problem. 
Jensen alphas, market betas and asset pricing models are estimated based on the 27 
CSP-sorted portfolios. If CSP was not such an important issue in the present study these 
portfolios should arguably be sorted based on financial criteria, so as to construct portfolios 
that are more homogeneous in terms of F AC. Hence, a limitation exists in that the CSP-sorted 
portfolios might not be as homogeneous in terms of F AC as desirable. However, portfolio 
homogeneity in CSP is in this context more important than portfolio homogeneity in F AC. 
Lastly, the approach to constructing the industry groups required for the present 
study is to some extent subjective. The method employed here follows the suggestions 
provided by Rowley and Berman (2000) and in the consumer behaviour literature (Andersen 
& Philipsen, 1998; Jacoby & Kaplan, 1989; Lawson et al., 1996). Ideally, the use of pure 
industry classifications would render such additional classification unnecessary, but this is 
impossible here due to the uneven distribution of companies across the GICS industry groups, 
and due to the small number of constituent companies within some industry groups. Hence, 
the industry classification approach used here is the best possible approach given these 
limitations. 
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In sum, the sample included in the analysis is representative of the Australian market 
considering its limited size, covering the majority of large and frequently traded companies. 
The size of the sample is large enough to enable reliable estimation of Jensen alphas, market 
betas and portfolio-based regression models, but a larger sample size would improve the 
quality of the analysis further. Although the CSP data are inherently subjective to some 
extent, it has been demonstrated that the CSP data used in the analysis are comparable to 
alternative data sources both in terms of rating criteria and actual company ratings. 
Contingency factors related to industry, firm size and trading history are identified and, 
although the methodology involved in this task is subjective to some extent and may be 
approached differently, this type of approach presents a significant contribution to the existing 
CSP literature. 
The present study presents many interesting areas of future research. First and 
foremost, the evidence presented here requires explanation. The question of how and why 
CSP-financial characteristics relationships exist has been explored to some extent from a 
theoretical perspective. It is perhaps time to search for evidence of why such relationships 
exist. In particular, future research could attempt to explain why there is a such a strong 
positive relationship between governance performance and risk, why there is a negative 
relationship between CSP and risk, and why relationships between social and environmental 
performance and financial characteristics are so elusive. 
Other more technical and peripheral areas of research are also indicated. Firstly, 
because CSP-F AC relationships may be sensitive to the time-period over which they are 
measured, it is important to continually track the CSP-financial characteristics relationships in 
order to obtain evidence of how robust such relationships are over time. Secondly, research 
into the properties of SRI funds is indicated. For example, an analysis of how the constituents 
of SRI funds differ from those of conventional funds, in terms of CSP, would provide useful 
insight into the actual properties of such funds (that is, are they really different in terms of 
CSP?). Thirdly, the industry-specific analyses provided in the present study indicate that more 
specific similar approaches could yield clearer and more useful evidence of how industry­
specific factors affect CSP-financial characteristics relationships. Lastly, the evidence 
provided here could also be used as a basis for more specific research on self-regulation 
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within industries, and the extent to which negative environmental and social externalities of 
production are internalised and corrected by market forces. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The emergence of an extensive literature on CSR, followed by the advent of publicly 
available CSP measures, suggests that the contemporary firm is expected to pursue CSP as well 
as financial performance as part of the corporate objective function. The question of whether and 
why managers should be expected to pursue CSP has been debated for more than a century from 
various perspectives. The present study has approached this debate from a financial asset 
perspective, investigating how CSP and financial characteristics are related. 
Although evidence of a relationship between CSP and financial characteristics has 
been sought with vigour since the early 1970s, findings are largely inconsistent. The existing 
literature is also wrought with several problems, including an overwhelming bias towards U.S. 
evidence, small samples representative of only very large companies, use of inappropriate 
measures of CSP and financial performance, and the assumption that CSP-financial 
characteristics relationships are homogeneous across all firms. The identified empirical literature, 
consisting of 55 studies, was critically analysed in search for possible patterns between the use of 
particular data or methods and reported findings. No such patterns were discovered, suggesting 
that the explanation to the inconsistency in reported findings lies elsewhere - possibly in the fact 
that CSP-financial characteristics relationships are not unique but contingent on certain factors. 
The present study makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by 
providing much needed Australian evidence and investigating a large sample of 237 companies 
covering a wide spectrum. The analysis employs publicly available CSP measures sourced from 
an independent agency, covering three separate issues (environmental impact, social impact and 
corporate governance), measures of financial characteristics that are consistent with contemporary 
conventions in the evaluation of financial assets. Lastly, the methodology employed allows for 
important sources of heterogeneity in CSP-financial characteristics relationships linked to size, 
trading history and industry. 
These efforts have been rewarded by the discovery of important evidence of CSP and 
financial characteristics among Australian firms. Among measures of environmental, social and 
governance performance, the strongest and clearest patterns between CSP and financial 
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characteristics are found usmg governance performance measures. Relationships between 
environmental and social performance and financial characteristics are much more elusive, and 
are contingent on industry-specific factors and size. 
Evidence of a positive relationship between governance performance and size is found 
when a wide spectrum of companies is considered. It is suggested here that this may be evidence 
of a link between organisational complexity and governance performance. Environmental and 
social performance is highest for very small and very large companies, and it is suggested here 
that this occurs because social and environmental performance is an expensive luxury that may 
only be enjoyed by very large companies, or by some very small companies that specialise in 
highly specific niche markets where high social or environmental performance is a fortunate by­
product of core operations. 
Evidence is presented of a positive relationship between governance performance and 
financial performance, which is particularly strong among recently listed companies, large 
companies and within the industry group containing banks, diversified financials, insurance 
companies and telecommunications companies. This is interpreted as supportive of the 'good 
management hypothesis' , positing that CSP and financial performance are positively related 
because CSP indicates quality of management. It is suggested here that governance performance 
is a particularly good indicator of the quality of management. The very strong negative 
relationship between CSP (particularly governance performance) and risk gives further support to 
the 'good management hypothesis'. 
Good governance is suggested to be particularly important to the success of recently 
listed companies because they need to convince their stakeholders of their quality of management 
by other means than historical track-records and reputation, and to large companies because they 
face higher expectations of good governance than small companies. It is suggested that 
governance is particularly important to companies in the aforementioned industries because these 
companies provide high-credence services and can lower perceived risk by committing to good 
corporate governance. Relationships between environmental performance and social performance 
are more elusive than those between governance performance and financial performance and are 
somewhat dependent on industry-related factors, consistent with the hypothesis that CSP­
financial characteristics relationships are not unique. 
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This evidence is important to managers, investors, SRI fund managers and regulators. 
It is important to managers because it means they may justify the pursuit of governance 
performance by the fact that good governance is associated with lower risk and higher financial 
performance. On the other hand, it implies that managers in general should be wary of pursuing 
environmental performance (and to a lesser degree social performance) as part of a wealth­
maximising corporate strategy, since the effectiveness of such a strategy is likely to be very 
specific to the type of company. 
This evidence is important to investors because it provides financial justification for 
selecting companies with high governance and social performance and avoiding companies with 
low governance and social performance. According to the evidence presented here, socially 
responsible investors do not need to sacrifice financial return for moral satisfaction. In fact, they 
are likely to gain financially on it. This evidence is naturally also important to SRI fund 
managers. High governance performance portfolios are likely to contain companies that are 
relatively large and have relatively low book-to-market value, that have low risk and perform well 
(meaning there should be no difficulty in marketing a good-governance portfolio). Portfolios 
selected on the basis of environmental and social performance could result in a 'mixed bag' of 
some wealthy large companies and some very small companies operating in very specific niche 
markets. 
Lastly, this evidence is important to regulators. The strong positive relationship 
between governance performance and financial performance suggests that governance 
performance is a market-driven virtue and that undue intervention may be unnecessary. On the 
other hand, social and particularly environmental performance is not always a profitable strategy, 
hence intervention may be necessary in certain markets. 
In sum, the present study contributes significantly by providing important Australian 
evidence of significant relationships between CSP and financial characteristics, and by 
demonstrating that CSP-financial characteristics research must adopt and further explore research 
methods that allows and searches for CSP-financial characteristics contingency factors. Such 
research is important because CSP and financial characteristics are related, and although the 
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present study presents important findings there is much that can be done to further improve our 
understanding of why and how such relationships occur. 
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8.3 Comparing CSP Ratings from Corporate Monitor Pty. Ltd. 
and Reputation Management Pty. Ltd. 
This section provides a detailed companson of the CSP data obtained from 
Corporate Monitor and Reputation Management. Section 4.1.3 is based on this material, 
which covers differences in rating methodology, rating format, and the statistical properties of 
the ratings awarded to a sample of companies covered by both rating agencies. 
The CSP data from Corporate Monitor and Reputation Management are constructed 
based on methodologies that have important differences. Whereas Reputation Management 
relies on self-reporting, Corporate Monitor construct ratings only from information available 
in the public domain. Reputation Management collaborate with various research groups 
representing various stakeholder perspectives, whereas Corporate Monitor construct CSP 
ratings mainly from an investor perspective without such collaboration. The fact that 
Corporate Monitor rate companies from an SRI perspective implies that ratings are likely to 
be influenced by common investment screens that are placed on SRis and managed SRI 
funds. Traditional screening criteria include involvement in alcohol, tobacco and gaming, 
hence these are part of the rating criteria used by Corporate Monitor when measuring social 
performance. Reputation Management does not place particular importance on such 
traditional SRI screens, and do not include involvement in alcohol, tobacco and gaming as 
part of their rating criteria. 
The Reputation Management CSP ratings are published once a year, whereas 
Corporate Monitor ratings are adjusted and published on a monthly basis. Rating format is 
also different, especially prior to the RepuTex 2003 ratings. Corporate Monitor provide 
ratings on a cardinal scale between one (low CSP) and five (high CSP). The Reputation 
Management 2000, 2001 and 2002 ratings are presented as ordinal ranks, which makes it 
difficult to compare the two datasets prior to 2003. The RepuTex 2003 ratings are however 
provided with a similar format to the Corporate Monitor ratings, and are provided on a 
cardinal scale between one (high CSP) and six (low CSP). Hence, this section compares 
Corporate Monitor ratings published between August 2001 and July 2003 and the RepuTex 
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Bosworth.and Kells' (1998) review of performance measures implies that the ideal 
performance measure is total rather than partial, and dynamic rather than static. Earlier 
discussions in Section 3.3.1 included the fundamental differences between accounting-based 
and market-based data. The most important difference between these two types of data is 
suggested to be that accounting-based data reflects only historical information whereas 
market-based data reflects expectations of future value creation. According to Bosworth and 
Kells (1998), only measures which takes into account both historical information (through 
accounting data) and expectations about future value creation (through market data) provide 
good measures of performance. Whereas accounting data does not reflect expectations, 
market data is likely to reflect both historical information and expectations of future value 
creation. Hence, it would seem that market-based performance measures are more complete 
than accounting-based performance measures. 
The performance measures included in the present study are mainly market-based, 
but include accounting information via book-to-market value. Hence, it is unlikely that 
important information (in a general sense) is not accounted for as a consequence of evaluating 
companies as financial assets, using the F AC measures included in the analysis. As Bosworth 
and Kells (1998) conclude, although different approaches to firm valuation are based on 
perspectives of the firm that are fundamentally different, alternative measures of total and 
dynamic performance measures are not so different in practice. 
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